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Abstract 
This thesis, a collection of three essays, focuses primarily on modelling conditional 
expectations and investigates the central research question: is the ex-ante market risk premium 
always positive?  
Many asset pricing studies have focused on testing linear restrictions imposed by asset 
pricing models and largely ignore another important restriction: the positivity of the market risk 
premium. Aiming to enhance our understanding in this area, the first essay applies a novel market-
based measure of conditional expected return, namely, the implied cost of capital, and examines 
whether or not the ex-ante risk premium is always positive. Employing economically meaningful 
information variables and a multiple inequality constraints framework, I find evidence that this 
positive condition is violated not only in the US, but also in other major international markets 
including Japan, Italy, and Germany. In stark contrast, when the realised return is used to proxy for 
the expected return, there is insufficient evidence against the hypothesis due to a high degree of 
noise embedded in the realised return proxy. Accordingly, I argue for the use of the implied cost of 
capital in modelling the time varying expected return. 
In the second essay, I further examine the positive risk premium hypothesis. Specifically, I 
introduce a new two-stage method, involving Principal Component Analysis and Boosted 
Regression Tree to model conditional expected return. With these techniques, I address potential 
pitfalls associated with existing methods of capturing the true identity of investors’ information 
sets, and how investors use the information in forming expectations. Consistent with the first 
essay’s finding, the positivity condition of the risk premium is violated in the US. Collectively, the 
evidence suggests the rejection of the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
The implied cost of capital is appealing in its own right, yet its validity as a proxy for 
conditional expected return is open to debate. Returning to this measure, the third study investigates 
when and to what extent this estimate deviates from true expectations. In a simulation study 
allowing for time varying discount rates, I find that due to the constant term structure assumption 
embedded in the research method, the variation of the implied cost of capital is significantly lower 
than that of the true expected return. This feature reveals that in a standard regression, the economic 
significance interpretation of the coefficient is no longer appropriate. Additionally, I show 
analytically that when analyst forecasts are biased and/or unable to capture the full information of 
cash flow expectations incorporated in the market price, the derived implied cost of capital is 
contaminated. Moreover, there exists a real issue regarding spurious regressions involving the 
implied cost of capital. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This thesis, a collection of three essays, focuses on modelling the conditional expected 
return and testing a central research question: 
“Is the ex-ante risk premium always positive?” 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
Understanding the risk-return trade-off is fundamental in finance. Intuitively, risk-averse 
and rational investors demand higher expected returns to compensate for taking on additional risk, 
leading to the ex-ante risk premium of aggregate wealth (i.e. the market portfolio) always being 
greater than, or equal to, zero. The positive risk premium ensures the mean-variance efficiency of 
the market portfolio; therefore it is a necessary condition for the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (Conditional CAPM). Merton (1980) argues that this restriction should be explicitly included 
as a necessary condition for capital market equilibrium. However, under the general stochastic 
discount framework (Harrison and Kreps (1979)), a negative risk premium can theoretically exist 
when the marginal rate of substitution is positively correlated with market returns. The equity 
market, by providing infinite claims in the future, can help investors hedge against adverse changes 
in the investment opportunity set. As this hedging component is desirable, investors demand lower 
expected returns, especially in states associated with high probability of a regime shift (Whitelaw 
(2000)). Despite the important nature of the positive risk premium in theoretical modelling, much 
less effort has been devoted to testing whether or not the condition is violated in the data. My thesis 
aims to fill this gap.  
As in any conditional asset pricing tests, operationalising this research question requires a 
tight and reliable proxy for the conditional expected return. However, modelling the conditional 
mean return is difficult (Merton (1980)), and existing methods have been subject to a number of 
criticisms.  
The first common approach estimates the conditional mean return by linearly projecting 
future returns onto a set of predetermined variables (see, for example, Campbell and Thompson 
(2008); Rapach, Strauss and Zhou (2010); and Welch and Goyal (2008)). However, since the 
identity of the investors’ information set is unobservable, various biases embedded in this 
methodology are likely to yield misleading inferences (see Ang and Bekaert (2007) for omitted 
variable biases; Foster, Smith and Whaley (1997) and Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2008) for data 
snooping bias). Additionally, a simple linear model is unlikely to capture a constantly changing 
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return data generating process, due to numerous information shocks from policy shifts, technology 
advancement, and institutional changes (Rapach, et al. (2010)). 
Realised return is another widely used estimate of expected return, motivated by the belief 
that in the long run, if positive and negative information surprises in asset returns cancel each other 
out, the realised return is an unbiased proxy for the expected return. However, the noise in asset 
returns is large so that it might have significant impact on average realised return, even after a long 
time (Elton (1999)). Lundblad (2007) confirms this observation by showing in simulation analysis 
that it requires a very long sample period, well beyond 100 years, for the detection of a meaningful 
risk-return trade-off. 
These criticisms highlight serious doubts about the construct validity of conditional asset 
pricing evidence. Elton (1999) emphasises in his American Finance Association presidential 
address that the quest for better measures of expected return and alternative ways of examining 
asset pricing models will yield a much better payoff than development of additional statistical tests 
that continue to rely on the realised return. My thesis follows this research agenda. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In the first essay, I employ the Implied Cost of Capital (ICC) method to model the expected 
return, and examine the positivity condition of the risk premium. The ICC is the internal rate of 
return that equates the firm’s stock price and present value of its future cash flows. Because the 
main inputs to compute the ICC are analyst earnings forecasts and stock prices, the ICC is forward- 
looking and does not assume that the information set observed by the economic agents is the same 
as that of the econometricians in forming expectations. Due to this appealing feature, the ICC has 
found increasing applications in both the accounting and the finance literature (see, for example, 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) on default risk; Pastor, Sinha and Swaminathan (2008) on risk-
return trade-off; Hwang, Lee, Lim and Park (2013) on probability of informed trading). I model the 
conditional expected return of the market portfolio alternatively as the value-weighted and equal-
weighted averages of individual firms’ ICCs. The market implied risk premium is obtained by 
subtracting long term government bond yields from the aggregate market ICC. To formally test the 
positivity condition of the risk premium, the implied measure is brought into the multiple inequality 
constraints testing framework developed by Boudoukh, Richardson and Smith (1993). The risk 
premium hypothesis is investigated in the context of G7 countries (the US, Canada, France, Italy, 
Germany, the UK, and Japan). 
In the second essay, I propose a new two-stage procedure, taking into account a large 
amount of information and a complex return data generating process, to model the conditional mean 
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return. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is performed in the first stage to find a set of common 
factors representing 160 financial variables from Ludvigson and Ng (2007) and Welch and Goyal 
(2008). By summarising a rich source of information into a small set of factors, I aim to span the 
investors’ information set and avoid the curse of dimensionality (Ludvigson and Ng (2007)). The 
set of predictors is incorporated in the second stage, in which I employ the regression tree technique 
developed in the machine learning literature (see Hastie, Friedman and Tibshirani (2009) for 
literature review) to capture the complex relation between the conditional risk premium and the 
information variables. Specifically, without imposing strong modelling assumptions, the unknown 
function is approximated by carving out the predictor space through a sequence of piece-wise 
constant models. Additionally, a final stable model is constructed by using additive expansions of 
the simple regression trees, a supervised learning process known as ‘boosting’, similar to that 
discussed in the forecast combination literature (Rapach, et al. (2010)). Finally, the risk premium 
estimated from the two-stage model is incorporated in the multiple inequality constraints 
framework, to investigate the positive risk premium hypothesis in the US market from 1970 to 
2012. 
 Although the ICC is intuitively attractive, its validity is subject to open debate. Coming 
back to this estimate in the third essay, I examine its validity as a proxy for the conditional expected 
return. In particular, a simulation study is conducted to investigate two aspects of measurement 
errors in the ICC. First, the primary focus is to understand how the constant term structure 
assumption embedded in the ICC methodology leads the mean and the variance of the ICC to 
deviate from those of the true expected return. The consequences of the deviation in the regression 
context, particularly related to the economic significance interpretation of the regression 
coefficients, are highlighted. Second, I extend the framework to a panel of firms and years to 
examine how measurement errors in cash flow forecasts, a critical input in calculating the ICC, can 
result in spurious regressions that involve the ICC as a proxy for the expected return. 
1.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In the first essay, when the ICC is used as a proxy for the expected return, the positivity 
restriction of the risk premium is violated in the US (S&P 500 market portfolio), Japanese, German, 
and Italian markets. In contrast, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the realised market 
returns are less than the risk free rate, with the exception of Germany, even though the realised risk 
premium has multiple instances of negativity in the sample period. Noise in the realised measure 
seems large, so it might obscure the true violation of the condition (Ostdiek (1998)). 
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In the second essay, I continue to find evidence against the positive risk premium hypothesis 
in the US market. Additionally, I show that the validity of the two-stage method in modelling the 
conditional expected return is justified through numerous specification tests. The superior 
performance, both statistically and economically, results from the technique ability in capturing the 
investors’ information identity and the complicated return data generating process. 
In the third essay, the simulation results suggest that the mean of the ICC and that of the true 
expected return are not significantly different from each other. Yet, the ICC variation seems to be 
significantly smoother than the true expected return variation. The lack of variation, resulting from 
the constant term structure assumption in the ICC method, can cause bias in the regression 
coefficient estimates, and thus leads researchers to invalidly interpret the economic significance of 
the relationship they examine. Further, when researchers aim to draw conclusions about the 
relationship between the expected return and the variables of interest from the regressions of the 
ICC on those variables, simulation evidence suggests that the analyst forecast errors can confound 
the inferences in such regressions. The confounding effects come from analyst forecasts being 
systematically biased and/or unable to capture the full cash flow expectations incorporated in the 
market price. 
1.4 CONTRIBUTION 
The first essay contributes by connecting important, yet unrelated, strands of the literature. 
The first strand focuses on the notion of risk-return trade-off. While a considerable segment of 
empirical work investigates the sign (see, for example, Pastor, et al. (2008); Ludvigson and Ng 
(2007); Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2005); or Rossi and Timmermann (2010)), the 
magnitude of the risk premium remains under-explored. This study, among a few, puts forward this 
restriction into direct empirical test (for example, Boudoukh, et al. (1993);Boudoukh, Richardson 
and Whitelaw (1997); Ostdiek (1998); and Walsh (2014)). Unlike previous studies, the positivity 
restriction is tested using a novel forward-looking measure of the expected return, the ICC. The 
second strand of literature centres on using the ICC as a measure of the expected return, yet mainly 
examines the cross-sectional properties of firms’/portfolios’ ICC. The study, among a few, 
examines the aggregate ICC (Pastor, et al. (2008); and Li, Ng and Swaminathan (2013)). I find 
evidence that the positive risk premium is violated not only in the US, but also in other large 
economies, which implies the rejection of the Conditional CAPM in those markets, consistent with 
findings documented in Lewellen and Nagel (2006). 
The contribution of the second essay lies in the new two-stage methodology in modelling 
the conditional expected return. The importance of addressing the identity of the investors’ 
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information set, along with the complex return data generating process, in estimating the first 
moment of return is emphasised by the superior predictive performance of the proposed model. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to apply the boosted regression tree, a state-of-the-
art methodology in the machine learning literature, in testing the positivity of risk premium 
hypothesis. The most similar paper to this essay is Rossi and Timmermann (2010), who also use 
this technique; however, they focus on testing the time varying risk-return trade-off. 
The proposed contributions in the final essay are threefold. First, I provide a convenient 
analytical framework, allowing for time varying structure in both cash flow expectations and 
discount rates. This lays a useful foundation for assessing and comparing the properties of the ICC 
and those of the true conditional expected return. Second, simulation conducted under this 
framework reveals that the ICC variation is significantly lower compared to that of the true 
expected return. This feature warns researchers that they can no longer validly interpret the 
economic significance from the regression coefficient that involves the ICC. Even though assessing 
statistical significance plays a major role in empirical research, judging economic significance is 
equally important (McCloskey and Ziliak (1996)). This is the first study to show such evidence. 
Finally, I go further than existing works in the ICC measurement error literature (for example, see 
Wang (2015)) by demonstrating analytically and through simulation that the measurement errors in 
analyst forecast errors can be transferred to the ICC estimates which, in turn, induces the threat of 
spurious regressions.1 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 present Essay 1, 
Essay 2, and Essay 3 respectively. Chapter 5 offers a conclusion of the thesis. 
                                                 
1 Existing studies simply describe or argue, without showing in analytical forms, that measurement errors in 
cash flow expectations can be transferred to the discount rate. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IS THE EX-ANTE RISK PREMIUM ALWAYS POSITIVE?  
A MARKET EXPECTATION PERSPECTIVE2 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Risk premium serves as a central theme in any asset pricing models. The idea that risk 
matters in determining expected return is intuitive and well-founded. If the marginal investors are 
strictly risk-averse and expected utility maximisers, they demand higher returns for investments that 
have a higher level of risk. As a result, the ex-ante market return should always exceed the risk free 
rate, leading to the positive risk premium. The positivity restriction is embedded as a necessary 
condition for the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (Conditional CAPM) because it ensures 
the mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio. This implies that violation of the restriction 
leads to the rejection of the Conditional CAPM. Furthermore, Merton (1980) supports that for 
equilibrium of the capital market, this condition should be explicitly incorporated as a necessary 
condition. 
However, this is not as definitive as it sounds. Theoretically, in more general equilibrium 
asset pricing models (Harrison and Kreps (1979); and Lucas (1978)), the existence of negative risk 
premium is possible when the market excess return is positively correlated with the marginal rate of 
substitution. Because the market, generally equity, has indefinite claims in the future, it can provide 
investors hedging ability against adverse shocks to the investment opportunity set, induced by high 
probable regime shifting states of the economy (Whitelaw (2000)). The investors, facing such 
desirable hedge, might require a lower rate of return even though the risk in those states is high. 
Adding to the complication, the vast quantity of empirical literature on the true intertemporal risk-
return relation is far from reaching a consensus. While some studies find a positive mean-variance 
trade-off (see, for example, Ludvigson and Ng (2007)), others find a negative relation (Guo and 
Whitelaw (2006)), and yet others document a highly non-linear structure (Glosten, Jagannathan and 
                                                 
2 Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the 7th International Accounting & Finance Doctoral 
Symposium, Trondheim Norway, June 2014; SIRCA Inaugural Young Researcher Workshop, Sydney 
Australia, July 2014; and UQ Workshop with Professor Murillo Campello (Cornell University), Brisbane 
Australia, August 2014. 
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Runkle (1993). In light of the inconclusive evidence, it is surprising that much less effort has been 
devoted to testing whether or not the sign restriction of the risk premium is violated in the data. 
There are a few exceptions including Boudoukh, et al. (1993), Ostdiek (1998), and Walsh (2014). In 
this essay, without relying on the realised return as in previous studies, I re-examine this restriction 
with a novel market-based measure of the conditional expected return, the Implied Cost of Capital 
(ICC). 
Asset pricing tests are replete with the use of the realised return as an empirical proxy for 
the expected return. Such a pragmatic approach is motivated by the belief that the realised return is 
an unbiased estimate of the expected return; if, in the long run, positive and negative information 
surprises in asset returns cancel each other out, the realised return closely matches the expected 
return. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe that this might be a poor proxy. First, noise 
in asset returns tends to be large, which could significantly reduce the power of empirical analyses 
(Sharpe (1978); and Black (1986)). Additionally, information surprises are either large by 
themselves or highly correlated so that the aggregate effect is large, which might have significant 
impacts on the average realised return, even after a long period of time (Elton (1999)). So how long 
does it take for the realised return to “catch up” with the expected return? Lundblad (2007) studies 
this question in the context of risk-return trade-off and finds that the required data span could be 
well beyond 100 years. Second, the realised return contains both information about changes in 
expected cash flows and changes in expected return. Chen, Da and Zhao (2013) show that cash flow 
news has significant and dominant impacts on driving both aggregate and firm level average stock 
returns, relative to expected return news. As a result, the average ex-post return might be 
contaminated by these cash flow shocks. Third, the inferences about the expected return may be 
counterintuitive for equity. For example, there was a long period, commencing in the early 1990s, 
during which the Japanese stock market realised returns are lower than the risk-free rate. Would 
anyone conclude that the Japanese stock market became less risky during this period, just because 
its expected return, as proxied by the realised return, was low? Intuitively, the stock market should 
be more risky because of its prolonged poor performance. 
All of these criticisms lead to one critical enquiry: if this proxy is so poor, the construct 
validity of existing empirical results is surely violated. Therefore, do these findings continue to hold 
under alternative proxies of the expected return? In his American Finance Association (AFA) 
presidential address, Elton takes the stand that looking for superior measures of the expected return, 
and different ways of testing asset pricing theories without using the realised return, will yield a 
much better outcome than developing further statistical tests that continue to rely on this noisy 
proxy. 
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Responding to these types of criticism, the ICC literature has developed. The ICC of a firm 
is the internal rate of return that equates to the firm’s market value and present value of its expected 
future cash flows. This is an attractive alternative proxy for the expected return on several counts. 
In contrast to the ex-post realised return, the ICC, directly derived from a firm’s stock price and 
cash flow forecasts, is forward-looking. As these primary inputs are determined by market 
participants, the ICC is the market-based measure of the time varying expected return and does not 
assume that the information set observed by the economic agents is the same as that of the 
econometricians in modelling the conditional expected return. Additionally, if the expected cash 
flows in the model truly capture the market expectation of the firm’s future cash flows, the 
remaining price variation is attributed to the change in the expected return. As a result, the ICC 
measure might be less, if not, contaminated by the cash flow news (Cochrane (2011); and Chen, et 
al. (2013)). 
Due to these appealing features, the ICC has recently gained attention from finance. Brav, 
Lehavy and Michaely (2005), and Lee, Ng and Swaminathan (2009), revisit traditional asset pricing 
tests in the US and the international contexts, respectively. Pastor, et al. (2008) examine the risk-
return trade-off implication of asset pricing models; while Chava and Purnanandam (2010) 
investigate the relationship between the default risk and the stock expected returns. Chen, et al. 
(2013) examine the sources of stock price movements. Li, et al. (2013) find that the market ICC is a 
good predictor for future realised returns. Following the theme, this essay applies the ICC as a 
proxy for the conditional expected return, and tests the positivity restriction of the ex-ante market 
risk premium in the international G7 markets (the US, Canada, the UK, Germany, Italy, France, and 
Japan). 
Specifically, I model the conditional mean return of the market portfolio as the value-
weighted and equal-weighted averages of individual firms’ ICC. Subsequently, long term 
government bond yield is subtracted from the aggregate market ICC to obtain the market implied 
risk premium. The implied measure is then brought into the multiple inequality constraints testing 
framework, which formally deals with the inequality nature of the positive risk premium 
hypothesis.  
Given the critical assumption in the ICC methodology, that explicit cash flow forecasts need 
to capture the market expectation of future cash flows, I employ two cash flow estimates: analyst 
earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S database and the forecasts from the regression model developed 
by Hou, Van Dijk and Zhang (2012). Consequently, the two alternative ICC estimates are labelled 
as the analyst-based and fundamental-based ICC, respectively. By employing the latter proxy, the 
test of the implied risk premium on the US sample can be extended to a longer time period (from 
1962 to 2012), covers a larger number of firms, and overcomes biases pertaining to analyst earnings 
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forecasts (e.g. overoptimism, conflict of interest, sample selection, and survivorship biases). Alas, it 
is not possible to apply the fundamental-based ICC to other G-7 countries because the sample 
period is too short.3 To summarise, with respect to the analyst-based ICC, the US sample spans 
from 1977 to 2012; whereas for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 
sample spans are from 1990 to 2012. The fundamental-based ICC is only used for US firms and the 
sample period coverage starts from 1962 to 2012. 
I find evidence that the positivity restriction of the market risk premium is violated for the 
US (S&P 500 market portfolio), Japanese, German, and Italian markets in some states of the 
economy, particularly associated with periods of downward-sloping term structure, high T-bill 
rates, and lagged negative risk premium. Motivated by empirical evidence, these periods signal the 
shift in regimes in which, predicted by the theory, the negative risk premium can exist (Whitelaw 
(2000)). For example, Harvey (1988) finds that the inverted term structure typically happens at the 
peak of the business cycle and therefore indicates that the economy moves towards a different 
regime, i.e. a contractionary state. In contrast, when the ex-post realised return is used to proxy for 
the expected return as in Boudoukh, et al. (1993) and Ostdiek (1998), there is insufficient evidence 
that the ex-post realised market return is less than the risk free rate, the exception being in the 
German market. Although the risk premium constructed by subtracting realised returns from risk 
free rate have multiple occasions of being negative in the study periods, noise in the realised 
measure tends to be large, so the test power might be significantly impaired (Ostdiek (1998)). Given 
the above evidence, I conclude that the implied risk premium can be served as a tight proxy for the 
conditional risk premium. 
I aim to contribute by connecting three important, yet unrelated, areas of the literature. First, 
despite a vast empirical effort devoted to investigating the true nature of the time varying risk-return 
relation, it is surprising that there is significantly less research in testing whether and when the 
negative risk premium can occur. Although the positive risk premium is fundamental and has an 
important role in theoretical modelling, it remains an open and under-researched empirical question. 
This study, among a few, demonstrates such testing. Unlike previous studies using the realised 
return, I employ a novel proxy (ICC) for the conditional expected return to examine the hypothesis. 
Furthermore, because I do not employ predictive regressions in modelling the expected return in the 
                                                 
3 Fundamental-based ICC is computed at yearly frequency. Thus, if I compute fundamental-based ICC for G-
7 countries other than the US, there are only 22 yearly time series data points between 1990 and 2012. 
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conditional inequalities framework, I therefore avoid model misspecification resulting from 
assuming functional forms between the risk premium and predetermined information variables 
(Boudoukh, et al. (1993)). Second, the revealing evidence regarding the negative-risk premium on 
the market portfolio implies the rejection of one of the most respected models, the Conditional 
CAPM (Jagannathan and Wang (1996)). While most of the existing evidence on the Conditional 
CAPM is conducted in the US and focuses on the linear restriction imposed by the model (Lewellen 
and Nagel (2006)), I find that the Conditional CAPM is rejected, not only in the US, but also in 
other international markets including Germany, Italy, and Japan. Third, unlike most of the 
accounting literature that examines firm level ICC, this study is among a few to study the ICC on 
the aggregate market level (Pastor, et al. (2008); and Li, et al. (2013)). The main advantage lies 
under aggregation at the market level ICC, which might help reduce estimation errors presented in 
the ICC calculation at firm level (Lee, So and Wang (2014)). 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides formal representation of the sign 
restriction of the ex-ante market risk premium and its application in asset pricing tests. I then show 
how to test the restriction using the multiple conditional inequalities testing framework. Section 2.3 
demonstrates the construction of the ICC. Section 2.4 describes the data for empirical analysis. 
Section 2.5 discusses the main findings. I offer brief concluding remarks in Section 2.6. 
2.2 EX-ANTE RISK PREMIUM RESTRICTION 
2.2.1 Ex-ante Risk Premium and Asset Pricing 
The restriction that the conditional expected return exceeds the conditional risk free rate can 
be represented as: 
 𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1� − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 ≥ 0 
(2.1) 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 is the market expected return from time 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the risk free rate 
from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1.  
The idea is that all risk-averse investors should demand higher returns for risky assets than 
for the risk free asset. The non-negative ex-ante risk premium in all states is implied in the 
conditional version of CAPM, because it ensures that the conditional mean-variance efficiency of 
the market portfolio is satisfied. However, more general equilibrium models do not impose this 
restriction. Under the stochastic discount framework, that is, in the absence of arbitrage, there exists 
a stochastic discount factor, or pricing kernel, such that all asset returns follow the equation 
(Harrison and Kreps (1979)): 
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 𝐸𝑡�𝑚𝑡+1𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1� = 1 ∀𝑖,∀𝑡 (2.2) 
where 𝑚𝑡+1 is the marginal rate of substitution or the pricing kernel at time 𝑡 + 1, 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the gross return on asset 𝑖 at time t+1. 
Equation (2.2) holds for all assets, thus it holds for the market portfolio 𝑅𝑚 and the risk free 
rate 𝑅𝑓. I express the excess market return within the stochastic discount framework by applying 
equation (2.2) to the market portfolio and the risk free asset, and subsequently taking the difference: 
 𝐸𝑡�𝑚𝑡+1𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1𝑒 � = 0 (2.3) 
where 𝑅𝑚𝑒 = 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓 is the market excess return. 
Applying the Covariance formula 𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑋,𝑌) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑌) − 𝐸(𝑋)𝐸(𝑌) and rearranging the 
equation (2.3), the conditional excess return of the market portfolio can be expressed separately as: 
 𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1𝑒 � = −𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1,𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1𝑒 )𝑅𝑓,𝑡 4 (2.4) 
In light of equation (2.4), the negative market excess return can only be possible if the return 
of the market portfolio positively covaries with the marginal rate of substitution. Whitelaw (2000) 
demonstrates that in the standard power utility with a regime-switching consumption process 
incorporated in the marginal rate of substitution, the negative risk premium can be obtained in states 
when a regime shift is most likely to occur. In such a state, the volatility of equity return is high, yet 
expected return might be low because the equity market can induce hedging demand from the 
investors due to its infinite claims in the future, as opposed to the marginal utility which depends 
only on the next state’s consumption. 
Testing the positive risk premium hypothesis provides a possible solution to the well-known 
critique, emphasised by Roll (1977), with respect to the identity of the market portfolio in any 
CAPM empirical tests. Roll’s insight points to the idea that because the linear restriction hold as a 
mathematical identity, the important economic content in any appropriate standard CAPM tests lies 
on the ability of the portfolio proxy being able to represent the true, yet unobservable market 
portfolio. Such identification is daunting; and attempts to avoid it are largely unsuccessful (see 
Wheatley (1989)). Fortunately, testing the positive risk premium requires only a weak restriction 
that is to find a market portfolio proxy that is positively correlated with the true market portfolio, 
                                                 
4 Assuming 𝑅𝑓 is constant, 𝑅𝑓 is expressed in the context of (2.2): 𝐸𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1)𝑅𝑓 = 1 → 𝑅𝑓 = 1𝐸𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1) 
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whereas the magnitude of the correlation is not crucial. To see the logic under the conditional 
CAPM, the return on the market portfolio proxy 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 should follow the relation: 
 
𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑝,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡� = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡�𝑅𝑝,𝑡+1,𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1�𝐶𝑣𝑟𝑡�𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1� 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) (2.5) 
As can be seen from equation (2.5), so long as the covariance between the market portfolio 
proxy and the market portfolio remain positive i.e. the first term on the right hand side, their risk 
premiums will have the same sign. Therefore, any evidence against the positive risk premium on the 
market portfolio proxy indicates the violation of the positive risk premium on the true market, 
which in turn implies the rejection of the Conditional CAPM. The positive co-movement between 
the proxy, a well-diversified portfolio containing a large number of assets, and the market portfolio 
is a weak condition to be satisfied. 
2.2.2 Multiple Conditional Inequalities Methodology 
Define 𝜇𝑡 as the ex-ante risk premium from (2.1): 
 𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� = 𝜇𝑡 ≥ 0 (2.6) 
As the econometricians cannot observe the information set of the economic agents, they face 
the positivity restriction conditioning on their own information set. This implies multiple inequality 
restrictions. In particular, suppose 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+  is the strictly positive information set that is available to the 
econometricians,5 then the above inequality (2.6) implies multiple restrictions: 
𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧1,𝑡+ ) = 𝜇𝑡×𝑧1,𝑡+ ≥ 0  
𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧2,𝑡+ ) = 𝜇𝑡×𝑧2,𝑡+ ≥ 0  
…………. 
𝐸𝑡�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧1,𝑡+ ) = 𝜇𝑡×𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ ≥ 0  
Rearranging the preceding set of inequalities and applying the law of iterated expectations, a 
system similar to the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Hansen and Singleton (1982)) 
arises: 
 𝐸 ��𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡�⊗𝑧𝑡+ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+� = 0 (2.7) 
where 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ = 𝐸(𝜇𝑡⊗𝑧𝑡) ≥ 0. 
                                                 
5 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ ≥ 0. 
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Different from the GMM, the parameter 𝜃 in this system is subject to a set of positivity 
constraints. The above restriction can be written as a system of N-moment conditions: 
𝐸��𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧1𝑡+ � = 𝜃𝜇𝑧1+  
……………. 
𝐸��𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧𝑁𝑡+ � = 𝜃𝜇𝑧𝑁+ 
Boudoukh, et al. (1993) develop a formal framework that takes into account autocorrelation 
and cross-correlation of the conditional estimates subject to inequality constraints. First, the sample 
means of the product of the observable variables are estimated. In particular,  
 
𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+  = 1𝑇���𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ �𝑇
𝑡=1
 ∀𝑖 = 1. .𝑁 (2.8) 
𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+  are referred to as the unconstrained estimates because there is no sign restriction 
imposed on the parameters. They may be negative either because the null is false i.e. the violation 
of the positive risk premium or simply due to sampling errors. 
Next, I calculate sample means under the inequality restriction in the null 𝜃�𝜇𝑍𝑖
𝑅  by 
minimising deviations from the unrestricted model under the quadratic form: 
 min�𝜃�𝜇𝑧++ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+�′ 𝛺�(−1)�𝜃�𝜇𝑧++ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+� (2.9) 
subject to 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ ≥ 0. 
where 𝛺�  is the consistent variance-covariance matrix of the moments. I employ the Bartlett 
kernel (Newey and West (1987)) to estimate 𝛺� . Alternative consistent covariance matrix estimates 
proposed by Andrews (1991) could also be applied. 
The test statistic is: 
 𝑊 ≡ 𝑇�𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑅 − 𝜃�𝜇𝑧+ �
′𝛺�−1�𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑅 − 𝜃�𝜇𝑧+ � (2.10) 
The idea of the test statistic W is to measure how close the parameters of the restricted 
model 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑅  are to those of the unrestricted model 𝜃�𝜇𝑧+ . Under the null, the difference should be small. 
Wolak (1989) shows that W is distributed as a weighted sum of 𝜒2 with different degrees of 
freedom ∑ Pr [𝜒𝑘2 ≥ 𝑐]𝑤(𝑁,𝑁 − 𝑘, 𝛺�𝑇𝑁𝑘=0 ) where c is the critical value for a given size test, and the 
weighting function 𝑤(𝑁,𝑁 − 𝑘, 𝛺�𝑇) has exactly 𝑁 − 𝐾 positive elements. 
2.2.3 Limitations of Realised Returns 
Using annual realised return data spanning from 1802-1990, Boudoukh, et al. (1993) find 
that the ex-ante risk premium is negative in some states of the world, related to periods of high 
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expected inflation and a downward-sloping term structure. Ostdiek (1998) applies this methodology 
to test the world market portfolio. 
Without modelling the conditional market risk premium directly, the previous authors iterate 
the conditional moments down to the unconditional expectation as in equation (2.7). However, 
iterating down to the unconditional expectation involves loss of the test power. This procedure 
becomes more severe with the use of ex post realised return because it implicitly assumes the 
convergence of the realised return toward the expected return. There are numerous reasons to 
believe that this is not the case. First, information surprises in the realised return are either large or 
highly correlated so that their cumulative effects are large and they might have a permanent impact 
on the mean realised return (Lundblad (2007)). Thus, it requires a time period spanning over a 
century for the realised return to approximate the expected return. Hoping for convergence towards 
the expected return over a realistic study period, if not in the long run, might not be a good idea 
(Elton (1999)). Second, stock price movements contain information about cash flows and discount 
rate shocks (Chen and Zhao (2009)). The heated debate on which sources are more important in 
driving stock prices: the change in cash flow expectations (Bansal and Yaron (2004)) or the change 
in expected returns (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) is ongoing. Therefore, the realised return 
contains more information than that incorporated in the expected return. Third, the time varying 
expected return makes the convergence to the expected return counterintuitive for equity markets 
(Campello, Chen and Zhang (2008)). For example, the market realised risk premium, is often 
negative during bad times. Would anyone infer that stock markets are less risky in these periods? 
By contrast, it is more intuitive to think that rational investors would demand a higher risk premium 
in the corresponding times. 
An alternative way to overcome this issue is to model the conditional expected return 
directly by employing predictive regressions using information variables. The idea is to regress 
future realised returns on a set of economic information variables under assumed functional forms 
(typically linear). Subsequently, the expected return can be proxied by the predicted value of the 
model. It can be formally represented in the inequalities framework as such: 
 
𝐸 �
[(𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) − 𝛽′𝑧𝑡] ⊗ 𝑧𝑡+(𝛽′𝑧𝑡) ⊗ 𝑧𝑡+ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧 � = 0 (2.11) 
where 𝜃𝜇𝑧 = 𝐸(𝜇𝑡 ⊗ 𝑧𝑡+) ≥ 0, 
𝑧𝑡 is the set of information variables, and 
𝛽 is the coefficients vector. 
The above method implicitly assumes that the information variables in the predicting model 
can well capture the information set of the economic agents. However, the econometricians’ 
information set is much smaller than that of the representative agents. Additionally, because there is 
 
 
15 
no consensus on which variables should be used, the method is subject to a data snooping criticism 
(Foster, et al. (1997); and Ferson, et al. (2008)). Furthermore, much less is known about how these 
information variables enter in forming expectations. Ghysels (1998) and Harvey (2001) highlight 
the problem of misspecification of the beta dynamics on inference and estimation, due to the linear 
functional form. Finally, as pointed out by Boudoukh, et al. (1993), because 𝛽 needs to be estimated 
and not specified in the null inequality restriction, deriving global valid test statistics, which are 
valid for all values of the parameters can be problematic. 
2.3 IMPLIED COST OF CAPITAL 
2.3.1 Analytical Framework 
In this section, I show analytically how the implied cost of capital (ICC) can be an excellent 
proxy for the time varying expected return. By definition, the ICC is the internal rate of return that 
equates market price with the present value of streams of future cash flows (earnings or dividends): 
 
𝑃𝑡 = �𝐸𝑡(𝐷𝑡+𝑘)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑘∞𝑘=1  (2.12) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the firm stock price, 
𝐷 is the stream of dividends, 
𝑟𝑒 is the implied cost of capital. 
To provide tractability, the present value formula can be represented in a log-linear 
approximation (Campbell and Shiller (1988)): 
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑘1 − 𝜌 + (1 − 𝜌)�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗�∞
𝑗=0
−�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1+𝑗)∞
𝑗=0
 (2.13) 
where 𝑝𝑡 = log (𝑃𝑡) 
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑙𝐶𝑙(𝐷𝑡), 
𝜌 = 11+exp (𝑑−𝑝������) , 
𝑑 − 𝑝������� is the average dividend yield, 
𝑘 = − log(𝜌) − (1 − 𝜌)log ( 1𝜌−1) 
Analogous to equation (2.13), I define 𝑟𝑒 that solves: 
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑘1 − 𝜌 + (1 − 𝜌)�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗�∞
𝑗=0
− 𝑟𝑒,𝑡�𝜌𝑗∞
𝑗=0
 
(2.14) 
Equations (2.13) or (2.14) show that as an accounting identity, an increase (decrease) in the 
market price can be attributed to any increase (decrease) in expectation of the future cash flows 
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and/or decrease (increase) in the expected future returns. Under a further assumption that the log 
conditional expected return 𝜇𝑡 follows an AR(1) process: 
 𝜇𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖, 0 < 𝛾 < 1 (2.15) 
Pastor, et al. (2008) demonstrate that: 
 𝑟𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼1 − 𝛾 + �𝜇𝑡 − 𝛼1 − 𝛾� 1 − 𝜌1 − 𝜌𝛾  (2.16) 
Indicated by equation (2.16), 𝑟𝑒,𝑡 is perfectly correlated with the conditional expected return 
𝜇𝑡, and thus an excellent proxy for conditional expected return. 
In stark contrast to the ex-post realised return, the ICC is forward-looking. As these primary 
inputs are determined by market participants, this market-based measure of the time varying 
expected return does not impose the assumption that the information set observed by the economic 
agents is the same as that of the econometricians in modelling the conditional expected return. 
Additionally, if the expected cash flows in the model truly capture the market expectation of the 
firm’s future cash flows, the remaining price variation is attributed to changes in the expected 
return. As a result, the ICC measure might be less, if not, contaminated by the cash flow news. 
2.3.2 ICC Construction 
To calculate the ICC empirically, I follow Pastor, et al. (2008), Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010), and Li, et al. (2013). The model is a version of the residual income model of Gebhardt, Lee 
and Swaminathan (2001). At each time period the ICC of a firm is computed by equating the firm’s 
stock price and its expected cash flows to equity and solving for the internal rate of return: 
 
𝑃𝑡 = �𝐸𝑡(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑘∞𝑘  (2.17) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the stock price at year 𝑡, 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘 is the free cash flow to equity at year 𝑡 + 𝑘, 
𝑟𝑒 is the ICC at year 𝑡 that will be solved numerically. 
Next, the expected cash flow to equity is defined as: 
𝐸𝑡(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘) = 𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘(1 − 𝑏𝑡+𝑘) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘 is the earning forecast of year 𝑡 + 𝑘 at year 𝑡,  
𝑏𝑡+𝑘 is the plowback ratio at year 𝑡 + 𝑘, thus 1 − 𝑏𝑡+𝑘 is the payout ratio. 
Because it is impractical to forecast earnings to infinity, equation (2.17) is decomposed into 
the explicit forecasts component spanning 15 years and the terminal value component starting from 
year 16. Specifically, equation (2.17) becomes: 
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𝑃𝑡 = �𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘(1 − 𝑏𝑡+𝑘)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑘15𝑘=1 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡+16𝑟𝑒(1 + 𝑟𝑒)15  (2.18) 
The explicit earnings forecast component is then divided into two sub-periods. The earnings 
forecasts for the first three years (𝐹𝐸𝑡+1, 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2, and 𝐹𝐸𝑡+3) are obtained directly. Subsequently, to 
compute 𝐹𝐸𝑡+4 to 𝐹𝐸𝑡+16 the long term growth forecast at year 𝑡 + 3 is assumed to exponentially 
mean-revert to the steady-state value equal to the nominal GDP growth rate 𝑙: 
 𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘 = 𝐹𝐸𝑡+𝑘−1 × (1 + 𝑙𝑡+𝑘) (2.19) 
 
𝑙𝑡+𝑘 = 𝑙𝑡+𝑘−1 × exp�𝑙𝐶𝑙 � 𝑙𝑙𝑡+3�13 � , 4 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 16 (2.20) 
where 𝑙𝑡+𝑘 is the earnings forecast growth rate between year 𝑡 + 𝑘 − 1 to 𝑡 + 𝑘, 
𝑙𝑡+3 is long term growth forecast at year 𝑡 + 3, 
𝑙 is the steady-state value which is the nominal GDP growth rate at year 𝑡. 
In terms of plowback ratios, 𝑏𝑡+1 and 𝑏𝑡+2 are obtained as the firm’s most recent net payout 
ratio. From year 𝑡 + 3 to 𝑡 + 16, the plowback rates are assumed to follow a linear mean-reverting 
process to the steady-state value: 
 𝑏𝑡+𝑘 = 𝑏𝑡+𝑘−1 − 𝑏𝑡+2 − 𝑏15 , 3 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 16 (2.21) 
where 𝑏 = 𝑔𝑟𝑒 is the steady-state value of plowback ratio,6 
𝑏𝑡+𝑘 is previously defined. 
Plugging equations (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21) into equation (2.18) and solving numerically 
for 𝑟𝑒, the firm level ICC is obtained at each time period. 
Note that the performance of the ICC in capturing the time varying expected return depends 
crucially on how well the earnings forecasts explain cash flow expectation variation. I employ a 
fundamental-based earnings forecast model recently developed by Hou, et al. (2012), in addition to 
the analyst earnings forecasts, to proxy for cash flow expectations. They show various advantages 
of the earnings produced by this method over the analyst forecasts in capturing the market 
expectations of cash flows. Biases pertaining to analyst forecasts such as optimism, survivorship, or 
                                                 
6 The steady-state plowback ratio 𝑏 = 𝑔𝑟𝑒 implies that return on new investment is equal to the cost of equity 
𝑟𝑒, meaning that after explicit forecast periods there is no additional economic value associated with new 
investments. 
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conflicts of interest can be overcome by the fundamental-based substitute. Unfortunately, due to the 
short data period, I do not apply the fundamental-based method for the international markets. The 
construction of the earnings forecast is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
2.4 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
2.4.1 Data Sources 
For the US, I obtain data of firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges 
(CRSP item EXCHCD with value of 1, 2, and 3), and exclude ADRs, close-end funds, and REITS 
(CRSP item SHRCD not having value 10 and 11). Annual accounting information and stock market 
information are collected from the COMPUSTAT and the CRSP databases, respectively. Consensus 
analyst forecast information is from the I/B/E/S summary files. GDP growth rates are acquired from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Government bond yields are from Federal Reserve Bank 
Reports. The sample period for the US starts from 1962 (1977) for the fundamental-based forecasts 
(analyst-based forecasts) and ends in 2012. 
For non-US firms, I obtain firm level stock price, shares outstanding and earnings forecasts 
from the I/B/E/S database. Accounting and exchange rate data are collected from the GLOBAL 
COMPUSTAT vendor. Bond yields and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) market 
return indices are from DATASTREAM, while GDP growth rates are provided by the World Bank. 
The sample for non-U.S. firms spans the course of 1990-2012. Data filtering and merging criteria 
between databases are discussed in the following sections. 
2.4.2 Earnings Forecasts 
For US firms, explicit earnings forecasts are acquired in two ways: analyst forecasts and 
fundamental-based forecasts (Hou et al. 2012). With respect to the analyst-based approach, I obtain 
the mean consensus earnings forecasts of each firm for the fiscal years 𝐹𝐸𝑡+1, 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2, and the long 
term growth forecast 𝑙𝑡+3 (i.e. I/B/E/S item FPI with value 1, 2, and 0, respectively). I then 
calculate 𝐹𝐸𝑡+3 = 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2(1 + 𝑙𝑡+3). If the long term growth forecast is missing, I replace it with 
the implicit figure as 𝑙𝑡+3 = 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 − 1. Non-missing and non-zero data of 𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 and 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2 are 
required. Long term growth forecasts which are less (more) than 2% (100%), are set to 2% (100%), 
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except for firms with negative 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2.7 The steady-state value of earning growth is the nominal 
GDP growth rate estimated by the historical average GDP growth rate, using an expanding window 
to capture the implicit inflation rate. 
With respect to the fundamental-based approach, I use the methodology of Hou, et al. 
(2012) to forecast earnings for the first 3 years. Specifically, rolling pooled cross-sectional 
regressions using the previous 6 years’ data are run for each year: 
 
 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑖𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝑁𝑙𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝜏 (2.22) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 is the earnings before extraordinary items of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 + 𝜏 (𝜏 = 1 𝑡𝐶 3) 
(COMPUSTAT item IB), 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total asset of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 (COMPUSTAT item AT), 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the dividend payment of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 (COMPUSTAT item DVC), 
𝐷𝑖𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the dummy equal to 1 if 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 > 0 year 𝑡, and 0 otherwise, 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the earning before extraordinary items of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡, 
𝑁𝑁𝑙𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the dummy variable equal to 1 if 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 < 0, and 0 otherwise, 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the total accrual of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡, calculated as the change in total current assets 
(COMPUSTAT item ACT) minus the change in cash and short-term investment 
(COMPUSTAT item CHE) minus the change in total current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item 
LCT) plus the change in total debt in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item DLC). 
The first three year-ahead earnings (𝐹𝐸𝑡+1,𝐹𝐸𝑡+2, and 𝐹𝐸𝑡+3) are forecasted, out-of-sample, 
based on the estimated coefficients. I require data availability for the level variables in the 
regressions. The earnings and the level variables are winsorised each year at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the effect of extreme observations. The long term growth forecast is 
calculated as 𝑙𝑡+3 = 𝐹𝐸𝑡+3𝐹𝐸𝑡+2 − 1. Other filtering criteria are similar to the analyst-based approach. 
For non-US firms, I do not apply the fundamental-based methodology because at yearly 
frequency, my sample has only 22 data points for each country. The analyst-based earnings 
forecasts are constructed similar to US firms. 
                                                 
7 If 𝐹𝐸𝑡+2<0, I keep observations with long term growth forecasts greater than 100% because it is the only 
way the remaining years’ forecasts do not end up with negative numbers. Dropping these observations does 
not affect the main result. 
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2.4.3 Plowback Ratio 
With respect to US firms, for the first two years the plowback ratio is equal to one minus the 
current net payout ratio of the firm. The net payout ratio is calculated as  
 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡  (2.23) 
where 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the net payout ratio of firm 𝑖 at  year 𝑡, 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the dividend payment of firm 𝑖 at  year 𝑡 (COMPUSTAT item DVC), 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of common and preferred stock repurchased by firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 
(COMPUSTAT item PRSTKC), 
𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of common and preferred stock sold by firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 (COMPUSTAT 
item SSTK), 
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the net income of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 (COMPUSTAT item NI). 
Non-missing values for 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 are required. If 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is negative, it is then set to be 6% 
of total assets (Chen, et al. (2013)). If either 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is missing, I replace with a value of 0.8 
If 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is greater (less) than 1 (0) then a value of 1 (0) is assigned. 
For other G-7 countries, due to the data limitation I use the dividend payout ratio as 
dividends divided by earnings. If firm earnings (GLOBAL COMPUSTAT item NICON) are 
negative, they are again first set to 6% of total assets; and subsequently I calculate the dividend 
payout ratio. If firm earnings are missing, I calculate them as the sum of income before 
extraordinary items (GLOBAL COMPUSTAT item IB), extraordinary items (GLOBAL 
COMPUSTAT item XI), and discontinued items (GLOBAL COMPUSTAT item XIDO).9 If the 
dividend payout ratio is greater (less) than 1 (0) then a value of 1 (0) is assigned. 
2.4.4 Putting It All Together 
With respect to the analyst-based forecasts approach in the US sample, the final sample is 
the intersection between the COMPUSTAT, the CRSP, and the I/B/E/S databases at monthly 
                                                 
8 A stricter requirement of dropping observations with missing values of 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑡 does not affect the 
main result. 
9 NICON are missing partly due to missing values of XI and XIDO. By setting XI and XIDO to 0 when their 
values are missing, I implicitly assume Net Income (NICON) is equal to income before extraordinary items 
(IB). 
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frequency. To ensure the public availability of accounting information, i.e. to avoid the look-ahead 
bias, firms’ fiscal year-end (COMPUSTAT) is required to be at least three months prior to the 
month when the ICC is calculated. The analyst forecasts are matched with the firms’ stock price at 
the end of the month. Stock prices are adjusted for stock splits using an adjustment factor (CRSP 
item CFACPR). Earnings forecasts are already adjusted in the I/B/E/S database. 
 For non-US firms, the merged sample is from the GLOBAL COMPUSTAT and the I/B/E/S 
databases. Accounting information is required to be at least six months prior to the period of ICC 
computation. As earnings forecasts are often submitted a few days after mid-month, when the ICC 
is computed I merge firm earnings forecasts with firm stock prices on the closest trading day after 
the 15th of the month. Stock prices and the number of outstanding shares are already adjusted in the 
I/B/E/S database. To maintain consistency, I calculate realised returns from the first trading day 
after the 15th of the previous month to the first trading day after the 15th of the current month. The 
extreme values of the ICC in each month are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The market-
wide ICC is then computed, alternatively, as the value-weighted and equal-weighted averages of 
individual ICCs to represent the market portfolio’s expected return. This process produces the 
analyst-based ICC. 
With regard to the fundamental-based earnings forecast approach, only the COMPUSTAT 
and the CRSP databases are required at yearly frequency. I estimate the ICC for each firm at the end 
of June. To make sure the accounting information is publicly available at the time the ICC is 
calculated, a reporting lag of three months is again required. For example, the accounting 
information of firms having fiscal year-end between April last year and March this year is used to 
estimate the ICC in June this year. The ICC sample is winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles at 
the end of June each year. Unlike the analyst-based market-wide ICC, the model-based market-wide 
ICC is just an equal-weighted average of every firms’ ICC each year end. Value-weighting is not 
employed in this instance since the earnings forecast regression in equation (2.22) has implicitly 
imposed the weight in earnings forecasts through the fixed coefficient on the 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 variable; thus 
subsequently weighting the individual firms’ ICC. To avoid double-weighting, an equal-weighted 
scheme is more appropriate than the value-weighted counterpart in calculating the market-wide 
ICC. 
Finally, the implied risk premium is equal to the market-wide ICC minus long term 
government bonds, which are 10-year (7-year) government bond yields for the US, the UK, Japan, 
Germany, Canada, and France (Italy). To compute the realised risk premium, I subtract 1-year 
continuously compounded value-weighted market realised return from 1-year T-bill (1-year 
interbank offer rate from British Bankers Association BBA) for US and Canada (Germany, France, 
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Italy, UK, and Japan). For the US, I use two market portfolios CRSP index and S&P 500 Index. For 
the other G-7 countries, local MSCI return indices are employed as market portfolios. 
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panels A and B of Table 2.1 report summary statistics for the annual risk premium, 
computed by the ICC method (fundamental-based and analyst-based) and ex-post realised returns, 
on two “market” proxies CRSP-AMEX/NYSE/NASDAQ (Panel A) and S&P 500 (Panel B). With 
respect to the CRSP portfolio, the average value-weighted and equal-weighted implied risk 
premium computed from analyst forecasts are 4.9% p.a. and 5.4% p.a., respectively.  These figures 
are close to the 4.5% computed from the realised return. The equal-weighted implied annual risk 
premium derived from the fundamental-based earnings forecasts is quite high at 8%, partly 
reflecting the inclusion of a larger number of firms (2666 firms) that are mostly smaller than the 
analyst-based counterpart (2416 firms). The standard deviation of the fundamental-based implied 
risk premium, 4.5%, is considerably larger than that of the analyst-based value-weighted (equal-
weighted) risk premium being 2.03% (1.8%). However, the standard deviation of the fundamental-
based implied risk premium is substantially lower than that of the realised premium, 17.07%, which 
highlights the important point stressed earlier that the realised return is a noisy estimate for the 
conditional expected return. 
With regard to the S&P 500 market portfolio in Panel B, the statistics are very similar 
except for the fundamental-based risk premium. In this case, the average annual risk premium 
undergoes a major reduction to 2% (Column 3). The average number of firms in the fundamental-
based approach is now less than that of the analyst-based counterpart (391 versus 448 firms), as 
opposed to the CRSP portfolio (2666 versus 2416 firms). The difference is due to the data filtering 
criteria of the two earnings forecast methods. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of risk premium (%) computed by the ICC methodology and ex-
post realised returns of the CRSP (Panel A) and the S&P 500 (Panel B) portfolios. Summary statistics for 
other G7 countries are reported in Panel C (equal-weighted analyst-based risk premium), Panel D (value-
weighted analyst-based risk premium), and Panel E (realised risk premium of local MSCI indices). At firm 
level, the implied cost of capital is derived from analyst earnings forecasts or fundamental-based earnings 
forecast regressions. I term these ‘analyst-based ICC’ and ‘fundamental-based ICC’. The market-wide ICC 
is the equal-weighted or value-weighted average of individual firms’ analyst-based ICC at monthly 
frequency. For fundamental-based ICC, the market-wide ICC is the equal-weighted average of individual 
firms’ ICC at yearly interval. The ex-post market realised returns are value-weighted returns including 
dividends at monthly frequency. The implied risk premium is computed by subtracting the yield of 10-year 
or 7-year Treasury Bond from the market-wide ICC. I compute realised risk premium for US and Canada 
market portfolios by subtracting the 1-year T-bill rate from market realised returns. For non-US and non-
Canada firms, 1-year T-bill rates are replaced by 1-year interbank offer rates by British Banker Association 
BBA. The study period is from 1977-2012 for analyst-based ICC, while for fundamental-based ICC and 
realised-returns the study period spans 1962 to 2012. The sample period for other G-7 countries is from 
1990 to 2012.  
Panel A: Risk Premium CRSP  
  Analyst Fundamental Realised Returns 
 Value-weighted Equal-Weighted Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted 
Mean 4.89 5.40 8.00 4.50 
Std Deviation 2.03 1.80 4.45 17.07 
Minimum 1.15 1.33 0.41 -47.89 
Q1 3.46 4.36 4.63 -6.01 
Median 4.40 4.97 7.92 6.83 
Q3 5.92 6.44 11.55 15.53 
Maximum 14.29 11.29 18.21 54.75 
Number of firms  2416 2416 2666 5650 
     Panel B: Risk Premium S&P 500 
  Analyst Fundamental Realised Returns 
 Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted 
Mean 5.16 4.72 1.98 4.49 
Std Deviation 2.13 1.87 2.89 16.54 
Minimum 1.04 0.81 -3.95 -46.05 
Q1 3.72 3.41 -0.67 -4.96 
Median 4.71 4.17 2.50 6.26 
Q3 6.32 5.68 4.61 15.82 
Maximum 16.74 11.26 8.02 50.00 
Number of firms 448 448 391 500 
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 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
CAN JPN GER UK ITA FRA 
Panel C: Equal-Weighted Analyst-based Risk Premium 
Mean 9.21 6.72 6.28 7.07 4.86 5.00 
Std Deviation 3.08 4.71 4.25 3.13 4.10 2.66 
Min 1.87 -3.93 -2.24 0.73 -6.19 -3.28 
Q1 7. 20 3.22 3.20 4.19 2.28 3.36 
Median 8.73 8.34 6.93 7.14 5.86 5.13 
Q3 10.76 9.90 9.59 9.35 7.89 6.99 
Max 19.56 14.03 14.20 15.28 11.80 10.15 
Panel D:Value-Weighted Analyst-based Risk Premium 
Mean 5.38 5.01 3.27 3.12 2.10 2.53 
Std Deviation 2.03 3.91 2.86 2.11 3.21 2.02 
Min 0.13 -3.29 -2.20 -1.23 -6.94 -3.28 
Q1 4.10 2.78 1.37 1.60 -0.28 1.04 
Median 4.93 5.08 2.89 2.71 2.54 2.09 
Q3 6.48 7.37 5.17 4.29 4.62 3.97 
Max 10.79 13.44 10.36 7.92 8.68 7.16 
Number of firms 241 839 242 591 87 242 
Panel E: Realised Risk Premium MSCI Index 
Mean 4.07 -2.76 2.64 2.19 -0.68 2.34 
Std Deviation 17.85 23.65 24.58 15.50 24.36 22.35 
Min -58.08 -58.14 -78.76 -51.52 -72.61 -56.05 
Q1 -7.42 -19.04 -13.51 -4.51 -17.49 -13.42 
Median 5.84 -3.47 9.84 6.29 3.20 7.59 
Q3 15.06 13.63 19.77 12.25 16.63 19.49 
Max 53.00 54.30 51.82 40.22 62.53 41.74 
 
Panel C, D and E of Table 2.1 report the summary statistics for the equal-weighted, the 
value-weighted implied risk premium, and the realised risk premium of the local MSCI indices, 
respectively, for the international markets. These numbers are close to those reported in Pastor et al. 
(2008) (Table II, page 2875). With respect to the implied risk premium, the unconditional means of 
the equal-weighted measure are always greater than their value-weighted counterparts, indicating 
that the small-firm effect exists in the international markets. Across the implied measures, Canada 
has the highest risk premium (9.21% for equal-weighted and 5.38% for value-weighted); whereas 
the least risky stock market is Italy (4.86% for equal-weighted and 2.1% for value-weighted). 
Notably, the Japanese equity market which experiences a prolonged poor performance from the 
early 1990s, is the second (third) most risky market among G-7 countries according to equal-
weighted (value-weighted) implied risk premium. Turning to the realised risk premium (Panel E of 
Table 2.1), consistent with the implied measures, Canada is still the most risky stock market among 
non-US countries (4.07%). However, Japan provides contrasting evidence, as its equity market is 
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now considered the least risky, with the mean (median) realised risk premium of -2.76% (-3.84%). 
It is quite counterintuitive to rationalise the inference, because rational investors should see the 
Japanese stock market as considerably risky. Additionally, there are multiple periods where the 
realised risk premium are negative, reflected by the fact that the first quartile statistic (Q1) is 
negative in all of the countries; whereas there are only a few negative observations in the implied 
samples. Finally, the standard deviation in the realised risk premium is considerably larger than its 
implied counterparts emphasising the noise embedded in the realised proxy. 
Table 2.2 presents the correlation among measures of the market risk premium for the US 
sample.10 The correlation of the ex-post realised risk premium of the CRSP and S&P 500 portfolios 
is 98.5% and significantly positive at the 1% level of significance. In contrast, the ex-post realised 
measures are negatively correlated with the analyst-based and fundamental-based counterpart, yet 
not statistically significant. Finally, the implied risk premium are all positively correlated with each 
other (value-weighted versus equal-weighted, analyst-based versus fundamental-based). This is not 
surprising considering that the implied risk premium is derived from the same residual income 
model. 
Figure 2.1 plots the time series of the risk premium on the CRSP portfolios. Panel A 
presents the implied risk premium for the analyst-based and the fundamental-based approaches. The 
analyst-based value-weighted and the equal-weighted plots tend to move in tandem, consistent with 
the 74.4% correlation shown in Table 2.2. For instance, there is an increase in the implied risk 
premium from 2007 to 2009, which intuitively matches the recent financial crisis. This pattern is 
also followed by the fundamental-based risk premium. Divergence between the analyst-based 
equal-weighted and the value-weighted expected returns occurs, particularly around the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s, potentially reflecting the period of technology stock bubbles. 
Panel B of Figure 2.1 displays the time series plots of the implied risk premium with the ex-
post realised risk premium. Consistent with Panel A of Table 2.1, the ex-post realised risk premium 
is very noisy compared to the implied risk premium series. There is no particular pattern that can be 
observed with realised returns. In fact, some of the trends are missed. For example, while my 
implied risk premium reveals that equity is risky in this period, the ex post realised premium 
presents a significantly negative risk premium. 
                                                 
10 For brevity, I do not report the correlation matrix for non-US countries here because the correlation 
between the implied and the realised risk premium exerts the same patterns. The correlation matrix is 
reported in Table A.1.1 in Appendix A.1. 
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Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix among measures of risk premium, computed by the implied cost of capital methodology and ex-post realised returns of the 
CRSP and S&P 500 portfolios. At firm level, the implied cost of capital is derived from analyst earnings forecasts or fundamental-based earnings forecast 
regressions. I term these as analyst-based ICC and fundamental-based ICC. The market-wide ICC is the equal-weighted or value-weighted average of individual 
firms’ analyst-based ICC at monthly frequency. For fundamental-based ICC, the market-wide ICC is the equal-weighted average of individual firms’ ICC at yearly 
interval. The ex-post market realised returns are value-weighted returns including dividends at monthly frequency. The risk premium is computed by subtracting the 
yield of 10-year Treasury Bond from the market-wide ICC or the market ex-post realised returns. The study period is from 1976-2012 for analyst-based ICC, while 
for fundamental-based ICC and realised-returns the study period spans from 1962 to 2012. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistically significant levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
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One important thing to note in this graph is that the conditional implied risk premium is 
always greater than zero. The minimum values of the analyst equal-weighted, value-weighted and 
the fundamental premium are 1.3%, 1.1%, and 0.4%, respectively (Panel A, Table 2.1). A direct 
implication of these observations is that the inequality constraint hypothesis cannot be rejected 
(with the associated p-value equal to 1) because there is no difference between estimates of the 
restricted and unrestricted models. Therefore, this restriction is not violated, if 1) the market proxy 
is the CRSP portfolio and 2) expected return is proxied by the ICC. In contrast to the implied 
premium, the ex-post realised premium has many cases below zero. This could be due to sampling 
error, or a reflection that the positivity restriction of the market risk premium is truly violated. 
Panel A of Figure 2.2 plots the time series of the implied risk premium of the S&P 500 
“market” portfolio. Similar to Figure 2.1, the analyst-based implied risk premium never becomes 
negative, which implies that the positivity restriction on risk premium cannot be rejected with a p-
value equal to 1.  On the other hand, the fundamental-based approach produces negative risk 
premium in some instances. Specifically, the negative risk premium occurs in the late 1980s and 
1990s corresponding to periods with relatively low risk premium produced by the analyst-based 
approach. Once again, a negative risk premium frequently occurs when the ex-post realised returns 
are used. 
Figure 2.3 plots the time series of the ICC (left-hand-side of each panel) and the implied risk 
premium (right-hand-side of each panel) for the international markets. With the exception of Japan, 
there is a strikingly similar mean-reverse pattern for the ICC. The market-wide ICC is high in the 
early 1990 and starts to decrease to the lowest level around 2000. This pattern is quite interesting 
because it corresponds to the period leading up to the European Monetary Union (EMU) formation. 
Since 2000, the market-wide ICC exhibits an increasing trend, with a typical spike around the 
Global Financial Crisis period. After added back the risk free rates into the ICC plots, there is a 
clear upward trend of the implied risk premium across all international markets partly associated 
with declining risk free rates. With the exception of Canada, negative risk premium is observed in 
non-US samples. As a consequence, I only apply the multiple conditional inequalities test to these 
samples because I know for certain that the positivity of the Canadian implied market risk premium 
cannot be rejected. 
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Figure 2.1: Risk Premium of the CRSP Portfolio 
Panel A plots the time series of the value-weighted and equal-weighted analyst-based, and 
the equal-weighted fundamental-based implied risk premium. Panel B plots the value-weighted 
analyst-based, equal-weighted fundamental-based, and value-weighted ex-post realised risk 
premium of the CRSP market portfolio. 
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Figure 2.2: Risk Premium of the S&P500 Portfolio 
Panel A plots the time series of the value-weighted and equal-weighted analyst-based, and 
the equal-weighted fundamental-based implied risk premium. Panel B plots the value-weighted 
analyst-based, equal-weighted fundamental-based, and value-weighted ex-post realised risk 
premium of the S&P 500 market portfolio. 
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Figure 2.3: Risk Premium of the International Markets 
The time series of the analyst-based implied cost of capital (left-hand-side) and the implied 
risk premium (right-hand-side) are plotted for non-US countries. 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
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Figure 2.3 (Continued) 
Panel D 
 
Panel E 
 
Panel F 
 
 
2.5.2 Test of Non-negative Market Risk Premium Hypothesis  
2.5.2.1 Instrumental Variables 
In the inequality constraint framework, I employ three instrumental variables: 1-year 
nominal Treasury bill or interbank offer yields 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏; term structure [with a difference between 5-
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year (10-year) Treasury bond 𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑 for the US (non-US) and 1-year T-bill (1-year interbank offer 
rate) nominal yields for the US (non-US); and lag negative risk premium 𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1. The 
choice of these instruments is based on existing empirical evidence. In particular, it has been 
documented that high T-bill rates and downward-sloping term structures (see, for example, Fama 
and Schwert (1977) for T-bill rates; Campbell (1987) for term structures) tend to be associated with 
periods of low stock returns. The lag negative risk premium can be thought of as an equity 
counterpart for downward-sloping term structure. Additionally, these information variables tend to 
signal regime switching states, in which theories predict the negative risk premium can occur. As 
such, these economically motivated instruments should have the power to reflect periods associated 
with low risk premium/negative risk premium. 
 The variables are constructed to be strictly positive so that I can preserve the inequality 
restriction (see equations (2.6) and (2.7)). High T-bill rate is defined when it lies above the 
unconditional mean 𝑧1,𝑡+ = max(0,𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏]). This definition not only maintains the strict 
positivity of T-bill rate, but also takes into account the magnitude of those high rates. To provide an 
economic interpretation, I normalise this variable as 𝑧1,𝑡∗ = 𝑧1,𝑡+𝐸(𝑧1,𝑡+ ) where 𝐸(𝑧1,𝑡+ ) is the sample mean 
of 𝑧1,𝑡+  in the context of equation (2.8) 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+  = 1𝑇 ∑ ��𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�𝑧1𝑡+ �𝑇𝑡=1 . Therefore, 𝜃�𝜇𝑧1+  is the 
conditional sample mean of risk premium, weighted by the magnitude of high T-bill rates. In a 
similar manner, I define 𝑧2,𝑡+ = max �0,−�𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡�� as the downward-sloping term 
structure, and 𝑧3,𝑡+ = max (0,−(𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1) as the lag negative risk premium. Their normalised 
versions are 𝑧2,𝑡∗ = 𝑧2,𝑡+𝐸(𝑧2,𝑡+ ) and 𝑧3,𝑡∗ = 𝑧3,𝑡+𝐸(𝑧3,𝑡+ ), respectively.  
2.5.2.2 The US Market Evidence 
With respect to the US market, I apply the conditional inequality constraints test to the three 
cases where the negative risk premium occurs: the S&P 500 fundamental-based implied risk 
premium, and the S&P 500 and the CRSP ex-post realised risk premium, since the other implied 
risk premium cases imply that the non-negativity restriction cannot be rejected. Empirical results 
are reported in Table 2.3. For the S&P 500 fundamental-based implied risk premium (Column 1), 
the probabilities of high T-bill rate, inverted yield curve, and lag negative risk premium occurring 
are 22%, 47% and 28%, respectively. The high T-bill rate and the downward-sloping term structure 
do not seem to have power in detecting negative implied risk premium periods. Conditioning on 
these two instruments, the conditional means of the implied risk premium weighted by the 
magnitude of these states are positive, ranging from 2.07% (high T-bill rate) to 3.79% (downward-
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sloping term structure). In contrast, the magnitude and sign of the risk premium is successfully 
captured by the negative risk premium of the preceding period. The corresponding conditional 
implied risk premium is -1.01%, weighted by the absolute value of the instrument. This result 
highlights the desirable persistent property of the expected return (Cochrane (2011)). Turning to the 
ex-post realised risk premium cases of the CRSP (column 2) and the S&P 500 (column 3) market 
portfolios, the power of the instruments in predicting realised negative risk premium is somewhat 
different. A downward sloping term structure state is highly associated with low risk premium 
states, resulting in the weighted conditional mean realised risk premium of -4.81% (-5.17%) for the 
CRSP (S&P500) market portfolio. Conditioning on the remaining instruments, the mean risk 
premium is positive (2.56% for high T-bill rate and 8.95% for lag negative risk premium). 
However, these univariate results that detect the negative risk premium in some conditional 
states are only suggestive of the violation of positivity restriction. To formally test the null 
hypothesis of whether or not market risk premium is always positive, it is necessary to take into 
account the correlation across individual conditional estimates 𝜃�𝜇,𝑧𝑖+ . The high autocorrelation 
structure of the instrumental variables results in noisy estimates of the conditional means in small 
samples.11 I apply the Newey and West (1987) consistent covariance matrix method to adjust for 
the embed correlation structure, and provide the resulting W test statistic. The W test statistics are 
3.47 (associated p-value is 0.08), 0.98 (p-value=0.35), and 1.36 (p-value=0.29) for the S&P 500 
implied risk premium, the CRSP realised risk premium, and the S&P 500 realised risk premium, 
respectively. As a result, while I find evidence against the positivity of the implied market risk 
premium at the significance level of 10%, I cannot reject the hypothesis in the realised risk 
premium counterpart. 
                                                 
11 The autocorrelation of the instrument variables is quite high, ranging from 0.86 to 0.95 for lag negative 
implied risk premium and for T-bill rate, respectively. I do not report this in a table for the sake of brevity. 
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Table 2.3: Inequality Tests on the Positivity Restriction of the Market Risk Premium 
This table reports the statistic to test the hypothesis of whether the ex-ante market risk premium is 
always positive 𝐸𝑡[�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�⊗𝑧𝑡+) − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ ] = 0 where 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ = 𝐸[𝜇𝑡⊗𝑧𝑡+] ≥ 0. The S&P 500 
fundamental-based implied risk premium, and the CRSP and S&P 500 ex-post realised risk premium 
are tested. W is a joint test of multiple inequality restrictions associated with the high T-bill rate, 
downward-sloping yield curve, and lag negative risk premium periods. 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+ represents the conditional 
mean of the risk premium, weighted on the magnitudes of these states. Particularly, the high T-bill rate 
is defined as 𝑧1,𝑡+ = max(0,𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏]); the downward-sloping yield curve is defined as 𝑧2,𝑡+ =max �0,−�𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡�� where 𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑 and 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏 are the yields of 5-year and 1-year treasury bonds 
(bills), respectively; lag negative risk premium is 𝑧3,𝑡+ = max (0,−(𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡). I also report the 
standard errors of these conditional means and the probability that these states occur. All of the 
estimates are corrected for conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey and West 
(1987) method. 
 
S&P 500 
Implied 
 Risk Premium 
CRSP 
 Realised Returns 
S&P 500 
Realised 
 Returns 
High T-bill Rate 
  Probability of State 22.25 27.24 22.85 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧1+ 2.07 2.56 2.88 
(Standard Error) (1.25) (3.36) (3.12) 
    Downward-Sloping 
 Term Structure 
Probability of State 46.87 45.07 44.85 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧2+ 3.79 -4.81 -5.17 
(Standard Error) (1.57) (4.87) (4.44) 
    Lag Negative Risk Premium 
 Probability of State 27.75 22.76 22.15 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧3+ -1.01 8.95 8.18 
(Standard Error) (0.54) (4.48) (4.23) 
    Multiple Inequality  
Restriction Statistic W  3.4680 0.9786 1.3586 
p-value 0.0788 0.3521 0.2873 
 
 
35 
 
2.5.2.3 The International Markets Evidence 
Turning to the non-US samples, Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 report the empirical results for the 
value-weighted implied risk premium and realised risk premium, respectively. Focusing on Table 
2.4, the most successful instrument in capturing the negative risk premium is the lag negative risk 
premium. Conditioning on the lag negative risk premium, the means of risk premium, taking into 
account the absolute magnitude of the risk premium are all negative across international markets -
2.13% (Japan) to -0.4% (France). 
The conditional means of the implied risk premium, weighted by the magnitude of high 
short-term rate (1-year interbank offer rate), are negative for Japan (-1.44%) and Italy (-1.76%) 
only, demonstrating that the high T-bill rate has some success in predicting low market risk 
premium. The downward sloping term structure does not fare well in capturing the negative implied 
risk premium. Conditioning on the states where the long rate is less than the short rate, the means 
weighted by the absolute value of the term structure premium are mostly positive for non-US stock 
markets, with the exception of the Japan sample (-2.13%). Taking into account the correlation 
structure of the multiple conditional estimates, I can reject the positivity market risk premium 
hypothesis for Japan (W=5.22) at the 5% level, Italy (W=8.336) at the 1% level, and Germany 
(W=4.94) at the 5% level. 
Turning to Table 2.5, the downward-sloping term structure is the strongest predictor for the 
negative realised risk premium with its weighted conditional means negative across countries 
ranging from -1.8% (Canada) to -18.55% (Italy). The high T-bill rate and the lag negative risk 
premium show some suggestive evidence of the negative risk premium for Japan, Italy, and 
Germany. The p-values indicate that the magnitudes of these conditional realised means are much 
larger than those of the implied means. However, I do not find any evidence to support the violation 
of the positivity restriction on the market, except marginally for Germany at the 10% level of 
significance (p-value=0.0987). In light of the empirical results, I suggest that the noise in realised 
returns is large that it significantly reduces the power of the test. 
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Table 2.4: Inequality Tests on the Positivity Restriction of the Implied Market Risk 
Premium: International Markets 
This table reports the statistic to test the hypothesis of whether the value-weighted analyst-based implied 
ex-ante market risk premium is always positive 𝐸𝑡[�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�⊗𝑧𝑡+) − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ ] = 0 where 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ =
𝐸[𝜇𝑡⊗𝑧𝑡+] ≥ 0 for non-US countries. W is a joint test of multiple inequality restrictions associated with the 
high T-bill rate, downward-sloping yield curve, and lag negative risk premium. 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+ represents the 
conditional mean of the risk premium, weighted on the magnitudes of these states. Particularly, the high T-
bill rate is defined as 𝑧1,𝑡+ = max(0,𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏]); the downward-sloping yield curve is defined as 
𝑧2,𝑡+ = max �0,−�𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡�� where 𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑 and 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏 are the yields of 10-year (7-year for Italy) 
treasury bonds and 1-year interbank offer rates from the British Banker Association, respectively. Lag 
negative risk premium is 𝑧3,𝑡+ = max (0,−(𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1). I also report the standard errors of these 
conditional means and the probability that these states occur. All of the estimates are corrected for 
conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method. 
 
JPN ITA UK FRA GER 
High T-bill Rate 
     Probability of State 5.36 26.11 25.45 27.84 23.46 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧1+ -1.44 -1.76 0.54 0.36 0.05 
(Standard Error) (0.7) (0.61) (0.2) (0.17) (0.26) 
      Downward-Sloping 
 Term Structure 
     Probability of State 49.85 47.62 45.81 44.8 47.41 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧2+ -2.23 3.39 1.75 1.00 1.20 
(Standard Error)  (1.12) (1.98) (0.39) (0.47) (0.76) 
 
     
Lag Negative Risk Premium 
     Probability of State 44.64 23.89 24.55 22.16 26.54 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧3+ -2.13 -2.85 -0.55 -0.4 -0.77 
(Standard Error) (0.93) (1.07) (0.41) (0.26) (0.35) 
 
     
Multiple Inequality  
Restriction Statistic W  5.2222 8.336 1.7914 2.3371 4.9437 
p-value 0.0153 0.0068 0.2126 0.1694 0.0368 
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Table 2.5: Inequality Tests on the Positivity Restriction of the Realised Market Risk 
Premium: International Markets 
This table presents statistics that examine whether or not This table reports the statistic to test the 
hypothesis of the realised market risk premium is always positive 𝐸𝑡[�𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�⊗𝑧𝑡+) − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ ] = 0 
where 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ = 𝐸[𝜇𝑡⊗𝑧𝑡+] ≥ 0 for non-US countries. I use local MSCI indices to proxy for local market 
portfolio. W is a joint test of multiple inequality restrictions associated with the high T-bill rate, downward-
sloping yield curve, and lag negative risk premium. 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+ represents the conditional mean of the risk 
premium, weighted on the magnitudes of these states. Particularly, the high T-bill rate is defined as 𝑧1,𝑡+ = max(0,𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏]); the downward-sloping yield curve is defined as 𝑧2,𝑡+ = max �0,−�𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑,𝑡 −
𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡�� where 𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑 and 𝑅𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏 are the yields of 10-year (7-yaer for Italy) treasury bonds and 1-year 
interbank offer rates from the British Banker Association, respectively. Lag negative risk premium is 
𝑧3,𝑡+ = max (0,−(𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1). I also report the standard errors of these conditional means and the 
probability that these states occur. All of the estimates are corrected for conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method. 
 
 
JPN ITA UK FRA GER CAN 
High T-bill Rate 
      Probability of State 22.69 26.05 30.71 27.5 27.94 31.55 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧1+ -10.46 3.32 2.13 0.27 -4.02 0.97 
(Standard Error) 7.18 5.47 1.52 2.21 3.39 2.07 
       Downward-Sloping 
 Term Structure 
      Probability of State 47.2 45.38 42.96 45.23 45.09 42.93 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧2+ -10.95 -18.55 -3.96 -3.00 -11.41 -1.87 
(Standard Error)  8.17 21.28 2.64 4.72 6.22 1.32 
 
      
Lag Negative Risk Premium 
      Probability of State 27.31 23.95 19.29 22.5 22.06 18.45 
Conditional mean 𝜃�𝜇𝑧3+ -0.87 -1.08 4.26 0.88 3.4 8.84 
(Standard Error) 4.6 5.74 6.33 6.04 7.18 5.66 
 
      
Multiple Inequality  
Restriction Statistic W  2.1601 0.7598 2.2437 0.399 3.3635 2.0129 
p-value 0.159 0.3918 0.1945 0.5088 0.0987 0.2225 
 
 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this essay, I employ an appealing market-based measure of the conditional expected 
return, the Implied Cost of Capital, in testing the positivity restriction on the market risk premium. 
Numerous asset pricing studies focus on studying the linear restrictions implied by asset pricing 
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models, but they largely ignore the importance of the positive market risk restriction in testing 
framework. With economically meaningful instruments that can signal the regime shift in the 
business cycles (high T-bill rates, downward sloping term structure, and lag negative risk premium) 
I detect the violation of the positive implied market risk premium, which necessarily implies the 
rejection of the conditional CAPM. Interestingly, it is in these states that the theory predicts the 
existence of negative risk premium (Whitelaw (2000)). The “market portfolios” that exhibit this 
violation include S&P 500, Japan, Italy, and Germany. These results on the implied risk premium 
are in stark contrast to the realised risk premium counterpart. In six out of seven market portfolios, I 
do not find any convincing evidence against the positivity condition of the market realised risk 
premium. In light of the noisy realised return’s numerous limitations in proxying for the expected 
return, I attribute the success in detecting the violation of the non-negativity restriction to the ICC 
and therefore conclude that the ICC can serve as a tight proxy for the time varying expected return. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IS THE EX-ANTE RISK PREMIUM ALWAYS POSTIVE? 
EVIDENCE FROM A NEW CONDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL12 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Under rational expectations, if marginal investors are strictly risk-averse and expected utility 
maximisers, they demand higher returns for bearing additional risk. This leads the ex-ante market 
risk premium to be greater than or equal to zero. The positivity of market risk premium is necessary 
for the conditional mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio; therefore it is a necessary 
condition of the Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (Conditional CAPM). Violation of this 
restriction implies a rejection of the Conditional CAPM. Merton (1980) further suggests that the 
positive risk premium should be included as a necessary condition for capital market equilibrium, 
although more general equilibrium asset pricing theories do not impose this restriction (Lucas 
(1978)). The belief in the positive risk premium is so strong that the recent empirical literature has 
gone so far as to impose this constraint directly in the predictive stock returns models (for example, 
see Campbell and Thompson (2008); and Pettenuzzo, Timmermann and Valkanov (2013)). Despite 
its debatable nature in theoretical modelling (Whitelaw (2000)), the positive risk premium 
hypothesis remains an open empirical question. Yet, little effort has been devoted to conducting this 
testing. In this paper, I continue to examine this hypothesis with a new conditional expectation 
model.  
Specifically, I model the conditional risk premium for the US market (CRSP index) from 
1960 to 2011 through a two-step procedure, in which the Principal Component Analysis and the 
Boosted Regression Trees (BRT) techniques (Friedman (2001); and Breiman, Friedman, Stone and 
Olshen (1984)) are employed. The technique aims to circumvent two major problems on how 
                                                 
12 Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the UQ Workshop with Professor Allen Kleidon 
(Cornerstone Research), Brisbane Australia, November 2014; 6th
 
Financial Markets and Corporate 
Governance Conference, Perth Australia, April 2015; and Accounting and Finance Association of Australia 
and New Zealand Conference, Hobart Australia, July 2015. 
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researchers capture the identity of the investors’ information set and their use of the information in 
forming expectations. I highlight the problems below to motivate my method. 
Conditional expectations (mean, variance, and higher-order moments) are unobservable, 
thus testing the asset pricing theories requires reliable empirical proxies. For the expected return, a 
common approach is to linearly project ex-post realised excess returns on a small number of 
available information variables space. However, since the identity of the investors’ information set 
is unknown, omitted variable bias surrounding the linear regression is likely to yield misleading 
inferences (Ang and Bekaert (2007) for the empirical perspective; and Hansen and Richard (1987) 
for the theoretical). The inclusion of as many variables as possible to span the true information set 
does not solve the problem, but points to another statistical issue in which the degrees of freedom 
quickly exhaust when the number of predictors approaches the number of observations (Ludvigson 
and Ng (2007)). Adding to this complication, data snooping bias is prevalent and the statistical 
results are sensitive to the choice of conditioning variables (Foster, et al. (1997); and Harvey 
(2001)). 
Second and more importantly, the question on how investors use the information to generate 
the expected return is highly debatable. A highly complex and uncertain environment, where 
investors face numerous information shocks as a result of institutional change, evolution of 
information technology, or policy shift, leads to a constantly changing return data generating 
process. As a result, it is quite unlikely that a simple linear predictive model can capture such 
complexity. A linear model, at best, provides an approximation, and is more likely to be 
misspecified (Harvey (2001)). Not surprisingly, Welch and Goyal (2008), after a careful assessment 
of the literature, reach a disappointing conclusion that most existing economic variables do not 
outperform a naïve historical mean in predicting future stock returns. If returns are not predictable, 
testing conditional asset pricing models becomes an elusive task (Chen and Zhao (2009)).  
To address the above critiques, I propose a two-stage procedure, including principal 
component analysis and a state-of-the-art supervised learning technique, known as Boosted 
Regression Trees (BRT), in modelling the conditional risk premium (see Hastie, et al. (2009) for a 
discussion of the literature). Specifically in the first stage, the principal component analysis (PCA) 
is performed to capture the common information underlying 160 financial variables from 
Ludvigson and Ng (2007) and Welch and Goyal (2008). With this step, I aim to span the identity of 
the investors’ information set, without relying on a small subset of arbitrary conditioning variables, 
by compressing a much richer source of information into a small set of factors.  
My new set of predictors, including a small number of principal components and the well-
known predicting variables in Welch and Goyal (2008), enters the second stage. In this stage, to 
address the inherent, highly complex and non-linear relations between the expected excess return 
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and the information set, I use the BRT technique that is developed in the machine learning. Unlike 
any parametric models imposing strong modelling assumptions, the non-parametric regression trees 
estimate the unknown function by breaking up the predictor space through a sequence of pierce-
wise constant models. To understand the method, it is easier to express the conditional expectation 
estimation through the concept of basis functions. Generally, the conditional expectation of a 
variable 𝑌, the regression problem seeks to approximate the unknown function from basis function 
expansions of input 𝑋 (information variables) 
 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥) = �𝛽𝑖ℎ(𝑥;𝜃)𝑝
𝑖=1
 (3.1) 
where 𝛽 is the expansion coefficients and ℎ is the basis functions of the input 𝑋, 
parameterized by 𝜃. Traditionally, the linear regression is convenient because it approximates 𝑓(𝑥) 
by first-order Taylor expansion and ℎ(𝑥,𝜃) = 𝑥. However, linearity is unlikely in modelling the 
conditional expected return because the data relates in a complicated and non-linear nature (Brandt 
and Wang (2007)). Instead of assuming a linear functional form, the regression trees approximate 
the unknown function by recursively partitioning the predictor space 𝑋 into disjoint sub-regions; 
and ideally until the information is “tamed”, simple constant models are fit into these regions. The 
regression tree method forms the basis functions of 𝑋 through parameter 𝜃 which decides the 
partitioning variables, partitioning values, and the prediction rule within regions. 
Figure 3.1 provides a visual explanation of how the regression tree works. The variables and 
their associated values are the splitting parameters. Numbers within circles are constant values 
within each partitioned region, which are used to model the expected risk premium. For example, 
corporate bond return is first chosen to split the sample at -2.5%. In the region where corporate 
bond return (𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟) is less than -2.5%, the 8𝑡ℎ principal component (𝑃𝐶8) is a subsequent split at 
the value of 0.45. If the 𝑃𝐶8 ≥ 0.45, the constant -7.1% is a fitted value of the equity premium, 
whereas a further split is needed for the region in which 𝑃𝐶8 < 0.45. The procedure continues until 
some stopping criteria are reached. The model can then form the prediction by summing up 
constant values in corresponding bins. 
Furthermore, I employ a type of ensemble methods, known as boosting, to improve the model’s fit. 
The idea of the ensemble scheme, similar to those discussed in the forecast combination literature 
(Rapach, et al. (2010)) is to aggregate the predictions from models which do not perform well 
individually into one with considerably improved properties. In this context, the simple individual 
models are the trees. The algorithm builds a sequence of small trees (typically after 1 split), in 
which subsequent trees seek to minimise the residuals weighted by previous trees’ errors. As a 
result, the final model is the sum of the forecasts from all of the small trees. The BRT methodology, 
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perhaps one of the most powerful ideas recently developed in machine learning literature, not only 
helps to extract unknown functional form, but also has the ability to handle high dimensional data 
(Hastie, et al. (2009)). Yet, this method has only found a few applications in the finance literature 
(see Rossi and Timmermann (2010) on risk-return trade-off; and Ng (2014) on business cycles). 
Figure 3.1: A Visual Demonstration of the Regression Tree Methodology 
 
To avoid overfitting and maintain generalisation of the model, it is important to build the 
model in a training set and form predictions on a test set, i.e. out-of-sample.13 In this study the risk 
                                                 
13 Ideally, a sample is divided into 3 parts: namely, a training period, a validation period, and an evaluation 
period, to estimate and assess a model. The training period is used to fit the model; the validation period is 
used to select the best set of model parameters by minimising the prediction error criteria; once the final 
model with the best set of parameters is built, the test period is used to evaluate the true test errors of the 
resulting model. If the fitting model is adapted to the training data by minimising an error criterion, it is 
apparent that the training error rate underestimates the true error rate. As a result, it is necessary to assess the 
generalisation error of the model by test set. I omit the validation step because the data is insufficient (Hastie, 
et al. (2009), page 241). 
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premium is estimated out-of-sample with recursive training periods. Following Ludvigson and Ng 
(2007), I use the first ten years from 1960:01 to 1969:12 to fit the PCA and the BRTs, and in turn 
estimate the first predicted risk premium in 1970:01. The forecast for 1970:02 is produced by fitting 
the two-stage procedure in an expanding training window from 1960:1 to 1970:01. The predicted 
values in the out-of-sample test set serve as the empirical proxy in the main hypothesis test of 
whether or not the risk premium is always positive.  
The findings can be summarised as follows. First, the out-of-sample 𝑅2 supports the validity 
of my two-stage methodology in forming the conditional risk premium. The predictive power of 
future returns consistently beats that of the historical mean returns and their linear counterparts 
(kitchen-sink OLS and Least Angle Regression of Efron, Hastie, Johnstone and Tibshirani (2004)). 
I attribute this superior performance to the ability of the technique in capturing the investors’ 
information identity and its underlying complicated data generating process. Second, I find strong 
evidence to support the existence of negative risk premium in some states of the world, which is 
related to periods in which corporate bond returns and long term government bond rates of return 
are low, along with the preceding period experiencing a negative risk premium, and a downward-
sloping term structure of interest rate. My result raises a question mark over a recent practice that 
imposes the positive risk premium constraint in predictive models (Pettenuzzo, et al. (2013)). 
I relate and contribute to several strands of literature. Empirically, the positive risk premium 
restriction remains an under-researched question despite its importance in theoretical modelling. I 
am among a few who have conducted a direct empirical test with this restriction (for example, 
Boudoukh, et al. (1997); Boudoukh, et al. (1993); and Walsh (2014)). Unlike previous studies using 
the realised return as a proxy for the expected return, I explicitly model conditional expected return 
by adopting the superior conditional expectations model. I am the first to apply the BRT in testing 
this empirical question. Rossi and Timmermann (2010) also use this technique and focus on the 
time varying risk-return trade-off, while Ng (2014) aims to detect the peaks and troughs of business 
cycles. I highlight the importance to address the non-linear nature of the information set and 
expectations. Finally, my PCA is in a similar spirit, yet simpler than that of  Ludvigson and Ng 
(2007) in addressing the dimensionality problem in the standard linear regression as well as the 
identity of the investors’ information set.14 
                                                 
14 Ludvigson and Ng (2007) adopt dynamic factor analysis to extract latent factors underlying the original set 
of predictors. However, they adopt linear regression to form expectations. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates the research method, followed 
by a brief data description in Section 3.3. Empirical results are discussed in Section 3.4. The chapter 
conclusion is offered in Section 3.5. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
Suppose there are a 𝑇 × 𝐾 matrix 𝑋 and a 𝑇 × 1 vector 𝑌 representing K information 
variables and a dependent variable 𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 (ex-post stock excess returns), respectively, over T 
periods. The traditional linear regression faces a practical degrees-of-freedom problem when the 
number of potential predictors 𝐾 approaches the number of observations 𝑇; and when 𝐾 > 𝑇, the 
estimation cannot be performed. The principal component analysis (PCA) circumvents this issue by 
linearly combining the available predictors into several orthogonalised common factors that 
collectively help to explain most variations among the original set. In particular, the first principal 
component 𝑍1  has the form: 
 𝑍1 = 𝑋𝐶1 (3.2) 
where 𝐶1 is the 𝐾 × 1 loading vector 
𝑋 is the 𝑇 × 𝐾 matrix of the information variables. 
𝑍1 is the 𝑇 × 1 principal component. 
To capture a large fraction of variation in 𝑋, the loadings vector 𝐶1 is the solution of the 
optimisation problem that ensures the sample variance of 𝑍1 is the largest: 
 max
𝑣1
𝐶1𝑇Σ𝐶1  𝑅𝐷𝑏𝑠𝑁𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝐶 𝐶1𝑇𝐶1 = 1 (3.3) 
where Σ = X𝑇𝑋/(𝑁𝑇 − 1) is the sample covariance matrix of 𝑋 with elements being 
centred. 
The normalisation constraint 𝐶1𝑇𝐶1 = 1 limits the value of 𝐶1 so that it is not arbitrarily 
large, otherwise the variance of the component could be arbitrarily large. Differentiating (3.3) with 
respect to 𝐶1, imposing the normalisation constraint, I obtain 
 Σ𝐶1 = 𝜆1𝐶1 (3.4) 
where 𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. 
It is easily seen that (3.4) is the characteristic equation where 𝐶1 is the eigenvector with the 
associated eigenvalue 𝜆1. Therefore, the largest eigenvalue of Σ should be chosen because the 
objective function (3.3) is maximised. 
The second component is constructed in a similar fashion, with an additional constraint that 
it is uncorrelated with the first component. The objective function can be expressed as: 
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 max
𝑣2
𝐶2𝑇Σ𝐶2 
subject to: 
𝐶2𝑇𝐶2 = 1 
𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝐶2,𝑋𝐶1) = 𝐶2𝑇Σ𝐶1 = 𝐶2𝑇λ1𝐶1 = 0 
(3.5) 
Differentiating (3.5) w.r.t 𝐶2 and set the first order condition (FOC) to be 0: 
 Σ𝐶2 − 𝜆2𝐶2 − 𝜙𝜆1𝐶1 = 0 (3.6) 
where 𝜆2 and 𝜙 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with two constraints in (3.5). 
Pre-multiply 𝐶1 on both side of (3.6), and the FOC becomes: 
𝐶1𝑇Σ𝐶2 − 𝜆2𝐶1𝑇𝐶2 − 𝜙𝜆1𝐶1𝑇𝐶1 = 0 
Since 𝑐𝐶𝐶(𝑋𝐶1,𝑋𝐶2) = 0, the first two terms are 0 and 𝐶1𝑇𝐶1 = 1; therefore 𝜙 is necessarily 
equal to 0. The quantity reduces to 
 Σ𝐶2 = 𝜆2𝐶2 (3.7) 
Again, equation (3.7) is the characteristic equation and eigenvector 𝐶2 is associated with the 
second largest eigenvalue 𝜆2 of Σ chosen. Continuing the strategy until 𝑘𝑡ℎ step, I first obtain 𝑘 
loading vectors, which are the eigenvector of Σ corresponding to the 𝑘 largest eigenvalues. These 𝑘 
components summarise a large amount of information inherent in the original set of predictors.  
The principal components obtained in this stage will enter the second stage as predictors in 
addition to well-known variables documented in previous literature. In particular, I choose the first 
10 components, in conjunction with the 13 predictors documented in Welch and Goyal (2008) to 
serve as independent variables in my regression tree stage, which is discussed below. 
3.2.2 Regression Trees 
I provide the intuition how tree-based regression works; a more detailed material discussion 
can be found in Hastie, et al. (2009). Because the functional forms between the dependent and the 
independent variables are unknown, the regression tree seeks to estimate the unknown functional 
form through elementary basis functions. In particular, it divides the predictor space into non-
overlapping regions and simply models the response variable as a constant within each region. The 
splitting variables, splitting points and constant fit in each region form the nature of basis functions. 
Formally, in the first step the tree algorithm searches through the entire predictor space; and choose 
an independent variable 𝑠 and a splitting point 𝑅 so that the two defined planes are given by: 
 𝑅1(𝑠, 𝑅) = �𝑋�𝑋𝑗 ≤ 𝑅� 𝑣𝐴𝑑 𝑅2(𝑠, 𝑅) = �𝑋�𝑋𝑗 > 𝑅� (3.8) 
which minimises the sum of squared residuals criterion in the resulting regions. Specifically, 
the optimal parameters set (𝑠, 𝑅) is the solution of: 
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 min
𝑗,𝑠 �min𝑐1 � (𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑐1)2
𝑥𝑖∈𝑅1(𝑗,𝑠) + min𝑐2 � (𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑐2)2𝑥𝑖∈𝑅2(𝑗,𝑠) � (3.9) 
For a given pair (𝑠, 𝑅), (?̂?1, ?̂?2) is the solution of the inner minisation, which is just the 
average of the response variable in each region.15 
 
?̂?1 = 1∑ 𝐼(𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑅1(𝑠, 𝑅))𝑇𝑡 �𝑟𝑝𝑡+1𝐼(𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑅1(𝑠, 𝑅))𝑇𝑡  
?̂?2 = 1∑ 𝐼(𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑅2(𝑠, 𝑅))𝑇𝑡 �𝑟𝑝𝑡+1𝐼(𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑅2(𝑠, 𝑅))𝑇𝑡  
(3.10) 
where 𝐼(𝑥 ∈ 𝑅) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 and is 0 otherwise, 
In a similar manner, the subsequent optimal split (a splitting point and a predictor) is 
decided by minimising the sum of squared residuals in the resulting regions from previous splits, 
instead of searching on the entire sample space. The process continues until some stopping criteria 
are satisfied. Suppose there are 𝑀 regions 𝑅1,𝑅2, … ,𝑅𝑚 at the final step, then the fitted value of the 
regression tree is: 
 
𝑓(𝑥) = � 𝑐𝑚𝐼(𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑚)𝑀
𝑚=1
 (3.11) 
where 𝐼(𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑚) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑚 and is 0 otherwise, 
𝑐𝑚 is the average of the response variable in region 𝑅𝑚. 
Regression tree analysis is a flexible method that can capture complex features of the 
predictors and the response variable. However, one problem associated with the size of the tree is 
the number of splits that should be performed. A large tree associated with more splitting points 
will result in fewer observations in each region, and therefore increases the risk of overfitting data; 
that is, the method might perform well in-sample, but the out-of-sample predicting accuracy is poor. 
On the other hand, a small tree might not be sufficient to capture important features in the data. 
Moreover, the above method of building a regression tree is a “greedy”, top down algorithm in 
which a subsequent split is performed dependent upon the result of the previous split. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that this approach can obtain a global optimal solution, because what seems to 
                                                 
15 That is what it means by modelling the response variable as constant within each region. 
 
 
47 
be an inferior split initially might become a valuable step in getting a good split in the next iteration. 
I discuss in the next section the boosting algorithm that can overcome these potential issues. 
3.2.3 Boosting 
Instead of fitting the data into a single large tree with the greedy approach, boosting builds a 
number of simple trees in a sequential way and seeks an efficient way to combine them. This is a 
type of ensemble method. It initiates the idea that the collection of poor individual models can have 
considerably improved properties.  
More generally, boosting is a supervised learning algorithm that can fit additive expansions 
of elementary basis functions of the input, which are the simple regression trees, to approximate the 
unknown function. The aim is to build 𝐵 simple trees in 𝐵 iterations. There are three steps in one 
iteration. First, a small tree is built, typically after a small number of splits by fitting the 
residuals 𝜀 = 𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑓(𝑥𝑡), rather than the original response variable in each region.16 The reason 
behind fitting residuals is that it aims to grow a new tree in the region where the current fitted 
model does not perform well, which results in a high sum of squared residuals. That is the essential 
idea of a supervised learning technique, that it can iteratively “learn” the true functional form in 
response to differences between the original and generated output, 𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑓(𝑥𝑡). Second, the 
additional information of the new tree is “slowly” updated to the current predicting model. Third, a 
new set of residuals is calculated with the new model to prepare for the next iteration. The process 
continues after 𝐵 iterations and the final model is just the sum of 𝐵 fitted trees. The algorithm can 
be summarised as follows: 
Step 1: Initialise 𝑓(𝑥𝑡) = 0 and 𝜀𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 
Step 2: For 𝑏 = 1. .𝐵 iterations 
Build a simple tree 𝑓𝑏 with one split, fitting the residuals 𝜀𝑡+1 
“Slowly” update 𝑓𝑏−1 with the information from 𝑓𝑏 , using shrinkage parameter 𝜆 
𝑓(𝑥𝑡) ← 𝑓(𝑥𝑡) + 𝜆𝑓𝑏(𝑥𝑡) 
Update the residuals:  
𝜀𝑡+1 ← 𝜀𝑡+1 − 𝜆 𝑓𝑏(𝑥𝑡) 
Step 3: Final predicted model 
                                                 
16 I use one split, which effectively focuses on the main effect of individual trees, on approximation of the 
functional form.  
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𝑓(𝑥𝑡) = �𝜆𝐵
𝑏=1
𝑓𝑏(𝑥𝑡) (3.12) 
The superior forecasting performance of using boosting compared to the greedy top down 
approach can be attributed to three factors. First, building small trees can reduce the risk of 
overfitting in the regression tree. Second, and more critical to the boosting algorithm, is the use of a 
small λ shrinkage parameter that controls for the learning rate of new information in the current 
model. Empirically, a small λ, i.e. a slow updating rate, tends to produce better out-of-sample 
forecast accuracy because it avoids fitting the data too intensely Friedman (2001). Finally, boosting 
provides a type of model averaging by summing up all of the small trees, which enhances the 
stability of the forecasts (Rapach, et al. (2010)). 
Three main intertwined parameters are required for the empirical implementation: 1) the 
number of splits to use in building a tree in each iteration, 2) the number of trees to be built, i.e. the 
number of boosting iterations, 3) the value of the learning rate λ. I follow common practice in the 
machine learning literature and adopt: 1) one split, 2) 1000 boosting iterations, and 3) 𝜆 = 0.001 
(Hastie, et al. (2009)). 
3.2.4 Estimation Period 
It is critical to build and test the model in two different data sets because the method tends to 
understate the error rate in-sample (Hastie, et al. (2009), page 219). As a result, I follow Ludvigson 
and Ng (2007) and adopt a recursive window, with the first training period being 120 months, to 
build my model; that is, I construct my components and initial regression trees using data up to 
1969:12 and form the prediction in 1970:01, which serves as the first estimate for expected risk 
premium. The second estimate in 1970:02 is calculated from the PCA and the regression tree fitted 
during the training period from 1960:01 to 1970:01. As a result, the time series risk premium 
calculated out-of-sample includes 504 observations. These observations are fed into the multiple 
inequality constraints framework to test the null hypothesis of the positive risk premium. 
3.2.5 Model Assessment 
I discuss measures to assess the performance of the predictors and the model in this 
subsection. Relative Influence and Partial Dependence statistics measure the importance of the 
predictors in the model, while the out-of-sample 𝑅2 assesses the performance of the method in 
modelling the conditional risk premium. 
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3.2.5.1 Relative Influence Measure 
Breiman, et al. (1984) propose the influence measure to evaluate the contribution of the 
predictors in a single regression tree as below: 
 
ℸ𝑘2 = �𝚤?̂?2𝐼(𝐶𝑗 = 𝑘)𝐽
𝑗=2
 (3.13) 
where 𝚤̂2 = 1𝑇 ∑ (𝜀?̂?,𝑗−12 − 𝜀?̂?,𝑗2 )𝑇𝑡=1  is the reduction in the squared forecast error at the 𝑠𝑡ℎ 
node, 
𝐼(𝐶𝑗 = 𝑘) is the indicator equal to 1 if variable 𝑘 is chosen at 𝑠𝑡ℎ split. 
The idea of this measure is straightforward. For example, at the 𝑠𝑡ℎ step, a predictor and a 
splitting point are chosen to partition an identified region from previous steps into two sub-regions. 
The predictor is one that satisfies the objective function (3.9), i.e. minimises the sum of squared 
errors in partitioned regions. Therefore, if a variable is chosen multiple times, its importance in the 
model can be measured as the sum of the reduction in squared errors 𝚤̂2 across the regions where it 
is chosen as the splitting variable. I then average ℸ𝑘2  across boosting iterations to obtain the measure 
of influence of variable 𝑘, ℸ𝑘2�. Finally, I obtain the relative influence measure, 𝑅𝐼𝑘, of the variable 𝑘 
by dividing the influence measure ℸ𝑘2� by the total influence of all variables across the boosting 
iterations: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑘 = ℸ𝑘2�∑ ℸ𝚤2�𝐾𝑖=1  (3.14) 
where ℸ𝚤2� = 1𝐵 ∑ ℸ𝑘2𝐵𝑏=1  is the influence measure of variable 𝑖 across 𝐵 iterations. 
3.2.5.2 Partial Dependence Plots 
While the relative influence shows the importance of predictors in fitting future stock 
returns, partial dependence plots inform on the marginal effect of individual variables on the 
conditional expected return. The marginal effect of variable 𝑋𝑘 on 𝑟𝑝, 𝑓𝑘(𝑋𝑘), is defined below: 
 𝑓𝑘(𝑋𝑘) = 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑓(𝑋𝑘,𝑋𝐶) (3.15) 
where 𝑋𝐶  is the information set that excludes variable 𝑋𝑘. 
The idea of this measure is that it averages the effect of all variables in 𝑋𝐶 for each value of 
𝑋𝑘, and thus tracks the effect of 𝑋𝑘 on the predicted value of the response variable. The sample 
estimate of 𝑓𝑘(𝑋𝑘) can be calculated as: 
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𝑓𝑘� (𝑋𝑘) = 1𝑇�𝑓(𝑋𝑘,𝑥𝐶,𝑡)𝑇
𝑡=1
 (3.16) 
3.2.5.3 Out-of-Sample Prediction 
Although the above measures offer useful information about the validity of my two-stage 
method, they do not directly indicate that my model is in fact superior in modelling conditional risk 
premium. To assess the performance of my two-stage method in modelling the conditional risk 
premium, I adopt the out-of-sample 𝑅2 statistic that is commonly used in the literature (see, for 
example, Campbell and Thompson (2008); and Welch and Goyal (2008)): 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 1 − ∑ (𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑓(𝑥))2 𝑇𝑡=1∑ (𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑝���𝑡+1𝑇𝑡 )2  (3.17) 
where 𝑓(𝑥) is my two-stage method’s predicted value of expected risk premium, 
𝑟𝑝���𝑡 is the historical average of stock excess returns until time 𝑡 − 1. 
Following Rapach, et al. (2010), I assess the statistical significance of the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  using the 
Clark and West (2007) adjusted statistic: 
 𝑓𝑡+1 = (𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑝���𝑡+1)2 − ((𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑝�𝑡+1)2 − (𝑟𝑝���𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑝�𝑡+1)2) (3.18) 
Regressing the out-of-sample value 𝑓𝑡 on a constant, and calculating the p-value of the one-
sided test associated with the constant, I obtain the p-value for the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 . 
To gauge the economic significance of the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 , I calculate the utility gains for mean-
variance investors with relative risk aversion γ, who form monthly portfolios between stocks and 
bonds using forecasts from the predictive models as opposed to forecasts based on the historical 
mean (Li, et al. (2013)). Specifically, the allocation to stocks in the next period based on historical 
forecasts of expected return and variance is illustrated below: 
 
𝑤0,𝑡 = �1𝛾��𝑟𝑝���𝑡+1𝜎�𝑡+12 � (3.19) 
Similarly, 𝑤1,𝑡 represents the allocation to stocks in the next period if the investors employ a 
predictive model of returns: 
 
𝑤1,𝑡 = �1𝛾� �𝑟𝑝�𝑡+1𝜎�𝑡+12 � (3.20) 
In both investment decisions, I forecast variance of stock returns 𝜎�𝑡+12  using a 10-year 
rolling window of monthly returns (Li, et al. (2013)). The investors’ average utility, based on the 
allocation using the historical mean and the predictive model over the out-of-sample period, are 
illustrated below: 
 
 
51 
 𝑈0 = 𝜇0 − 12 𝛾 𝜎�02  (3.21) 
and 
 𝑈1 = 𝜇1 − 12 𝛾 𝜎�12 (3.22) 
where (𝜇0,𝜎�02) and (𝜇1,𝜎�12) are the means and variances of the portfolios’ returns based on 
the historical mean and the predictive model forecasts, respectively.  
The utility gain is the difference between 𝑈1 and 𝑈0. To report the annualised percentage 
return, I multiply (𝑈1 − 𝑈0) by 1200. The risk aversion coefficients 𝛾 =  1, 3, and 5 are chosen for 
the main results. 
In addition to 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 , I conduct the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression test of unbiased forecasts by 
simply regressing 𝑟𝑝𝑡+1 on the forecasts  𝑟𝑝�𝑡+1, out-of-sample, and jointly testing the null that the 
intercept is equal to 0 and the coefficient is equal to 1.  
3.2.6 Inequality Constraint Method 
Defining 𝜇𝑡 as the true ex-ante risk premium, the positive risk premium condition can be 
expressed as below: 
 𝜇𝑡 ≥ 0 (3.23) 
As 𝜇𝑡 is unobservable, I replace the 𝜇𝑡 in the inequality (3.23) with its proxy, 𝑓(𝑥𝑡), 
estimated by the two-stage procedure. If the positive condition is true, it should hold across 
different environments, which in turn implies multiple inequality restrictions. In particular, suppose 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡+  is the strictly positive information set17 that is available to econometricians, then the above 
inequality implies multiple restrictions: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑓(𝑥𝑡) × 𝑧1,𝑡+ ) = 𝜇𝑡×𝑧1,𝑡+ ≥ 0 
𝐸𝑡(𝑓(𝑥𝑡) × 𝑧2,𝑡+ ) = 𝜇𝑡×𝑧2,𝑡+ ≥ 0 
…………. 
𝐸𝑡(𝑓(𝑥𝑡) × 𝑧1,𝑡+ ) = 𝜇𝑡×𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ ≥ 0 
Furthermore, if I arrange the preceding set of inequalities and apply the law of iterated 
expectations: 
                                                 
17 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ ≥ 0 
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 𝐸�𝑓(𝑥𝑡)⊗𝑧𝑡+ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+� = 0 (3.24) 
where 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ = 𝐸(𝜇𝑡⊗𝑧𝑡) ≥ 0.  
Equation (3.24) is now similar to the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen and 
Singleton (1982)), but the parameters in this system are subject to a set of positivity constraints. 
The above restriction can be written as a system of N-moment conditions: 
𝐸�𝑓(𝑥𝑡)𝑧1𝑡+ � = 𝜃𝜇𝑧1+ 
……………. 
𝐸�𝑓(𝑥𝑡)𝑧𝑁𝑡+ � = 𝜃𝜇𝑧𝑁+ 
Given the null, 
𝐻0:𝜃𝜇𝑧𝑖+ ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 = 1 …𝑁 
versus 
𝐻𝐴: 𝜃𝜇𝑧𝑖+ ∈ 𝑅𝑁 
To test this hypothesis, Boudoukh, et al. (1993) develop a formal framework that takes into 
account multiple autocorrelation and cross-correlation of the conditional estimates, subject to 
inequality constraints. First, I estimate the sample means of the observable variables’ product. 
Specifically, 
 
𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+  = 1𝑇��𝑓(𝑥𝑡)𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ �𝑇
𝑡=1
 ∀𝑖 = 1. .𝑁 (3.25) 
I refer to this as the unconstrained model because there is no restriction on the sign of these 
estimates. They can be negative either because the null is false or due to sampling errors. 
Next, I calculate the sample means under the inequality restriction in the null 𝜃�𝜇𝑍𝑖
𝑅  by 
minimising deviations from the unrestricted model under the quadratic form: 
 min�𝜃�𝜇𝑧++ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+�′ 𝛺�−1�𝜃�𝜇𝑧++ − 𝜃𝜇𝑧+� 
subject to 𝜃𝜇𝑧+ ≥ 0. (3.26) 
where Ω� is the consistent variance-covariance matrix of the moments. I employ the 
Quadratic Spectral kernel with asymptotically optimal lag length to estimate Ω� (Andrews (1991)). 
The test statistic is illustrated below: 
 𝑊 ≡ 𝑇�𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑅 − 𝜃�𝜇𝑧+ �
′𝛺�−1�𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑅 − 𝜃�𝜇𝑧+ � (3.27) 
The idea of the test statistic 𝑊 is to measure how close the parameters of the restricted 
model 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑅  are to those of the unrestricted model 𝜃�𝜇𝑧+ . Under the null, the difference should be small. 
Wolak (1989) shows that the 𝑊 statistic is distributed as a weighted sum of 𝜒2 with different 
degrees of freedom: 
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� Pr [𝜒𝑘2 ≥ 𝑐]𝑤(𝑁,𝑁 − 𝑘,𝛺�𝑇𝑁
𝑘=0
) 
where 𝑐 is the critical value for a given size test, and the weighting function 𝑤(𝑁,𝑁 − 𝑘, 𝛺�𝑇) has 
exactly 𝑁 − 𝐾 positive elements. 
3.3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
I consider 160 financial variables that have been used in the return predictability literature. 
In particular, the information set includes 147 financial variables documented in Ludvigson and Ng 
(2007). The other 13 predictors constructed by Welch and Goyal (2008) include the following: 
Log dividend price ratio (𝑑𝑝), 
Earning price ratio (𝑁𝑝), 
Default yield spread calculated as the difference between BAA and AAA corporate bond 
yields (𝑑𝑁𝑓), 
Term structure (𝑡𝑚𝑅), 
Long term government bond yield (𝑙𝑡𝐴), 
Long term bond returns (𝑙𝑡𝑟), 
Stock variance measured as squared daily returns (𝑅𝐶𝑣𝑟), 
Three-month T-bill rate (𝑡𝑏𝑙), 
Inflation rate (𝑖𝐴𝑓𝑙), 
Lag excess returns (𝑙𝑟𝑁𝑡), 
Net equity expansion is measured as the sum of 12 months net issue for NYSE stocks 
divided by the market capitalisation of the stocks (𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑅) (Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson and 
Roberts (2007)), 
Book to market ratio (𝑏𝑚) Kelly and Pruitt (2013), and 
Corporate bond returns (𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟). 
The stock market excess return (𝑟𝑝) is calculated as monthly CRSP market portfolio return 
including dividend minus the 1-month T-bill rate (𝑅𝑓𝑟𝑁𝑁) (continuously compounded). The sample 
period spans 1960 to 2011. 
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the predictors from Welch and Goyal 
(2008) and the conditional risk premium generated by the two-stage method. The statistics for 
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independent variables are similar to those that have been reported elsewhere (see, for example, 
Pettenuzzo, et al. (2013)). The monthly mean risk premium 𝑓(𝑥) is 0.28% with the associated 
standard deviation of 0.47%. It is interesting to see that there are negative observations in my risk 
premium prediction, indicating that it is meaningful to detect whether the positivity of the equity 
risk premium states is violated, or whether the negative fitted values are just an artefact of my 
sampling error. This is where I deviate from the prior literature, by not restricting my forecasts 
above 0 to improve the predictive performance (Campbell and Thompson (2008)), but rather testing 
whether or not these negative states provide evidence against the positivity condition of the risk 
premium. 
For brevity, Panel B presents the statistics of the first ten principal components estimated in 
the first stage of the procedure. The first component (𝑃𝐶1) explains the largest proportion of 
variation, 62%, in the original set of 160 financial variables. Orthogonalised to the first component, 
the second component (𝑃𝐶2) explains 4.48% of the variation in the predictor space. The 
contribution explained by subsequent components is steadily declining, with the 10𝑡ℎ component 
(PC10) capturing only 0.75% of the variation in my information set. I show later in Table 3.3 that 
the predictive performance of my model improves significantly once the first component is 
introduced, and remains stable as the number of components increases. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the monthly risk premium on the CRSP US market from 1970:1 
to 2011:12. These are estimated by the two-stage method described in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, and those of 
13 information variables documented in Welch and Goyal (2008) (Panel A) from 1960:1 to 2011:12. Panel B 
reports the relative and cumulative importance of the first 10 common components, 𝑅2 and Cum, 
respectively. 𝑅2 is reflected by the fraction of total variance in the original 160 information variables 
collected from Ludvigson and Ng (2007) and Welch and Goyal (2008). Panel C reports the relative influence 
of the 10 principal components and 13 information variables in Welch and Goyal (2008) entering the boosted 
regression tree stage described in Sections 3.2.5. The cumulative relative influence of the Top 3, 5, and 10 
are also reported in Panel C. 
Panel A: Instrumental Variables 
 
Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Std. Dev. 
𝒓𝒑�  0.0028 -0.0162 0.0013 0.0040 0.0053 0.0168 0.0047 
𝑏.𝑚 0.5189 0.1205 0.2949 0.4943 0.6872 1.2065 0.2633 
𝑙𝑡𝐴 0.0688 0.0248 0.0481 0.0641 0.0821 0.1482 0.0250 
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑅 0.0131 -0.0576 0.0055 0.0155 0.0258 0.0512 0.0189 
𝑅𝑓𝑟𝑁  0.0043 0.0000 0.0027 0.0041 0.0054 0.0136 0.0025 
𝑖𝐴𝑓𝑙 0.0033 -0.0192 0.0012 0.0029 0.0051 0.0179 0.0035 
𝑙𝑡𝑟 0.0065 -0.1124 -0.0095 0.0045 0.0229 0.1523 0.0292 
𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟 0.0065 -0.0949 -0.0070 0.0051 0.0190 0.1560 0.0261 
𝑅𝐶𝑣𝑟 0.0022 0.0001 0.0006 0.0011 0.0022 0.0709 0.0045 
𝑁𝑝 -2.8275 -4.8365 -3.0330 -2.8581 -2.5646 -1.8987 0.4440 
𝑑𝑝 -3.5587 -4.5240 -3.8794 -3.4974 -3.3076 -2.7533 0.4004 
𝑑𝑁𝑓 0.0102 0.0032 0.0072 0.0089 0.0121 0.0338 0.0046 
𝑡𝑚𝑅 0.0175 -0.0365 0.0064 0.0168 0.0301 0.0455 0.0150 
𝑙𝑟𝑁𝑡 0.0033 -0.2605 -0.0223 0.0080 0.0341 0.1470 0.0455 
 
Panel B: Principal Components (%) 
 
𝑃𝐶1 𝑃𝐶2 𝑃𝐶3 𝑃𝐶4 𝑃𝐶5 𝑃𝐶6 𝑃𝐶7 𝑃𝐶8 𝑃𝐶9 𝑃𝐶10 
𝑅2  62.8 4.5 3.5 3.2 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 
Cum. 𝑅2 62.8 67.3 70.8 74.0 75.6 77.0 78.2 79.3 80.3 81.0 
Panel C: Relative Influence (%) 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Variable corpr PC5 PC10 svar b.m dp PC9 ep ltr lret def 
 RI 32.02 26.36 15.78 5.48 4.13 3.42 2.10 1.80 1.60 1.32 1.19 
 Rank 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Variable infl ntis PC1 tms PC4 tbl PC8 PC3 PC6 PC7 PC2 lty 
RI 1.18 0.89 0.77 0.56 0.35 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.00 
 
Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 
         Cum.RI 74.16 83.77 94.01 
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3.4.2 Relative Influence Measure 
Table 3.1 Panel C presents the relatively influence statistics which measure the contribution 
of individual predictors in estimating the equity premium. Corporate bond returns appear to be the 
most important variable which obtains the relative influence weighting of 32%. Interestingly, 
although 𝑃𝐶5 and 𝑃𝐶10 only capture a small variation in the original information set (1.7% and 
0.8%, Table 3.1 Panel B ), they are the second and third most important factors in modelling the 
risk premium, which attract the relative influence scores of 26.3% and 15.78%, respectively.18 The 
well-known dividend price ratio is at sixth rank with the relative influence weighting of just 3.42%. 
The top three predictors dominate the sample and aggregate to a combined weighting of close to 
three-quarters. This evidence suggests the importance of some hidden factors that help to span 
investors’ information set in forming expectations. Furthermore, as I show later in Panel A of Table 
3.3, the predictive performance of my model improves significantly once the first component is 
introduced and remains stable as the number of components increases. 
3.4.3 Partial Dependence Plots 
Turning to Figure 3.2, which presents the partial dependence plots of 5 predictors, including 
corporate bond returns, 5𝑡ℎ principal component (𝑃𝐶5), stock variance, term structure, and 
dividend price ratio in modelling the equity risk premium, I gain some insight into the existence of 
non-linearity in the relationship between the equity premium and information variables. 19 
With respect to the corporate bond returns, the relation is highly non-linear. In particular, when 
returns fall in the range of -10% to -5%, the risk premium does not change and remains around -1%. 
In contrast, when the bond returns increase from -4% to -2%, a sharp increase in the risk premium 
is observed. The relation again becomes flat when the predictor passes into its positive domain. 
Turning to the 5𝑡ℎ principal component (PC5) plot, there is a flat structure in the negative and 
extreme positive levels. Yet, in the intermediate range, a higher value of the component is 
associated with a lower risk premium reaching its minimum at -0.6%. The non-linear pattern 
persists in the term structure of the interest rate. Although there is a general positive relation 
                                                 
18 Note that the relative influence measure provides the ranking of 23 variables in the predictor space (13 
variables from Welch and Goyal (2008) and 10 components from step 1. The ranking of the three most 
important variables remains robust to the number of components entering the BRT stage. 
19 For brevity, I present the plots for 5 predictors. Other predictors also exhibit a complicated relationship 
with the expected-risk premium. 
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between the term structure and the equity risk premium, the slope is particularly steep across the 
mid-range observations. Finally, the dividend price ratio shows the strongest positive relation across 
the high value range, whereas it remains constant mostly across lower values. Clearly, the partial 
dependence plots raise a concern over the assumption of using a linear functional form in modelling 
the conditional expected return in the prior literature. As the non-linearities are evident across all 
predictors, accounting for these effects might help capture the true conditional risk premium. I turn 
next to the out-of-sample evaluation to provide formal evidence in relation to this claim. 
 
Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of the Information Variables on the Expected Return  
These figures present partial dependence plots for the mean risk premium, based on the five 
predictors during the full sample period 1960:1-2011:12: namely, corporate bond returns (𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟), 5𝑡ℎprincipal component (𝑃𝐶5), stock variance (𝑅𝐶𝑣𝑟), and term structure (𝑡𝑚𝑅). The horizontal 
axis presents the sample values of the predictors. The vertical axis illustrates the conditional risk 
premium as a function of the individual predictor. 
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3.4.4 Out-of-Sample 𝑹𝑶𝑶𝑶𝟐  
3.4.4.1 Comparison with Linear Models 
Panel A of Table 3.2 directly compares the out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  and the associated p-values 
of my method, as opposed to those of pooled OLS (kitchen sink) and Least Angle Regression 
(LAR).20 LAR can be thought of as a linear counterpart to my regression trees. In this setting, I 
build a LAR model and form prediction of stock returns with the top 3 predictors.21 I also report the 
economic significance of these 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  through the gain in utility for mean-variance investors, with 
three different degrees of relative risk aversion 𝛾 (𝛾 = 1,3,𝑣𝐴𝑑 5). 
Not surprisingly, the kitchen sink OLS performs the worst in predicting future stock excess 
returns, with 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  being -10.41%. This is high in absolute value, so the historical average 
outperforms prediction generated by the OLS model. The low 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  of the OLS might be due to the 
linear assumption and degrees-of-freedom issues, which tend to cause the model highly unstable. 
LAR addresses the latter problem and in fact, shows a large improvement compared to the OLS, 
with the associated 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  equal to 0.66% and statistically significant at the 10% significance level. 
However, the LAR’s forecasts yield disappointing utility losses of 0.13% and 0.52% annually, for 
investors with risk aversion coefficients equal to 3 and 5, respectively. It turns out that the boosted 
tree estimation provides superior predictive performance. The 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 , 1.58%, with the associated p-
value of 1%, is twice as large as that of LAR. Encouragingly, the utility gains based on these 
superior forecasts are consistently positive and economically sizable, ranging from around 1.34% 
(𝛾 = 5) to nearly 6% (𝛾 = 1). These utility gains are all larger than those of the kitchen sink OLS 
and LAR, across different degrees of risk aversion.  
Panel B of Table 3.2 further reports the Mincer-Zarnowitz test discussed in Section 3.2.5.3. 
The joint test that the intercept is equal to 0 and the coefficient is equal to 1 offers a similar 
conclusion. The p-value near 0% indicates that the traditional OLS is highly misspecified, whereas 
the BRT model and LAR are not (with associated p-values of 91% and 87%, respectively). 
                                                 
20 LAR, recently proposed in the machine learning literature, is an efficient model selection mechanism that 
allows researchers to choose the best linear subset among potential conditioning variables in predicting, in 
this case, stock excess returns. I provide a brief description of LAR in Appendix A.2, while a more detailed 
discussion can be found in Efron, et al. (2004). 
21 For brevity, I choose the 3 best predictors in LAR. In an untabulated table, I find that the predictive 
performance of BRT outperforms that of LAR, regardless of the number of predictors chosen in LAR. 
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Table 3.2: Out-of-Sample Prediction Comparison 
This table compares the out-of-sample predictive performance of the two-stage 
method described in Section 3.2.5.3, as opposed to those of kitchen sink OLS and 
Least Angle Regression (Efron, et al. (2004)), from 1970:1 to 2011:12. The 
benchmark boosted regression tree uses 1000 boosting iterations, 10 principal 
components as well as 13 economic variables documented in Welch and Goyal 
(2008). The Least Angle Regression forms prediction based on the best 3 variables. 
Panel A reports the out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  and their Clark and West (2007) associated p-
value. The economic significance of the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 , measured by the average utility gain 
for mean-variance investors with three different relative risk aversion coefficients 
𝛾 = 1,3, and 5, are presented. Panel B illustrates the Mincer-Zarnowitz 
misspecification test discussed in Section 3.2.5.3. 
Panel A: Out-of-Sample 𝑹𝑶𝑶𝑶𝟐  
 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  p-value 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 𝛾 = 5 
Boosted Regression Tree 1.58% 0.01 5.99% 2.15% 1.34% 
Kitchen Sink OLS 10.41% 0.04 4.84% 0.87% -1.18% 
Least Angle Regression 0.66% 0.08 2.80% -0.13% -0.52% 
Panel B: Mincer-Zarnowitz Test 
 
Intercept Coefficient p-value 
  Boosted Regression Tree 0.0003 1.1425 0.91 
  Kitchen Sink OLS 0.0029 0.2361 0.00 
  Least Angle Regression 0.0008 0.7118 0.87 
   
3.4.4.2 Further Diagnostic Specifications 
In Table 3.3, I provide a more detailed picture of how my method fares in different 
specifications. I first show the importance of identifying the true investors’ information set by 
presenting the model’s predictive performance associated with varying numbers of principal 
components entering stage two. “0 component” is when I use the raw input (160 variables) directly 
in step two, without performing step one (PCA). I then increase the number of components entering 
the second step to 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 100, and 120. 
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that without step 1, PCA (0 component), the BRT performs 
quite poorly in predicting future excess returns. The 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  stays at 0.45% and is not statistically 
significant. However, once the first principal component is placed in the second stage with the 13 
predictors of Welch and Goyal (2008), predictive performance improves significantly to 1.27%, 
significant at the 5% level. It also generates sizable average utility gain of 1.26%, twice as large as 
that of no component. As the number of components increases, my method continues to beat the 
historical average, and reaches the best performance at 10 components. It is consistent with the 
evidence in Panel C of Table 3.1, in which PC5 and PC10 are among the top three most important 
predictors in forming the expected risk premium. The combining evidence highlights the 
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importance of identifying the true investors’ information set, which is essentially what my first 
stage tries to address. 
Turning attention to Panel B of Table 3.3, I present the model performance when I vary the 
number of boosting iterations to 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000 boosting trees. The overall observation 
is that the performance is not sensitive to this choice. All of the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Although there is a potential threat of overfitting once I increase the 
number of trees to 5000 as the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  declines to 0.34%, the forecasts generated by this specification 
yield the largest utility gain of 3.28% for investors with a relative risk aversion γ of 3. 
Next, I examine the robustness of the predictive performance as I vary the lengths of 
estimation and evaluation periods. Specifically, Panel C of Table 3.3 presents the out-of-sample 
performance when I change initial training periods from 10 years to 20 years, and then to 30 years, 
and thus my evaluation periods are effectively 1970:1-2011:12, 1980:1-2011:12, and 1990:1-
2011:12. Additionally, following Rapach, et al. (2010), other evaluation samples include Post Oil 
Shock (1976:1-2011:12), Technology Bubble (1:2000-2011:12), and the recent Great Recession 
(1970:1-2008:1). Overall, across different scenarios, I consistently find the out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  
positive, ranging from 1.29% to 1.58%. Most of them are statistically significant at least at the 10% 
level of significance, with the exception of the period between 2000:1 and 2011:12. This seems to 
be the strictest period, because within the course of only 11 years there are two major crises. 
Furthermore, the predictive performance seems to decrease after the Great Recession period. For 
example, the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  declines from 1.49% to 1.45% when comparing period (2000:1-2007:12) as 
opposed to (2000:1-2011:12). On the other hand, the utility gains are economically large, ranging 
from 1.03% in the period spanning from the Post Oil Shock (1976:1) to the Pre-Recession 
(12:2007), to 2.78% in the period covering the Technology Bubble (1-2001) up until the Post-
Recession (2011:12). 
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Table 3.3: Out-of-Sample Prediction with Different Specifications 
This table reports the predictive performance of the two-stage method, discussed in Section 3.2.5 under 
various specifications. Panel A presents the 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2 , the Clark and West (2007) p-value, and the average utility 
gain for mean-variance investors with a relative risk aversion coefficient equal to 3, when 0, 1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 
50, 100, and 120 components are included with 13 economic variables from Welch and Goyal (2008) in the 
boosted regression tree stage. Panel B reports similar statistics when the number of boosting iterations ranges 
from 1000 to 5000. Panel C shows the predictive performance of the method in different estimation and 
evaluation periods. The periods 1970:1-2011:12, 1980:1-2011:12 and 1990:1:2011:12 reflect that the initial 
training period are 120, 240, and 360, respectively. Pre-Recession 1970:1-2007:12, Oil Shock 1976:1-
2011:12, Oil Shock and Pre-Recession 1976:1-2007:12, Technology Bubble 2000:1-2011:12, and 
Technology Bubble Pre-Recession 2000:1-2007:12 periods are also under examination. 
Panel A: Number of Principal Components  
 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  p-value 𝛾 = 3 
0 Component 0.45% 0.14 0.63% 
1 Component 1.27% 0.03 1.26% 
3 Components 1.25% 0.03 0.98% 
5 Components 1.25% 0.02 1.15% 
10 Components 1.58% 0.01 2.15% 
20 Components 1.15% 0.02 1.88% 
50 Components 0.66% 0.08 1.54% 
100 Components 1.03% 0.03 2.13% 
120 Components 0.95% 0.04 2.10% 
    Panel B: Number of Boosting Iterations 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  p-value 𝛾 = 3 
1000 Iterations 1.58% 0.01 2.15% 
2000 Iterations 1.65% 0.01 2.29% 
3000 Iterations 1.44% 0.01 2.89% 
4000 Iterations 0.89% 0.01 3.01% 
5000 Iterations 0.34% 0.00 3.28% 
    Panel C: Estimation and Evaluation Periods 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂2  p-value 𝛾 = 3 
120 Periods 1970:1-2011:12 1.58% 0.01 2.15% 
240 Periods 1980:1-2011:12 1.47% 0.02 1.36% 
360 Periods 1990:1-2011:12 1.29% 0.08 1.85% 
    Pre-Recession 1970:1-2007:12 1.58% 0.01 1.98% 
Oil Shock 1976:1-2011:12 1.38% 0.02 1.39% 
Oil Shock Pre-Recession 1976:1-2007:12 1.32% 0.01 1.03% 
Technology Bubble 2000:1-2011:12 1.45% 0.13 2.78% 
Technology Bubble Pre-Recession 2000:1-
2007:12 1.49% 0.09 2.39% 
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3.4.5 Inequality Test 
The evidence above supports the validity of the two-stage method. I now apply the forecasts 
generated by the model to the multiple inequalities framework and test my main hypothesis: the 
positivity of the risk premium. In addition to testing the full sample (1970:1-2011:12), I consider a 
sub-period 1970:1-2007:12 which excludes the post Great Recession period based on previous 
evidence that my predictive performance deteriorates after the 2008 recession (see Table 3.3 Panel 
C). For the purpose of comparison, I also conduct the same analysis yet using the realised risk 
premium as a proxy for the expected risk premium. 
3.4.5.1 Instrumental Variables 
I construct the first set (Set A) of instrumental variables that are used in existing literature, 
including corporate bond returns (𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟), long term government bond returns (𝑙𝑡𝑟), and lagged 
risk premium in the inequality testing framework. Additionally, I consider a second set of 
instrumental variables (Set B) in which I replace the long term government bond returns with the 
slope of the term structure of interest rates, based on evidence that the term structure contains useful 
information about regime shifting states in business cycles (Campbell (1987); and Boudoukh, et al. 
(1997)). These states, predicted by theory, are likely to be associated with the negative risk 
premium periods (Whitelaw (2000)). I choose the corporate bond returns because the variable 
seems to be the best predictor in my predicting model (see relative influence measure in Panel C of 
Table 3.1). The choice of long term bond returns is the government counterpart to corporate bond 
returns. Finally, I choose the lagged risk premium following Ostdiek (1998). 
The variables should be constructed to be non-negative, so that the inequality restrictions in 
the testing framework are preserved. In this regard, I employ two transformation methods that 
correspond a priori to periods of low implied premium (i.e. low corporate and government bond 
returns, lagged negative risk premium, and downward-sloping term structure). In transformation 1, 
the low corporate bond return state is defined when it lies below the unconditional mean, and takes 
the value of 𝑧1,𝑡+ = 1, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝑧2,𝑡+ = 1 indicates the state when long term 
government bond returns are below its long run mean, and 0 otherwise. 𝑧3,𝑡+ = 1 is when the 
previous period has a negative risk premium. Finally, the term structure in set B 𝑧3𝐵,𝑡+ = 1 is when it 
is downward sloping. 
For transformation 2, I aim to improve the power of the test by taking into account the 
economic magnitude of states corresponding to low risk premium periods. More specifically, I 
define the low corporate bond return state as 𝑧1,𝑡+ = | 𝑚𝑖𝐴(0, 𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑡])|, where 
𝐸[𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑡] is the long run mean of corporate bond returns. In a similar manner, the low long term 
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government rate of returns state is 𝑧1,𝑡+ = | 𝑚𝑖𝐴(0, 𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑡])|, where 𝐸[𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑡] is the long run 
mean of corporate bond returns. I define 𝑧3,𝑡+ = 𝑚𝑣 𝑥�0,−𝑟(𝑝𝑡)� � as the lagged negative risk 
premium, and 𝑧3𝐵,𝑡+ = 𝑚𝑣 𝑥(0,−𝑡𝑚𝑅𝑡) as downward-sloping term structure. To provide an 
economic interpretation, I normalise these variable as 𝑧𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+𝐸�𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ � where 𝑖 = 1,2,3,3𝐵 and 𝐸�𝑧𝑖,𝑡+ � is 
the sample mean of 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+  in the context 𝜃�𝜇𝑧𝑖+  = 1𝑇 ∑ �𝑓(𝑥)𝑧𝑖𝑡+�𝑇𝑡=1  . 
3.4.5.2 Main Inequality Results 
Table 3.4 reports the empirical results for the positivity risk premium test. First, I present the 
results that employ the risk premium proxy generated by the two-stage method, in both the full 
period (1970:1-2011:12) and the pre-recession period (1970:1-2007:12), using the instrumental 
variables in set A (Panel A). Across all sample periods and transformation methods, the lagged 
negative risk premium has the strongest predictive power in detecting the negative risk premium 
periods. For example, with respect to the transformation 2 conditioning on this instrument, the 
conditional means of the risk premium for the full and pre-recession samples, weighted by the 
magnitude of this state, is -0.21% and -0.16%, respectively. Focusing on the dummy transformation 
1, conditional on the lagged negative risk premium, the means of the risk premium are slightly 
lower at -0.13% and -0.11%, respectively. For the full period using transformation 2, the low 
corporate and long term bond returns are associated with the negative equity premium states. In 
these, the corresponding weighted means of the risk premium conditioning on the low returns states 
are -0.13% and -0.08%, respectively. In contrast, the negative risk premium is not successfully 
captured by these two instrumental variables if I transform them using dummy method 1. One 
notable observation is that these univariate results seem to be weaker in the pre-recession period 
(1970:1-2007:12), relative to the full period (1970:1-2011:12). 
Turning to Panel B of Table 3.4, when the ex-post realised return proxy for the expected 
return, the lag negative realised risk premium continues to be a predictor in detecting negative 
realised risk premium. Conditioning on this variable, the sample means of the realised risk premium 
range from -0.05% to -0.42%. Interestingly, the corporate and government bond returns are now 
more strongly associated with low negative realised risk premium states. In particular, regardless of 
the samples and transformation methods conditioning on these two events, the sample averages of 
the risk premium vary from -0.07% (1970:1-2011:12; low long term government bond returns; and 
transformation 1) to 1.3% (1970:1-2011:12; low corporate bond returns; and transformation 2). 
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Table 3.4: Inequality Tests on the Positivity Restriction of the Market Risk Premium 
This table reports the statistics of the hypothesis test: whether or not the ex-ante equity risk premium is 
always positive for two sample periods, 1970:1-2011:12 and 1970:1-2007:12. W is a joint test of multiple 
inequality restrictions. The inequality testing framework is discussed in Section 3.2.6. To apply information 
variables to the multiple inequalities framework, I employ dummy transformation 1, and informative 
transformation 2. Detailed discussion of the transformation methods is presented in Section 3.4.5.1. 
Multivariate results are demonstrated for both transformations. Panel A reports the results where the 
predicted values from the two-stage method serve as proxy for expected risk premium. Panel B shows the 
analysis where realised measure proxies for expected risk premium. Panel A and Panel B use set A of 
instrumental variables, including low corporate bond returns, long term government bond returns and lagged 
negative risk premium. Panel C illustrates the results where set B instrumental variables are used. These 
variables include downward-sloping term structure, lagged negative risk premium, and low corporate bond 
returns. For brevity, only critical value, 𝑊 statistic, and p-value are shown in Panel C. The predicted risk 
premium indicates that the risk premium generated by the two-stage method proxies for expected risk 
premium. Realised risk premium uses realised measure to proxy for expected risk premium. I also report the 
standard errors of these conditional means and the probability that these states occur. All of the estimates are 
corrected for conditional cross-correlation and autocorrelation, using Quadratic Spectral kernel with 
asymptotically optimal lag length (Andrews (1991)). 
Panel A: Predicted Risk Premium 
 
1970:1-2011:12 1970:1-2007:12 
  Transformation 1 Transformation 2 Transformation 1 Transformation 2 
Lag risk premium         
Probability of State 18.08% 21.46% 18.82% 22.55% 
Conditional Mean  -0.13% -0.21% -0.11% -0.16% 
Standard Error -0.0007 0.0012 0.0007 0.0011 
          
Long term Government Returns        
Probability of State 48.48% 48.32% 48.41% 48.26% 
Conditional Mean  0.09% -0.08% 0.09% -0.06% 
(Standard Error)  0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 
          
Corporate Bond Returns         
Probability of State 31.92% 28.54% 31.18% 27.45% 
Conditional Mean  0.07% -0.13% 0.08% -0.08% 
(Standard Error) 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0006 
          
Critical Value 5% Level 4.02 4.19 4.06 4.25 
W Statistic 3.79 4.95 2.68 3.16 
p-value  0.06 0.03 0.11 0.09 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Realised Risk Premium 
 
1970:1-2011:12 1970:1-2007:12 
  Transformation 1 Transformation 2 Transformation 1 Transformation 2 
Lag risk premium         
Probability of State 17.53% 20.78% 16.68% 19.09% 
Conditional Mean  -0.23% -0.42% -0.21% -0.05% 
Standard Error 0.0040 0.0068 0.0040 0.0056 
          
Long term Government Returns        
Probability of State 48.20% 47.49% 48.41% 48.33% 
Conditional mean  -0.07% -0.40% -0.13% -0.27% 
(Standard Error)  0.0029 0.0047 0.0030 0.0044 
          
Corporate Bond Returns         
Probability of State 32.47% 29.22% 33.32% 30.91% 
Conditional mean  -0.2% -1.3% -0.2% -0.7% 
(Standard Error) 0.0031 0.0071 0.0030 0.0053 
          
Critical Value 5% Level 4.01 4.23 3.95 4.08 
W Statistic  0.37 3.18 2.68 1.54 
p-value  0.43 0.09 0.42 0.20 
  
Panel C: Set B Instrumental Variables 
 
1970:1-2011:12 1970:1-2007:12 
 Transformation 1 Transformation 2 Transformation 1 Transformation 2 
Predicted Risk Premium     
Critical Value 4.53 4.99 4.50 4.99 
W Statistic  4.40 4.95 3.52 3.16 
𝑝 − 𝐶𝑣𝑙𝐷𝑁  0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 
Realised Risk Premium 
    Critical Value 4.49 4.75 4.43 4.84 
W Statistic 2.71 3.29 2.72 1.65 
p-value 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.26 
 
These univariate results that detect the negative risk premium in some conditional states are 
only suggestive of the violation of the positivity restriction. To formally test the null hypothesis, 
whether or not the equity risk premium is always positive, I need to take into account the 
correlation across individual conditional estimates 𝜃�𝜇,𝑧𝑖+ . The autocorrelation structure of the 
instrumental variables results in noisy estimates of the conditional means in small samples, because 
the instrumental variables might be picking up similar sampling errors. Applying the inequality 
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procedure described in Section 3.2.6, I now turn to the formal evidence reflected by the W statistic. 
Looking back to Panel A of Table 3.4, I find strong evidence against the null of positive risk 
premium in the full sample period (1970:1-2011:12). After adjusting for the autocorrelation and 
cross-correlation structures of the information variables, the W statistic is equal to 3.79 (4.95) in the 
dummy transformation 1 (informative transformation 2). These statistics imply that I can reject the 
null of the positive risk premium at the 5% and 10% levels, for the informative transformation 2 
and the dummy transformation 1, respectively. There is a slight sensitivity when I test in the pre-
recession period. I cannot reject the null of negative risk premium if I use transformation 1. 
However, with the more powerful transformation 2, I continue to reject the null of positive risk 
premium at the 10% level. 
Focusing on Panel B of Table 3.4, the multivariate tests provide a stark contrast to the 
univariate test in the case of realised risk premium. Although I find strong suggestive univariate 
evidence that the information variables are associated with realised risk premium, after taking into 
account the autocorrelation and cross-correlation structures of these instruments, the multivariate 
test fails to reject the null of positive risk premium in three out of four scenarios. I only find 
evidence against the null for the full sample period and informative transformation 2. This stresses a 
disadvantage of the ex-post realised returns being a noisy estimate of the expected return. 
Applying set B instruments, results reported in Panel C of Table 3.4 offer a similar picture.22 
Focusing on the risk premium estimated by the two-stage method, in the full sample period the 
positivity of risk premium is violated at the 10% level in most cases. There is a minor sensitivity, 
and surprising evidence for the pre-recession period. Dummy transformation 1 in fact rejects the 
null (W=3.52), whereas the more powerful informative transformation 2 fails to do so (W=3.16). 
Turning to the realised risk premium counterpart, no evidence against the negative realised risk 
premium is detected. The W statistic values range from 1.65 to 3.29 and are not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A large number of studies focus on testing the linear restrictions imposed by theoretical 
models, yet mostly ignore the positivity condition of the risk premium. In this chapter, I empirically 
                                                 
22 I only report critical value, W statistic, and p-value on Panel C for brevity. The univariate results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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test this important restriction. The study’s contribution lies in the manner of modelling the 
conditional risk premium, in which I address two issues surrounding the traditional linear 
instrumental approach. Specifically, I adopt the principal component analysis and BRT techniques 
to alleviate criticisms pertaining to the identity of the investors’ information set, and the non-linear 
structure of the return data generating process. 
The empirical evidence suggests that my two-stage methodology is superior to other linear 
methods (OLS and LAR) in modelling the conditional risk premium. More importantly, I document 
that, in the US market, the positive risk premium condition is violated in some states of the 
economy, such as low corporate and government bond returns, downward-sloping term structure, 
and lag negative risk premium periods. The result implies a rejection of the conditional CAPM. 
Finally, I raise a concern over the current practice of imposing directly the positive risk premium 
constraint in a predictive model.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPLIED COST OF CAPITAL:  
A CLOSER LOOK AT MEASUREMENT ERRORS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The implied cost of capital (ICC) is the internal rate of return that equates the firm’s market 
value and present value of expected future cash flows. Due to its forward-looking nature, the ICC is 
an attractive proxy for the expected return, and has increasingly gained attention in the accounting 
and the finance literature.23 Much of the existing research aims to assess the relation between the 
ICC and firm characteristics or regulatory events, and draws inferences of those variables on the 
expected return (see, for example, Naiker, Navissi and Truong (2013) on option trading; Chen, 
Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011) on audit quality; Hwang, et al. (2013) on probability of informed 
trading PIN; and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) on default risk). 
However, the construct validity of the ICC as an expected return proxy is open to serious 
debate. Botosan, Plumlee and Wen (2011) report that after controlling for discount rate news and 
cash flow news, some ICC estimates are related to firm risk proxies, but others are not. Easton and 
Monahan (2005) conclude that the ICC, at either the firm or portfolio levels, is not a good predictor 
for future realised returns. In contrast, realising that the noise in computing the ICC at the firm level 
Li, et al. (2013) find that the aggregate ICC is quite successful in predicting future returns. The 
inconclusive evidence urges deeper enquiry, and has recently sparked a new research avenue 
focusing on why the ICC deviates from the true expected return, i.e. measurement errors. In his ICC 
survey, Easton (2009) emphasises that measurement errors should be one of the focuses of future 
research on these estimates. 
The current chapter follows this research agenda. In particular, I build an analytical 
framework allowing cash flow expectations and discount rates to be time varying. I then conduct 
                                                 
23 Unlike factor-based models or realised returns which rely on noisy ex-post data, the ICC is forward- 
looking and directly derived from the firm’s current stock price and expectation of future firm’s 
fundamentals, e.g. analyst earnings forecasts. As the primary inputs to compute the ICC are analyst earnings 
forecasts and stock prices, which are determined by market participants, the ICC does not assume that the 
information set observed by the economic agents is the same as that of the econometricians in modelling 
conditional expected returns. 
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simulation and study the two aspects of measurement errors in the ICC. First, in the time series 
dimension, I seek to understand the extent to which the mean and variance of the ICC deviate from 
those of the true expected return, due to the constant term structure assumption. I highlight the 
consequences of the deviation in the regression context, particularly related to the interpretation of 
the regression coefficients’ economic significance. Second, I extend the framework to a panel of 
firms and years, and examine how measurement errors in cash flow forecasts, a critical input in 
calculating the ICC, can result in spurious regressions. 
Lambert (2009) suggests that among all the issues pertaining to the ICC, the lack of 
constancy is the most under-researched area. Despite a number of ICC models being developed, 
they all employ a common assumption, namely, the flat term structure of the discount rate. This 
assumption is in stark contrast to extensive finance research documenting the dynamic of the 
discount rate and a large proportion of cost of equity variation resulting from the intertemporal 
changes in the equity premium (Cochrane (2011); and Croce, Lettau and Ludvigson (2015)). 
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the term structure of equity is not flat (Ang and Liu 
(2004); and Callen and Lyle (2014)). If the expected return is time varying, the constant term 
structure ICC is the weighted average of the discount rates over time. The constant ICC will 
overstate/understate the short rates/long rates, depending on the shape of the term structure (Cready 
(2001)).  
A subsequent inquiry is to understand how the violation of the constant term structure 
affects established results, using the ICC as a measure of the expected return. It could be the case 
that even though the equity term structure is not flat, its effects are of second-order importance. For 
example, Botosan, et al. (2011) and Li, et al. (2013) still find that some static ICC models can track 
future realised returns quite well. However, Callen and Lyle (2014) show that the non-flat term 
structure ICC can have better predictive power of future realised returns than its static counterpart, 
and thus is a better proxy for the expected return. Little effort has been devoted to examining this 
area. 
In this regard, I examine the extent to which the constant term structure leads to the mean 
and variance of the ICC deviating from the true time varying expected return. I find that, if 
conditional expected return is time varying, the variation of the ICC is significantly smoother than 
that of the true expected return. The lack of variation in the ICC can severely bias the regression 
coefficient estimates, and thus lead researchers to wrongly interpret the economic significance of 
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the relationship they examine. Specifically, I find that an estimated coefficient is biased downward 
when the ICC serves as a dependent variable.24 Because an interpretation of economic significance 
depends on the magnitude of the coefficient and the distribution of the independent variable, given 
that the distribution of the independent variable is unchanged, researchers will understate the 
economic impact of the independent variables on the true expected return.25 
The second type of measurement error in the ICC stems from measurement errors in analyst 
cash flow forecasts, the most critical input into the ICC estimation. I show analytically and in 
simulations that this type of measurement error confounds the researchers’ inferences, i.e. it creates 
spurious regressions. The measurement errors stem from analyst forecasts that are 1) not 
sufficiently capturing the true market expectations of future cash flows, or 2) being systematically 
biased towards certain types of firms. 
To understand the first source of spurious regressions, note that price is a function of the 
future cash flow expectation and the expected return, thus any changes in price reflect shocks to the 
expected cash flows and/or shocks to the discount rate in an indefinite period. However, analysts 
only update their cash flow forecasts in definite short-term periods, typically one, two, or three 
years ahead, and then assume a constant growth rate into the distant future. As a result, they 
potentially miss a fraction of price variation resulting from cash flow expectation shocks of more 
distant periods (4,5,6,…∞). If the market price and these limited cash flow forecasts are used to 
solve for the ICC, the missing variation is transferred to the variation of the estimated ICC. If the 
cash flow expectations are truly related to firm characteristics, the missing variation is related to 
firm characteristics and transferred to the discount rate. The ICC is then spuriously related to firm 
                                                 
24 Researchers who seek to examine the relationship between expected return and variable of interest will 
draw inference from regressions of the ICC on the variable proxy. For example, Naiker, et al. (2013) study 
the effect of option listing on expected return on equity, by running regression of the ICC on firms 
with/without listed options. The inference is drawn from the coefficient estimate. 
25 Consider that a regression of the ICC serves as a dependent variable on a variable of interest 𝑋. The 
coefficient on 𝑋, 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶, is a function of the correlation between 𝑋 and the 𝐼𝐶𝐶, the variance of 𝑋, and the 
variance of ICC: 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝑏𝑣(𝑋,𝐼𝐶𝐶)𝑉𝑉𝑟(𝑋) = 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝐼𝐶𝐶) ∗ 𝜎𝐼𝐶𝐶𝜎𝑋 , where 𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝑉𝑣𝑟, and 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 are Covariance, 
Variance, and Correlation operators, respectively. Compare 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 with the true coefficient, 𝛽𝜇 = 𝐶𝑏𝑟𝑟(𝑋,𝜇)∗𝜎𝜇σ𝑋  
when regressing the true expected returns on 𝑋, the difference between the coefficients comes from the 
difference between the standard deviations of the ICC and the true expected returns. As 𝜎𝐼𝐶𝐶 < 𝜎𝜇, therefore 
𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 < 𝛽𝜇. 
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characteristics, even though in the theoretical framework the true expected returns are only related 
to systematic risk. 
The second source of measurement error comes from analyst cash flows being biased. These 
systematic biases are manifested in different forms and well documented in the literature. For 
example, Guay, Kothari and Shu (2011) find that consensus analyst earnings forecasts tend to be 
over-optimistic for growth firms. In addition, the forecast errors can result from sample selection 
bias in which, for example, analysts tend to cover large and financially sound firms (Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina (2002)). Irrespective of the forms of bias, the cash flow measurement errors 
are correlated with firm characteristic variables. If these mismeasured cash flows are used to back 
out the ICC, the resulting ICC will be correlated with firm characteristic variables.  
To better understand the issue, consider that the analyst forecasts are biased, whereas the 
price is efficient and captures the true expected cash flows and the expected return. If solving for 
the ICC from “contaminated” cash flow forecasts and true price, the ICC will deviate from the true 
expected return by the amount of measurement error in the cash flow forecasts. And if the 
measurement error is related to some types of firms, the spurious regression problem arises when 
one regresses the ICC on the firm characteristics and finds significant results. The measurement 
error gives the false impression that the expected return is related to firm characteristics. 
I contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, I provide a convenient analytical 
framework, allowing for time varying cash flow expectation and expected return, which can be 
useful in assessing and comparing the ICC and the true conditional expected return. Although the 
ICC tracks the true time varying expected return quite well, the ICC variation is significantly lower 
than that of the true expected return, due to the constant term structure assumption. This lays the 
foundation for my second contribution, in which I show that researchers can no longer correctly 
interpret the economic significance from the regressions that involve the ICC. Albeit statistical 
significance is critical in empirical research, correctly assessing the economic significance is 
equally important (McCloskey and Ziliak (1996)). The ICC fails in this regard. The third 
contribution surrounds the notion of spurious regressions resulting from the mismeasured analyst 
cash flow forecasts. With respect to the biased forecasts, i.e. analyst forecast being biased towards 
certain types of firms (see, for example, Ecker, Francis, Olsson and Schipper (2013)), for the source 
of biases), I go further than Wang (2015) by showing analytically how the bias is transferred to the 
discount rate, which in turn results in spurious regressions. Finally, I show that spurious regression 
can manifest under the inability of analysts to capture the entire cash flow expectation. Given that 
firm cash flows are related to firm characteristics, the missing variation of the cash flows not 
captured by analyst forecasts transfers to the discount rate, creating a false impression that the ICC 
 
 
72 
is related to firm characteristics. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to document 
this phenomenon. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the analytical framework which 
helps derive the ICC. Section 4.3 shows the simulation procedures for both time series and panel 
data. Section 4.4 reports and discusses results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.2.1 General Framework 
The implied cost of capital is defined as the internal rate of return that equates the present 
value of future cash flows (dividends) to the firm’s current stock price:26 
𝑃𝑡 = �𝐸𝑡(𝐷𝑡+𝑖)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑖∞𝑖=1  
where 𝑃𝑡 is the firm’s stock price, 
 𝐸𝑡(𝐷𝑡+𝑖) is the expected dividend at time 𝑡 +  𝑖 conditioning on the information at time 𝑡. 
For tractability, I follow Pastor, et al. (2008) to approximate the present value formula: 
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑘1 − 𝜌 + (1 − 𝜌)�𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗� −�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑟𝑡+1+𝑗�∞
𝑗=0
∞
𝑗=0
 (4.1) 
where 𝑝𝑡 is the log price, 
𝑑𝑡 is the log dividend, 
𝜌 = 11+exp (𝑑−𝑝)��������, 
𝑘 = − log(𝜌) − (1 − 𝜌)log (1𝜌 − 1), 
𝑑 − 𝑝������� is the average log dividend price ratio. 
I define the ICC 𝑟𝑒,𝑡 in the context of equation (4.1): 
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑘1 − 𝜌 + (1 − 𝜌)�𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗�∞
𝑗=0
− 𝑟𝑒,𝑡�𝜌𝑗∞
𝑗=0
 (4.2) 
                                                 
26 I define dividend generally as the true cash flows that are distributed to the shareholders. Various ICC 
models can further impose the clean surplus accounting assumption to link dividends with earnings forecasts 
(Gebhardt, et al. (2001); and Hou, et al. (2012)). Regardless of the definition, the implications remain the 
same. 
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I assume that the log dividend growth 𝑙𝑡+1 = 𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡 is time varying and follows an 
AR(1) process: 
 𝑙𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜙𝑔𝑙𝑡 + 𝑁𝑔,𝑡+1, 0 < 𝜙𝑔 < 1, 𝑁𝑔∼𝑁�0,𝜎𝑔2� (4.3) 
In addition, I assume that the log expected excess return 𝜇𝑡 is specified as the Conditional 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (Jagannathan and Wang (1996)):27 
 𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡 (4.4) 
where 𝛽𝑡 is the firm beta, 
𝜆𝑡 is the market risk premium. 
To allow 𝜇𝑡 to be time varying, I specify the dynamics of 𝛽 and 𝜆 as mean reverting: 
 𝛽𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛽 + 𝜙𝛽𝛽𝑡 + 𝑁𝛽,𝑡+1 (4.5) 
 𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝜆 + 𝜙𝜆𝜆𝑡 + 𝑁𝜆,𝑡+1 (4.6) 
where 0 < 𝜙𝛽 ,𝜙𝜆 < 1 and (𝑁𝛽 , 𝑁𝜆)∼𝑁([0 0], [𝜎𝛽2 00 𝜎𝜆2] ). 28 
These specifications are convenient for us to extend to panel data later, by modelling each 
firm by its individual β (see the simulation procedure in Section 4.3.2) (Ferson, et al. (2008)). Given 
the dynamics of the key parameters, Appendix A.3.1 and A.3.2 show that: 
 
�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗� = 𝑑𝑡1 − 𝜌∞
𝑗=0
 + 𝛼𝑔(1 − 𝜌)2(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔) + 𝜙𝑔𝑙𝑡(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔) (4.7) 
 
�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑟𝑡+1+𝑗� =∞
𝑗=0
𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆 + � 𝜌𝛼𝜆𝜙𝛽(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆)�𝛽𝑡
+ � 𝜌𝛼𝛽𝜙𝜆(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆)� 𝜆𝑡+ 𝜌𝛼𝑏𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝜌2𝜙𝑏𝜙𝜆)(1 − 𝜌)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽�(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆� 
(4.8) 
Substituting (4.7) and (4.8) into (4.1), true price can be expressed as a function of the cash 
flow expectation and the discount rate: 
                                                 
27 Instead of modelling 𝜇𝑡 following AR(1) process as in Pastor, et al. (2008), I model 𝜇𝑡 as a function of 𝛽 
and risk premium 𝜆 under the Conditional CAPM. 
28 The dynamics of 𝛽 and 𝜆 are well documented in the literature (for time varying risk premium, see 
Cochrane (2011) for a review; for evidence on the time varying beta, see Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2000); for 
modelling the conditional expected return using the Conditional CAPM with time varying beta and risk 
premium, see Ang and Liu (2004)). 
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 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑘1 − 𝜌 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑔(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔) + 𝜙𝑔𝑙𝑡(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔)
− �
𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆 + � 𝜌𝛼𝜆𝜙𝛽�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽��1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆��𝛽𝑡+ � 𝜌𝛼𝛽𝜙𝜆(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�� 𝜆𝑡+ 𝜌𝛼𝑏𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝜌2𝜙𝑏𝜙𝜆)(1 − 𝜌)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽�(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�� 
(4.9) 
Once the true price is known, I plug equation (4.7) into (4.2) and rearrange to obtain 𝑟𝑒,𝑡 in 
which analysts have a full knowledge of expected future dividends: 
 𝑟𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑘 + (𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)(1 − 𝜌) + 𝛼𝑔1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔 + 𝜙𝑔𝑙𝑡(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔)  (4.10) 
Realistically, it is not possible to have full horizon information about expected future cash 
flows. Thus, I relax this assumption and compute several variations of 𝑟𝑒,𝑡 in which analysts can 
only forecast cash flows accurately for finite T periods, and subsequently assume cash flows will 
grow at the constant long term rate   ?̅? = 𝛼𝑔1−𝜙𝑔 at the terminal period. Specifically, the forecasts 
comprise explicit forecasting and terminal periods: 
 
�𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗� = �𝜌𝑗(𝑑𝑡 + �𝑙𝑡+𝑖𝑗+1
𝑖=1
)𝑇−1
𝑗=0
∞
𝑗=0
+ �𝜌𝑇+𝑗−1∞
𝑗=1
(𝑑𝑡+𝑇 + 𝑠?̅?) (4.11) 
Under this specification, Appendix A.3.3 shows that 
 
�𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗�
∞
𝑗=0
= 𝑑𝑡1 − 𝜌 + � 𝜙𝑔(1 − 𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑔𝑇)(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔)�𝑙𝑡
+ � �1 − 𝜙𝑔 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑔𝑇+1�(1 − 𝜌)2�1 − 𝜙𝑔��1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔��𝛼𝑔 
(4.12) 
Substituting (4.12) into (4.2), I solve for 𝑟𝑒,𝑡𝑇 : 
 
𝑟𝑒,𝑡𝑇 = 𝑘 + (𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)(1 − 𝜌) + �𝜙𝑔�1 − 𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑔𝑇�(1 − 𝜌)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔� �𝑙𝑡+ ��1 − 𝜙𝑔 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑔𝑇+1�
�1 − 𝜙𝑔��1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔� �𝛼𝑔 (4.13) 
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where 𝑟𝑒,𝑡𝑇  is the ICC derived from the cash flows explicitly forecasted until time T, and then 
is assumed to grow at a constant rate.  
To incorporate measurement errors in analyst cash flow forecasts, I first specify the 
measurement error 𝑤𝑡 following an AR(1) process:29 
 𝑤𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑤 + 𝜙𝑤𝑤𝑡 + 𝑁𝑤,𝑡+1 (4.14) 
where 0 < 𝜙𝑤 < 1, 𝑁𝑤∼𝑁(0,𝜎𝑤2). 
To addresses the existing issue pertaining to biases inherent in analyst forecasts, I impose 
measurement errors in the cash flow forecasts: 
 𝑑𝑡+1������ = 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡+1 + 𝑤𝑡+1 (4.15) 
where (𝑑𝑡+1)�������� is the cash flow with measurement error. 
Thus the ICC with measurement errors in cash flow forecasts 𝑟𝑒𝑤 can be expressed as: 
 𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡 = 𝑘 + (𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)(1 − 𝜌) + 𝛼𝑔1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔 + 𝜙𝑔𝑙𝑡(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔)+ 𝛼𝑤1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑤 + 𝜙𝑤𝑤𝑡(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑤)  (4.16) 
I assume that the long term measurement error reverts to 0; thus 𝛼𝑤 = 0. Although the long 
term measurement error is 0, as can be seen in equation (4.16) the ICC 𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡 derived from the biased 
analyst forecast is a function of the cash flow growth 𝑙𝑡, the dividend price ratio 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡, and the 
measurement error of the cash flow forecasts 𝑤𝑡.  
I compute some variations of 𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡 where analysts only have limited information about 
expected future dividends. Yet, in this case the analyst explicit forecasts are contaminated with 
errors. 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡𝑇 = 𝑘 − (𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)(1 − 𝜌) + �𝜙𝑔�1 − 𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑔𝑇�(1 − 𝜌)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔� �𝑙𝑡+ ��1 −𝜙𝑔 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑔𝑇+1�
�1 − 𝜙𝑔��1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔� �𝛼𝑔+ �𝜙𝑤(1 − 𝜌𝑇𝜙𝑤𝑇)(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑤) �𝑤𝑡 
(4.17) 
                                                 
29 This specification is consistent with the evidence from Wang (2015) documenting that measurement errors 
are persistent. 
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4.2.2 Constant Term Structure 
The framework conveniently allows us to compare different variations of the ICC and true 
expected return 𝜇. In the context of a single firm, I first compare how the mean and variance of 𝑟𝑒 
differ from those of 𝜇 without the threat of spurious regression. To show how the smoothing 
variance affects regression coefficients, I consider two regressions where the expected return 
proxies serve as dependent as well as independent variables. First, I impose the condition that the 
variable 𝑥𝑡 is actually related to the true expected return 𝜇𝑡: 
 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑣𝜇𝑥 + 𝑏𝜇𝑥 ∗ 𝑥𝜇𝑥,𝑡 + 𝑁𝜇𝑥,𝑡 (4.18) 
Second, I consider the predictive regression of the ex-post realised returns on the expected 
returns proxies: 
 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑣𝜇𝑟 + 𝑏𝜇𝑟𝜇𝑡 + 𝑁𝜇,𝑟,𝑡 (4.19) 
In both cases, I compare 𝑏𝜇𝑥 and 𝑏𝜇𝑟 with the coefficients obtained from the regressions 
involving the ICC. In particular, I run the regression where the expected return proxies are the 
dependent variables: 
 𝑟𝑒,𝑡∗ = 𝑣𝑥 + 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑥𝜇𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (4.20) 
where 𝑟𝑒,𝑡∗  stands for any expected return proxies. 
I run the predictive regression where the expected return proxies are the predictors. 
 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑣𝑟 + 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒,𝑡∗ + 𝜀𝑡 (4.21) 
The aim is to study the difference between two pairs: 1) 𝑏𝜇𝑥 in (4.18) and 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑥 in (4.20); and 
2) 𝑏𝜇𝑟 in (4.19) and 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑟 in(4.21). As projected, the smoothing variation of the 𝑟𝑒∗ induces 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑥 to be 
significantly lower than 𝑏𝜇𝑥 , and 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑟 to be significantly higher than 𝑏𝜇𝑟. 
4.2.3 Spurious Regressions 
The literature typically regresses the ICC on the variable of interest, and draws inferences on 
the relationship between the variable and the expected returns. I address the threat of confounding 
inferences in such regressions. There are two scenarios in which spurious regressions can arise. The 
first arises because the analysts have limited ability to capture the cash flow expectations related to 
the variable of interest, x. I relate the true cash flow forecasts with the variable x through 𝑙𝑡: 
 𝑙𝑡 = 𝑣𝑔𝑥 + 𝑏𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑥,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑔𝑥,𝑡 (4.22) 
To understand how spurious regressions can occur in this scenario, it should be noted that 
analysts only update their cash flow forecasts for a finite horizon, typically one, two, or three years 
ahead, and then assume a constant growth rate into the distant future. Yet, if the market price 
changes reflect all of the changes in the discount rates and/or the cash flow expectation, analyst 
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forecasts may potentially miss a fraction of price variation resulting from the cash flow shocks of 
more distant periods (rather than the explicit forecast periods: for example, periods 4, 5,…∞). If the 
market price and these limited cash flow forecasts are used to solve for the ICC, the missing 
variation is transferred to the variation of the ICC. Because the cash flow expectations are truly 
related to the interest variable (equation (4.22)) the missing variation is also related to that variable. 
As a result, the ICC inherits the missing variation and is thus spuriously related to the variable of 
interest. 
Second, spurious regressions can arise when analyst cash flow forecasts are systematically 
biased. Empirical evidence on these biases, manifested in different forms, is well documented in the 
literature. For example, Easton and Sommers (2007) show that analyst earnings forecasts are 
typically over-optimistic; and the level of optimism varies across firm size. Guay, et al. (2011) 
document that analysts tend to provide more optimistic forecasts for growth firms. Additionally, 
biased cash flow forecasts can result from sample selection bias manifested under analyst coverage. 
For instance, small or distressed firms are under-presented in the I/B/E/S database, particularly in 
the early period (Diether, et al. (2002)). Regardless of the form of the biases, the measurement 
errors in analyst forecasts are related to firm variables. I relate the firm characteristic 𝑥𝑤,𝑡 to 𝑤𝑡: 
 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑣𝑤𝑥 + 𝑏𝑤𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑥,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑤𝑥,𝑡 (4.23) 
Equations (4.16) and (4.17) show that the ICC resulting from the “contaminated” cash flow 
forecasts and the true price, is a function of the measurement errors in the cash flows forecasts. As 
the measurement errors are related to the firm characteristics, the ICC is related to the firm 
characteristics. 
4.3 SIMULATION PROCEDURE 
4.3.1 Mean and Variance of 𝑹𝒆 of a Single Firm 
I simulate in the context of a single firm across time because this is where the flat term 
structure becomes an issue. I describe the simulation procedure to generate the time series of 
𝜇𝑡, 𝑟𝑒,𝑡𝑇 , and 𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡𝑇 . I choose values of key parameters as follows. To obtain the yearly unconditional 
mean of the market risk premium 6%, I set 𝛼𝜆 = 0.1% per month and 𝜙𝜆 = 0.8. Next, 𝜙𝛽 = 0.8, 
𝛼𝛽 = 0.2, and 𝜎𝛽 = 0.6 imply the unconditional mean and variance of 𝛽 equal to 1. Therefore, the 
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unconditional mean of 𝜇 is 6% per year. With respect to the dividend growth, I obtain the 
unconditional mean of 𝑙 at 2.4% per year by setting 𝛼𝑔 = 0.04% per month and 𝜙𝑔 = 0.8. The 
unconditional means of 𝑙 and 𝜇 result in 𝜌 = 0.9734 and 𝑘 = 0.1227.30  
Appendix A.3.4 shows that the return variance can be can be explained by the variance of 
the expected return, determined by 𝜎𝜆, and 𝜎𝛽, and the variance of dividend growth rate 𝜎𝑔: 
 
𝜎𝑡2 =  𝜎𝑔2
�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔�2 +𝜌2 � 𝜎𝜆2𝜎𝛽2�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�2 + 𝜎𝜆2 �𝛼𝛽 + 𝛽𝑡𝜙𝛽(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�
2
(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)2�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�2
+ 𝜎𝛽2�𝛼𝜆 + 𝜆𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽�𝜙𝜆�2
�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽�2�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�2 � 
(4.24) 
I set the unconditional mean of return variance 𝜎𝑡2 at (16%)2 per year, to match the S&P500 
variance data. I choose 𝜎𝑔 = (0.559%, 0.722%, 0.855%) so that the fraction of return variance that 
is explained by dividend growth 𝜙 = 𝜎𝑔2
�1−𝜌𝜙𝑔�
2𝜎𝑡2
 is (0.3, 0.5, 0.7).31 Setting 𝜎𝛽 = 0.6 and 𝛽𝑡 = 1, 
the fraction of return variance is explained by the variance of 𝛽 being 0.082. The remaining (0.618, 
0.418, 0.218) explanatory power goes to the variance of 𝜆 resulting in 𝜎𝜆2 equal to 0.19%, 0.156%, 0.113%)2 per month. Finally, I set 𝑣𝜇𝑥 =  0, 𝑏𝜇𝑥 = 1, and 𝜎𝜇𝑥 = 𝜎𝜆. 
The initial values 𝑙0,𝛽0, and 𝜆0 are set at their unconditional means. 𝑑0 is initialised at 0. 
The initial price 𝑝0 is calculated from equation (4.9). The simulation below is repeated in each 
period 𝑡, 𝑡 = 1 … . .𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑠, given the information at time 𝑡 − 1: 
1) Draw 𝑙𝑡 from (4.3). 
2) Compute 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑡. 
3) Draw 𝛽𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡 from (4.5) and (4.6). 
4)  Calculate 𝜇𝑡 from (4.4). 
5) Compute true price 𝑝𝑡 from (4.9). 
                                                 
30 The parameters are chosen to match the empirical data and existing evidence (see Cochrane (2011) and 
Fama and French (2002) for the equity premium and cash flow growth; see Faff, et al. (2000) for time 
varying 𝛽). 
31 The quantity of the stock variance driven by expected returns and expected cash flow shocks, is still open 
to debate (see, for example, Chen, et al. (2013)). I choose the range of the parameter to address this open 
research question. 
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6) Compute 𝑟𝑒,𝑡, and 𝑟𝑒,𝑡𝑇  from (4.10) and (4.13). The explicit forecast periods 𝑇 are 0, 3, 5, 
and 10. 
7) Generate 𝑥𝜇𝑥 from (4.18). 
The process above allows us to generate time series for all variables that I use to study the 
properties of the ICC in comparison to true expected returns. I consider the difference in mean and 
variance of 𝜇𝑡 and those of the ICC proxies. I obtain the mean difference ∆𝑀𝑁𝑣𝐴 by substracting 
the average of the ICC proxies from the average of true expected returns in each simulation. 
Similarly, the difference in standard deviation, ∆𝑆𝑡𝑑, is calculated as standard deviation of the true 
expected return less standard deviation of the ICC proxies in each simulation. Next, I highlight the 
implication of the difference in the context of regression, when expected return proxies serve as 
dependent or independent variables. To do so, I calculate ∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 which are differences between two 
coefficient pairs 1) 𝑏𝜇𝑥 in (4.18) and 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑥 in (4.20); and 2) 𝑏𝜇𝑟 in (4.19) and 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑟 in (4.21). 
Three alternative sample sizes, T=360, 480, and 600 months, are considered. I run 1000 
repetitions of the simulation for each sample size. The true values of the statistics (coefficients, 
difference in mean, difference in standard deviation, difference in coefficients) are their average 
values across simulations. The “t-statistic” is calculated as the average values of the statistics 
divided by their standard deviations across simulations.32 
4.3.2 Spurious Regression with Panel Data 
In this section, I describe a simulation procedure that generates a panel of 100 firms and 40 
years of 𝜇𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑖,𝑒,𝑡𝑇  and 𝑟𝑖,𝑒𝑤,𝑡𝑇 , and study how measurement errors in the cash flows can confound the 
inferences of regressions involving the ICC. As discussed above, the sources of measurement errors 
in the cash flows come from 1) the inability of analysts to capture full cash flow expectation and 2) 
analyst forecasts being systematically biased. 
I choose values of key parameters as follows. To obtain the yearly unconditional mean of 
the market risk premium 6%, I choose 𝛼𝜆 = 0.012% per year and 𝜙𝜆 = 0.8. The cross section of 
firms features the cross-sectional variation in the conditional 𝛽 and dividend growth rates. In 
particular, I generate long term 𝛽 for each firm from a normal distribution with mean of 1 and 
                                                 
32 As a robustness check, I calculate the t-statistics corrected for Newey and West (1994) in regressions 
(4.18), (4.19), (4.20), and (4.21). The results are qualitatively similar. 
 
 
80 
standard deviation of 0.5, which consequently determines 𝛼𝛽,𝑖 in equation (4.5). Similarly, I 
generate long term dividend growth from a normal distribution with the mean of 2.4% and standard 
deviation of 2%. I describe the evolution of a firm’s 𝛽 and 𝑙𝑡 by setting each firm’s 𝜙𝛽 = 0.8 and 
𝜙𝑔 = 0.8, respectively. I compute numerically for 𝜌 = 0.9734 and 𝑘 = 0.1227.33 
I set the conditional mean of return variance 𝜎𝑡2 at (16%)2 per year. I choose 𝜎𝑔 =(1.939%, 2.503%, 2.962%) so that the fraction of return variance explained by dividend growth 
𝜎𝑔2
�1−𝜌𝜙𝑔�
2𝜎𝑡2
 is (0.3, 0.5, 0.7). The remaining variations of return are explained by 𝜎𝛽 and 𝜎𝜆. 
Specifically, I compute three pairs of (𝜎𝛽;𝜎𝜆) as (0.237; 1.424%), (0.305; 1.833%), and (0.360; 2.161%) so that variation of the conditional expected return captures 30%, 50%, and 70% 
of return variance, respectively.34 I set 𝑣𝑔𝑥 = 𝑣𝑤𝑥 = 0, 𝑏𝑔𝑥 = 𝑏𝑤𝑥 = 1, and 𝜎𝑔𝑥 = 𝜎𝑤𝑥 = 𝜎𝑔 , in 
equations (4.22) and (4.23). 
For each firm, the initial values 𝑙0,  𝛽0, and 𝜆0 are set at their unconditional means. 𝑑0 is 
initialised at 0. The initial price 𝑝0 is calculated from equation (4.9). For each firm, the simulation 
below is repeated in each period 𝑡, 𝑡 = 1 … . .𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑠, given the information at time 𝑡 − 1: 
1) Draw 𝑙𝑡 from (4.3). 
2) Compute 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑡. 
3) Draw 𝛽𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡 from (4.5) and (4.6). 
4)  Calculate 𝜇𝑡 from (4.4). 
5) Compute true price 𝑝𝑡 from (4.9). 
6) Compute 𝑟𝑒,𝑡, and 𝑟𝑒,𝑡𝑇  from (4.10) and(4.13). The explicit forecast periods 𝑇 are 0, 3, 5, 
                                                 
33 Ferson, et al. (2008) simulate cross-section of firms by modelling the 𝛽. 
34 I obtain (𝜎𝛽;𝜎𝜆) simultaneously by solving for: 
𝜌2
𝜎𝑡2
� 𝜎𝜆
2𝜎𝛽2(1−𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆)2 + 𝜎𝜆2(𝛼𝛽+𝛽𝑡𝜙𝛽(1−𝜌𝜙𝜆))2(1−𝜌𝜙𝜆)2(1−𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆)2 + 𝜎𝛽2(𝛼𝜆+𝜆𝑡(1−𝜌𝜙𝛽)𝜙𝜆)2(1−𝜌𝜙𝛽)2(1−𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆)2 � = 1 − 𝜎𝑔2𝜎𝑡2�1−𝜌𝜙𝑔�2
𝜎𝜆2(𝛼𝛽+𝛽𝑡𝜙𝛽(1−𝜌𝜙𝜆))2(1−𝜌𝜙𝜆)2(1−𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆)2 − 𝜎𝛽2�𝛼𝜆+𝜆𝑡�1−𝜌𝜙𝛽�𝜙𝜆�2�1−𝜌𝜙𝛽�2�1−𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�2 = 0 .  
The first equation is to make sure that the remaining fraction of return variance is explained by (𝜎𝛽;𝜎𝜆), 
while the second equation assumes that 𝜎𝛽 and 𝜎𝜆 explain the same amount of return variation. I set initial 
values of 𝛽𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡 as their unconditional values of 1 and 6%, respectively. 
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and 10. 
7) Draw 𝑤𝑡 from (4.14). 
8) Compute 𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡 and 𝑟𝑒𝑤,𝑡𝑇  from (4.16) and (4.17), respectively. Again, T explicit dividend 
forecast periods are 3, 5, and 10. 
9) Generate 𝑥𝑔𝑥 𝑣𝐴𝑑 𝑥𝑤𝑥 from (4.22) and (4.23). 
The process repeats for the cross section of firms, and allows us to generate a panel of all 
variables that I use to study measurement errors leading to spurious regression. 
With spurious regressions, I consider two cases highlighted below: 
 𝑟𝑒,𝑡∗ = 𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑥 + 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑥,𝑡 (4.25) 
 𝑟𝑒,𝑡∗ = 𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑥 + 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑥,𝑡 (4.26) 
I examine whether or not the coefficients 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑥 and 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑥 ≠ 0 through the t-statistic and its 
95th confidence interval in the regressions (4.25) and (4.26). In each regression I control for the firm 
𝛽. I run 1000 simulations and obtain 2-way clustered standard error t-statistics in each simulation 
(Petersen (2009)). The value of the t-statistic is its average value across simulations. To obtain the 
95% confidence interval band for the t-statistic, I rank the t-statistics obtained from 1000 
simulations, and the two empirical cut-off points are observations at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. 
4.4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.4.1 Constant Term Structure 
In this section, I report the simulation results for the differences in mean and standard 
deviation of the true expected returns 𝜇 and those of ICC (𝑟𝑒,0, 𝑟𝑒,3, 𝑟𝑒,5,𝑟𝑒,10, and 𝑟𝑒) (Table 4.1). 
These in turn affect the economic significance interpretation of regressions involving the ICC 
(Table 4.2 and Table 4.3).  
In Table 4.1, I observe that the ICC proxies do not deviate significantly from the true 
expected returns in magnitude. For instance, with T=360 and 𝜙=0.3, the mean difference (∆𝑀𝑁𝑣𝐴) 
between 𝜇 and 𝑟𝑒 is very close to zero, with the associated t-statistic being 0.0087. Moreover, the 
differences in mean are robustly negligible across all scenarios when I vary T and 𝜙. In contrast, the 
variation of the ICC is significantly smoother than that of the true expected returns. The difference 
∆𝑆𝑡𝑑 ranges from 0.41% to 0.59% per month. As I decrease the relative importance of cash flow in 
explaining return variance 𝜙, the differences increase. For instance, focusing on 𝑟𝑒 and T=600, 
∆𝑆𝑡𝑑 increases from 0.49% to 0.59% when 𝜙 is from 0.7 to 0.3. Most importantly, these 
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differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level. The t-statistics are large, ranging from 7 
to 12, and they increase as analysts become better able to capture cash flow expectations in more 
distant periods. 
Table 4.2 shows the direct consequence of smoothing variance on the regressions involving 
the ICC as the dependent variable. In this case, the coefficients obtained from the regressions of the 
ICC are downwardly biased (equation (4.20)). I compare the coefficients from (4.18) to those from 
equation (4.20), measured by ∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 and its associated t-statistic. As can be seen from Table 4.2, 
the ICC is quite powerful in tracking the true relation of a variable and expected return, reflected by 
the t-statistic of the coefficient, 𝑡𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓; however, all of the coefficients, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓, from the ICC 
regressions are significantly lower than the true coefficient of 1. The coefficient values, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓, range 
from 0.1006 (𝑟𝑒,0,𝜙 = 0.3, and 𝑇 = 480) to 0.1113 (𝑟𝑒,0,𝜙 = 0.7, and 𝑇 = 600). The differences 
between the coefficients from the ICC regression and those from the true expected return 
regression, ∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓, are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicated by 𝑡∆𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓. The result is in 
line with the evidence in Table 4.1 that the ICC’s standard deviation is significantly lower than that 
of the true expected return. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison between the Mean and Standard Deviation of the ICC as opposed to that of the true Expected Return 
This table reports differences in mean and standard deviation between the ICC proxies (𝑟𝑒,0, 𝑟𝑒,3, 𝑟𝑒,5, 𝑟𝑒,10, and 𝑟𝑒) and the true expected returns 𝜇. 
∆𝑀𝑁𝑣𝐴 is measured by averaging the mean difference between 𝜇 and the ICC proxies across 1000 simulations. The associated t-statistic 𝑡∆𝑀𝑒𝑉𝑏 is 
calculated as the average value of the statistic divided by its standard deviation across simulations. ∆𝑆𝑡𝑑 is measured by averaging the standard 
deviation difference between 𝜇 and the ICC proxies across 1000 simulations. The associated 𝑡∆𝑂𝑡𝑑 is calculated as the average value of the statistic 
divided by its standard deviation across simulations. I vary the number of observations T (360,480, and 600) and the fraction of return variance 
explained by cash flow news 𝜙 (0.3, 0.5, and 0.7). A detailed simulation procedure is discussed in Section 4.3. 
  
T=360 T=480 T=600 
𝝓=0.3 
Proxies ∆𝑴𝒆𝑴𝑴  𝒕∆𝑴𝒆𝑴𝑴  ∆𝑶𝒕𝑺  𝒕∆𝑶𝒕𝑺  ∆𝑴𝒆𝑴𝑴  𝒕∆𝑴𝒆𝑴𝑴  ∆𝑶𝒕𝑺  𝒕∆𝑶𝒕𝑺  ∆𝑴𝒆𝑴𝑴  𝒕∆𝑴𝒆𝑴𝑴  ∆𝑶𝒕𝑺  𝒕∆𝑶𝒕𝑺  
𝑟𝑒,0  2.70E-06 0.0030 0.0054 7.1551 -7.65E-06 -0.0100 0.0055 8.5089 3.15E-05 0.0451 0.0055 9.3860 
𝑟𝑒,3  5.37E-06 0.0060 0.0057 7.7615 -8.31E-06 -0.0110 0.0058 9.2446 3.18E-05 0.0459 0.0058 10.1957 
 
𝑟𝑒,5  6.32E-06 0.0071 0.0058 7.9227 -8.55E-06 -0.0113 0.0058 9.4349 3.19E-05 0.0461 0.0059 10.4126 
 
𝑟𝑒,10  7.35E-06 0.0082 0.0059 8.0234 -8.80E-06 -0.0117 0.0059 9.5466 3.21E-05 0.0463 0.0059 10.5505 
 
𝑟𝑒  7.77E-06 0.0087 0.0059 8.0341 -8.91E-06 -0.0118 0.0059 9.5542 3.21E-05 0.0464 0.0059 10.5665 
𝝓=0.5 
             
𝑟𝑒,0  9.70E-06 0.0118 0.0048 7.3404 -7.62E-06 -0.0106 0.0048 8.3208 2.49E-07 0.0004 0.0048 9.2467 
𝑟𝑒,3  8.73E-06 0.0108 0.0052 8.3385 -1.05E-05 -0.0150 0.0052 9.4588 2.25E-06 0.0034 0.0053 10.5050 
 
𝑟𝑒,5  8.39E-06 0.0104 0.0053 8.6374 -1.15E-05 -0.0165 0.0054 9.7982 2.95E-06 0.0045 0.0054 10.8801 
 
𝑟𝑒,10  8.01E-06 0.0100 0.0054 8.8394 -1.26E-05 -0.0182 0.0054 10.0232 3.72E-06 0.0057 0.0055 11.1323 
 
𝑟𝑒  7.86E-06 0.0098 0.0054 8.8603 -1.30E-05 -0.0188 0.0054 10.0438 4.03E-06 0.0062 0.0055 11.1579 
𝝓=0.7 
             
𝑟𝑒,0  -1.88E-05 -0.0241 0.0041 7.1353 4.11E-06 0.0059 0.0041 8.3278 3.37E-06 0.0055 0.0041 9.3084 
𝑟𝑒,3  -1.83E-05 -0.0246 0.0046 8.4980 6.92E-06 0.0102 0.0047 10.0198 -2.17E-06 -0.0036 0.0047 11.2202 
 
𝑟𝑒,5  -1.82E-05 -0.0246 0.0048 8.9289 7.91E-06 0.0118 0.0048 10.5745 -4.11E-06 -0.0068 0.0048 11.8450 
 
𝑟𝑒,10  -1.80E-05 -0.0246 0.0049 9.2292 9.00E-06 0.0135 0.0049 10.9856 -6.26E-06 -0.0104 0.0049 12.2986 
 
𝑟𝑒  -1.79E-05 -0.0245 0.0049 9.2514 9.44E-06 0.0141 0.0049 11.0307 -7.12E-06 -0.0118 0.0049 12.3424 
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Table 4.2: Difference between the Coefficients estimated from the Regression of the ICC on a Variable of Interest, and those from the 
Regression of the true Expected Returns on the same Variable of Interest 
This table compares two sets of the coefficients: those in which the ICC proxies (𝑟𝑒,0, 𝑟𝑒,3, 𝑟𝑒,5, 𝑟𝑒,10, and 𝑟𝑒), and ex-post realised returns 𝑟1 serve as the 
dependent variables (equation (4.20)); and those in which the true expected return 𝜇 is used as the dependent variable (equation (4.18)). I report the 
coefficients 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 and their associated statistics 𝑡𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓. ∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 is the difference between the coefficients obtained from equation (4.18) and those from 
equation (4.20). 𝑡∆𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓 is the associated t-statistic of ∆𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓. The statistic is calculated by averaging the estimates across 1000 simulations. The t-
statistic is calculated by dividing the average statistic by the standard deviation of the statistics across 1000 simulations. A detailed discussion of the 
simulation procedure is in Section 4.3. 
T=360 
 
 
𝝓 =0.3 𝝓 =0.5 𝝓 =0.7 
Proxies 𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  
𝜇  0.9207 39.9799 - - 0.9369 52.3331 - - 0.9591 76.7328 - - 
𝑟𝑒,0  0.1011 7.1152 0.8196 30.9629 0.1053 5.4295 0.8316 32.2628 0.1105 4.3303 0.8485 30.9614 
𝑟𝑒,3  0.1009 14.1871 0.8198 35.2158 0.1050 11.0515 0.8319 42.4813 0.1105 9.0540 0.8486 51.4094 
 𝑟𝑒,5  0.1009 21.0200 0.8198 36.2432 0.1049 17.0565 0.8320 45.6018 0.1104 14.4784 0.8486 61.5132 
 𝑟𝑒,10  0.1008 35.3106 0.8199 36.8921 0.1047 34.5587 0.8322 47.5466 0.1104 34.1911 0.8487 68.8459 
 𝑟𝑒  0.1008 38.8481 0.8199 36.9899 0.1047 41.8480 0.8322 47.7145 0.1104 43.1048 0.8487 68.8698 
 𝑟1  0.9192 3.6761 0.0015 0.0059 0.9393 2.9764 -0.0024 -0.0076 0.9546 2.2920 0.0045 0.0108 
T=480 
             
𝜇  0.9218 50.0365 - - 0.9373 61.5055 - - 0.9601 85.9031 - - 
𝑟𝑒,0  0.1006 8.1733 0.8211 39.3805 0.1045 6.0081 0.8328 37.3651 0.1110 4.8786 0.8491 33.8242 
𝑟𝑒,3  0.1008 16.2622 0.8210 44.8094 0.1047 12.3350 0.8327 49.9836 0.1106 10.1333 0.8495 55.6963 
 𝑟𝑒,5  0.1008 24.0459 0.8209 45.9038 0.1047 19.1601 0.8326 53.8078 0.1105 16.1643 0.8496 67.0680 
 𝑟𝑒,10  0.1009 40.7153 0.8209 46.3364 0.1047 39.3962 0.8326 55.9902 0.1103 39.3315 0.8497 76.9500 
 𝑟𝑒  0.1009 45.4949 0.8209 46.2638 0.1048 47.5616 0.8325 56.0429 0.1103 53.2044 0.8498 78.0664 
 𝑟1  0.9114 4.1590 0.0104 0.0459 0.9249 3.3139 0.0124 0.0438 0.9570 2.7527 0.0030 0.0086 
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  Table 4.2 (Continued) 
T=600 
 
 
𝝓 =0.3 𝝓 =0.5 𝝓 =0.7 
Proxies 𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  
𝜇  0.9233 56.2518 - - 0.9381 68.5402 - - 0.9601 97.7309 - - 
𝑟𝑒,0  0.1017 9.7055 0.8216 42.3919 0.1054 6.9592 0.8327 40.6261 0.1113 5.5682 0.8488 38.4623 
𝑟𝑒,3  0.1013 19.4570 0.8220 48.6721 0.1051 14.3605 0.8330 54.1155 0.1108 11.5857 0.8493 63.5251 
 𝑟𝑒,5  0.1012 29.0047 0.8222 50.2594 0.1050 22.4434 0.8331 58.5097 0.1106 18.4965 0.8495 76.5967 
 𝑟𝑒,10  0.1010 48.9004 0.8223 51.3210 0.1048 45.7219 0.8333 61.5343 0.1104 44.0465 0.8497 87.8964 
 𝑟𝑒  0.1009 53.1242 0.8224 51.5103 0.1048 52.7055 0.8333 61.9474 0.1104 56.5879 0.8498 89.1080 
 𝑟1  0.9021 4.6444 0.0213 0.1062 0.9155 3.6590 0.0226 0.0891 0.9151 2.9073 0.0450 0.1424 
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Given that the distribution of the independent variables does not change, the low 
coefficients will result in understating the true economic significance of the variable on expected 
returns. To see the issue analytically, consider that the regression of the ICC serves as a dependent 
variable on the variable 𝑋. The coefficient on 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 can be expressed as below: 
 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑋, 𝐼𝐶𝐶)𝑉𝑣𝑟(𝑋) = 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝐼𝐶𝐶) ∗ 𝜎𝑋 ∗ 𝜎𝐼𝐶𝐶𝜎𝑋2  (4.27) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝑉𝑣𝑟, and 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 are Covariance, Variance, and Correlation operators, 
respectively. Comparing 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 with the true coefficient, 𝛽𝜇 = 𝐶𝑏𝑟𝑟(𝑋,𝜇)∗𝜎𝑋∗𝜎𝜇𝜎𝑋2  when I regress the true 
expected returns on 𝑋, the difference between the standard deviations of the ICC and the true 
expected returns produce the difference between the coefficients. As 𝜎𝐼𝐶𝐶 < 𝜎𝜇, therefore 𝛽𝐼𝐶𝐶 <
𝛽𝜇. 
In contrast, despite being less powerful in tracking the time varying expected returns, which 
are reflected by the t-statistics being always less than those of the ICC, the magnitude of the 
coefficients from the realised return regression 𝑟1 are similar to the counterpart case involving the 
true expected returns 𝜇. For example, with 𝜙 = 0.5 and 𝑇 = 600, the coefficient of 𝜇 regression is 
0.9381, which is quite close to the value of 0.9155 of the coefficient of 𝑟1 regression. The difference 
between the two coefficients (0.0226) is not statistically significant (t-statistic=0.0891). 
Table 4.3 presents the results with respect to the predictive regression, using the ICC proxies 
as predicting variables. I report the coefficients from regressing ex-post realised returns on the true 
expected return and the ICC proxies, and the difference between these coefficients (∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓). 
Statistically, the ICC is powerful in predicting future realised returns, reflected by the large t-
statistics associated with the estimated coefficients. It is interesting to see that the larger the cash 
flow shocks are affecting stock price movement (larger 𝜙), the weaker the predictive power of the 
ICC (t-statistics associated with the coefficients decrease as I move from left to right of the Table). 
This observation is consistent with Botosan, et al. (2011) who highlight the importance of 
controlling for cash flow news in predictive regressions. Similar to Table 4.2, I can see that the 
coefficients on the ICC proxies deviate from the true coefficient of 1. The negative sign on the 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 implies the coefficients on ICC are larger than those on 𝜇. In particular, most of the 
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coefficients on the ICC are statistically larger than 1, with the exception of 𝑟𝑒,0 (𝑟𝑒,3) where 𝜙 is 0.5 
and 0.7.35  
Interestingly, the more successful analysts are at capturing cash flow expectations into the 
distant future, the larger the difference between the coefficients. For example, focusing on T=480 
and 𝜙 = 0.5, the coefficient on 𝑟𝑒 (perfect cash flow information) is 8.55 (t-statistic=3.4) while that 
on 𝑟𝑒,3 (accurate cash flow forecasts up to 3 years) is 5.21 (t-statistic=2.53). The differences ∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 
between these coefficients and those on the true expected returns 𝜇 (0.99) are statistically 
significant (-4.23 with t-statistic=-2.25 for 𝑟𝑒,3; and -7.39 with t-statistic=-3.37 for 𝑟𝑒). This 
evidence is consistent with the observation in Table 4.1, in which the more accurately the analyst 
captures future cash flow, the smoother the ICC’s variation becomes due to constant term structure 
assumption. Due to the significant difference between the coefficients reflected by ∆𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓, the 
economic significance interpretation of the coefficients, from regressions where the ICC is the 
independent variable, is no longer meaningful. In this case, researchers overstate the true economic 
impact of the ICC on the variable of interest. 
                                                 
35 Given that the 𝜎𝑟𝑒 < 𝜎𝜇 the coefficient 𝛽𝑟𝑒 = 𝐶𝑏𝑣(𝑟𝑒,𝑟)𝑉𝑉𝑟(𝑟𝑒) =𝜌𝑟𝑒  𝜎𝑟 𝜎𝑟𝑒  > 𝜌𝜇𝜎𝑟 𝜎𝜇 = 𝛽𝜇. 
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Table 4.3: Difference between the Coefficients estimated from the Regression of the Future Realised Returns on the ICC, as opposed to those 
from the Regressions of Future Realised Returns on the true Expected Returns 
This table compares two sets of coefficients: those in the predictive regression of ex-post realised returns where the ICC proxies (𝑟𝑒,0, 𝑟𝑒,3, 𝑟𝑒,5, 𝑟𝑒,10, and 
𝑟𝑒 serve as the independent variables (equation (4.21)); and those where the true expected return 𝜇 is used as the predicting variable (equation (4.19)). I 
report the coefficients 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 and their associated statistics 𝑡𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓. ∆𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑓 is the difference between the coefficients obtained from equation (4.19) and 
those from equation (4.21). 𝑡∆𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓 is the associated t-statistic of ∆𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑓. The statistic is calculated by averaging the estimates across 1000 simulations. 
The t-statistic is calculated by dividing the average statistic by the standard deviation of the statistics across 1000 simulations. A detailed discussion of 
the simulation procedure is in Section 4.3. 
T=360 
 𝝓 =0.3 𝝓 =0.5 𝝓 =0.7 
Proxies 𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  
𝜇  0.9971 3.6214 - - 0.9981 3.0549 - - 0.9956 2.3377 - - 
𝑟𝑒,0  3.5535 2.2084 -2.5564 -1.6849 2.2570 1.4962 -1.2589 -0.8686 1.5765 0.9842 -0.5809 -0.3787 
𝑟𝑒,3  6.5749 2.9718 -5.5778 -2.7667 5.2900 2.2701 -4.2919 -2.0138 4.2775 1.5761 -3.2819 -1.3247 
 𝑟𝑒,5  7.7850 3.2783 -6.7880 -3.1733 6.9947 2.6243 -5.9965 -2.4974 6.2209 1.9044 -5.2252 -1.7784 
 𝑟𝑒,10  8.6426 3.5753 -7.6455 -3.5494 8.4701 2.9560 -7.4720 -2.9280 8.2220 2.2582 -7.2264 -2.2373 
 𝑟𝑒  8.7322 3.6686 -7.7351 -3.6598 8.6485 3.0426 -7.6504 -3.0314 8.4646 2.3436 -7.4689 -2.3401 
T=480 
             
𝜇  0.9912 4.2061 - - 0.9859 3.3819 - - 0.9992 2.7470 - - 
𝑟𝑒,0  3.5008 2.5431 -2.5096 -1.9265 2.2004 1.6667 -1.2145 -0.9648 1.4131 1.0214 -0.4140 -0.3099 
𝑟𝑒,3  6.5211 3.5012 -5.5299 -3.2644 5.2134 2.5267 -4.2275 -2.2520 4.0739 1.7340 -3.0748 -1.4266 
 𝑟𝑒,5  7.7350 3.8605 -6.7437 -3.7450 6.9092 2.9077 -5.9233 -2.7742 6.0519 2.1433 -5.0527 -1.9825 
 𝑟𝑒,10  8.5972 4.1940 -7.6059 -4.1696 8.3731 3.2754 -7.3872 -3.2464 8.1959 2.6239 -7.1967 -2.5947 
 𝑟𝑒  8.6899 4.2975 -7.6986 -4.2921 8.5509 3.3806 -7.5650 -3.3707 8.5240 2.7623 -7.5249 -2.7595 
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 Table 4.3 (Continued) 
 
 𝝓 =0.3 𝝓 =0.5 𝝓 =0.7 
  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  ∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  𝒕∆𝑪𝑪𝒆𝑪  
T=600 
𝜇  0.9787 4.6919 - - 0.9778 3.7316 - - 0.9541 2.9382 - - 
𝑟𝑒,0  3.3175 2.6392 -2.3388 -1.9689 2.0607 1.6367 -1.0829 -1.0829 1.3671 1.1289 -0.4130 -0.3585 
𝑟𝑒,3  6.2996 3.7547 -5.3209 -3.4757 5.0147 2.5913 -4.0370 -4.0370 3.9130 1.8838 -2.9588 -1.5639 
 𝑟𝑒,5  7.5339 4.2299 -6.5552 -4.0892 6.7129 3.0814 -5.7352 -5.7352 5.7975 2.3180 -4.8434 -2.1543 
 𝑟𝑒,10  8.4637 4.6808 -7.4850 -4.6544 8.2465 3.6133 -7.2688 -7.2688 7.8363 2.8102 -6.8821 -2.7815 
 𝑟𝑒  8.5942 4.8168 -7.6155 -4.8149 8.4740 3.7770 -7.4962 -7.4962 8.1458 2.9384 -7.1917 -2.9337 
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4.4.2 Spurious Regression Effects 
In this section, I present simulation results on spurious regressions that are caused by 
measurement errors in analyst cash flow forecasts. The sources of measurement error are from 1) 
the limited ability of analysts to capture full cash flow information and 2) the systematic bias of 
analyst forecasts. Evidence of spurious regressions is reflected by the 95% confidence interval band 
for the t-statistics being different from the standard range (-1.98, 1.98). 
Table 4.4 shows how limited information in the cash flow forecasts can give rise to a 
mechanical relation between variable of interest and the ICC (equation (4.25)). Focusing on the true 
expected returns 𝜇𝑡 and the ICC 𝑟𝑒 in which analysts have full information about true cash flows, 
there is no evidence regarding the existence of spurious results. In Panel A, the t-statistics for 𝑟𝑒 and 
the true expected return 𝜇 are -0.02, and 0.04, respectively. Moving across the panels as cash flows 
become more important in explaining return variance, the t-statistics remain stable around -0.01 for 
𝑟𝑒 and about 0.4 for 𝜇. The confidence intervals for the t-statistic for 𝑟𝑒 and 𝜇 are (-2.09, 2.11) and (-
2.23, 2.09), respectively, which are close to the standard 5% interval (-1.98, 1.98).  
However, moving to the ICC proxies backed out from stock price and limited cash flow 
forecasts 𝑟𝑒,0, 𝑟𝑒,3, 𝑟𝑒,5, and 𝑟𝑒,10, there is clear evidence that the missing variation in the cash flows 
is transferred to the discount rate, which then induces the spurious regression effect. In Panel A, 
when the analyst has no information about cash flows and cash flow news captures 30% of the 
return variation, the ICC 𝑟𝑒,0 is negatively related to the variable of interest 𝑥 (t-statistic = -2.39; 
2.5%; cut-off = -4.49; 97.5% cut-off = -0.26) even though the true expected return 𝜇 is only related 
to 𝛽 by construction. Note that any increase in price results from either an increase in cash flow 
expectation and/or decrease in discount rate. As I specify that the variable 𝑥𝑔𝑥 is positively related 
to cash flow growth, the missing variation is incorporated into the discount rate and leads to a false 
impression that the variable of interest reduces expected returns. 
The more important the cash flows in driving stock returns variance, the more serious the 
spurious regression problem becomes. In Panel C, when 70% of price movement is driven by cash 
flow news (𝜙 = 0.7, Panel C), even though analysts can capture accurately up to 5 year cash flows, 
the implied cost of capital 𝑟𝑒,5 is still negatively correlated to the variable of interest at the 10% 
level (t-statistic=-1.76; 2.5% cut-off=-3.84; 97.5% cut-off=0.34). The t-statistic monotonically 
decreases with the amount of cash flow information analysts can capture, thus the spurious 
regression becomes less of a problem. In particular, when the cash flows explain 70% of return 
variance and analysts can forecast accurately up to 10 years (t-statistic=-0.51), there is less spurious 
threat. However, the left tailed t-statistic of -2.53 falls outside the traditional 5% of critical values -
1.98. 
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Table 4.4: Spurious Regression when Analyst Forecasts are unable to capture Full Cash 
Flow Expectations 
This table reports average value, 2.5%, and 97.5% empirical cut-off points of a 2-way clustered 
t-statistic in the regression of different ICC proxies on firm characteristics (equation (4.25)). 
1000 simulations are run. In each simulation, a balanced panel data including 100 firms and 40 
years is generated. Panels A, B, and C vary the results in accordance with changes in the 
amount of return variance explained by cash flow news from 30%, 50%, to 70%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: 𝝓=0.3   
Proxies t-stat 2.5% 97.5%    
𝑟𝑒  -0.02 -2.09 2.11   
𝜇  0.04 -2.23 2.09   
𝑟𝑒,0  -2.39 -4.49 -0.26   
𝑟𝑒,3  -1.14 -3.16 1.01   
𝑟𝑒,5  -0.69 -2.77 1.43   
𝑟𝑒,10  -0.21 -2.29 1.91   
Panel B: 𝝓=0.5   
Proxies t-stat 2.5% 97.5%    
𝑟𝑒  -0.01 -1.95 2.10   
𝜇  0.04 -2.07 2.03   
𝑟𝑒,0  -3.93 -6.19 -1.77   
𝑟𝑒,3  -1.87 -3.95 0.20   
𝑟𝑒,5  -1.14 -3.15 0.94   
𝑟𝑒,10  -0.33 -2.31 1.77   
Panel C: 𝝓=0.7   
Proxies t-stat 2.5% 97.5%    
𝑟𝑒  -0.01 -2.02 2.13   
𝜇  0.04 -2.09 2.02   
𝑟𝑒,0  -6.02 -8.65 -3.80   
𝑟𝑒,3  -2.88 -5.12 -0.83   
𝑟𝑒,5  -1.76 -3.84 0.34   
𝑟𝑒,10  -0.51 -2.53 1.64   
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Table 4.5: Spurious Regression when Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts are systematically 
biased 
This table reports average value, 2.5%, and 97.5% empirical cut-off points of a 2-way clustered t-
statistic in the regression of different implied cost of capital proxies on firm characteristics 
(equation (4.26)). 1000 simulations are run. In each simulation, balanced panel data, including 
100 firms and 40 years, is generated. Panels A, B, and C vary the results in accordance with 
changes in the amount of return variance is explained by cash flows news from 30%, 50%, and 
70%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 𝝓=0.3  
Proxies t-stat 2.5% 97.5%   
𝜇  0.05 -1.98 1.98  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,3  2.27 -1.70 6.53  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,5  3.05 -0.99 7.57  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,10  3.87 -0.23 8.52  
𝑟𝑒𝑤  4.19 0.07 4.74  
     
Panel B: 𝝓=0.5  
Proxies t-stat 2.5% 97.5%   
𝜇  0.02 -1.89 2.02  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,3  2.80 0.75 5.05  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,5  3.80 1.67 6.20  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,10  4.89 2.71 7.37  
𝑟𝑒𝑤  5.33 19.84 9.47  
     
Panel C: 𝝓=0.7  
Proxies t-stat 2.5% 97.5%   
𝜇  0.05 -1.96 1.98  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,3  4.22 0.54 8.34  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,5  5.55 1.69 9.99  
𝑟𝑒𝑤,10  6.87 2.81 11.98  
𝑟𝑒𝑤  7.36 3.08 12.71  
 
In Table 4.5, I present evidence that shows if analyst forecasts are biased towards certain 
firm characteristics, the expected return proxy spuriously relates to that firm characteristic, even 
though the true expected return is generated purely from the conditional CAPM (equation (4.26)). 
Similar to Table 4.4, I examine how much of the threat increases as I raise the importance of cash 
flow expectation shocks in driving stock price. First, I start with the benchmark true expected 
returns 𝜇. Regardless of the importance of the cash flows in driving stock movements, spurious 
regression is not a major concern. The t-statistic remains around 0.05 when I move across the 
panels. Additionally, the range of the t-statistic stays around (-1.89, 2.02) which is very close to the 
standard critical values for the two-tailed 5% level of significance (-1.98, 1.98).  
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Although the true expected return is not related to the firm characteristic, the ICC 
𝑟𝑒𝑤,3, 𝑟𝑒𝑤,5, 𝑟𝑒𝑤,10 and 𝑟𝑒𝑤 backed out from “contaminated” cash flow forecasts induce a serious 
spurious issue. In particular, consider the case where cash flows drive 30% of return variance 
(𝜙 = 0.3) and analysts capture three years of forecasts, with some bias towards certain firms 
(𝑟𝑒𝑤,3), the implied cost of capital 𝑟𝑒𝑤,3 is significantly related to firm characteristics, reflected by 
the t-statistic of 2.27. Similar to the prior analysis, the threat is more pronounced where cash flow 
news becomes increasingly important in driving price variation. Looking at Panels B and C, the 
𝑟𝑒𝑤,3’s t-statistic increases to 2.80 and 4.22, as cash flows explain 50% and 70% of return variance.  
If analyst forecast errors extend into the more distant future, the problem gets worse. In 
particular, if analysts try to capture up to five years of future cash flows, and are biased, the t-
statistics obtained from regression of 𝑟𝑒𝑤,5 on firm characteristics are all higher than those of three- 
year ahead forecasts (3.05 Panel A; 3.80 Panel B; and 5.55 Panel C). With respect to 𝑟𝑒𝑤,10, the 
average t-statistics are 3.87 (Panel A), 4.89 (Panel B), and 6.87 (Panel C). 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, I derive an analytical framework, allowing for time varying expected returns 
and time varying cash flow expectation, and conduct simulation to study in which circumstances the 
ICC deviates from true expected returns. First, I find that the ICC does not deviate from the true 
expected return in terms of magnitude, meaning that it does not overstate or understate the mean of 
the true expected returns. However, due to the constant term structure assumption, the variation of 
the ICC is significantly less than that of the true expected returns. It has a direct consequence for 
regressions involving the ICC. In particular, the coefficient on the regression of the ICC and any 
particular variable significantly understates the true relation. As a result, the economic significance 
cannot be interpreted based on the resulting coefficient. One remedy is to interpret the economic 
significance from a realised returns proxy. Although the realised return proxy is noisy, which makes 
it difficult to detect the statistical relationship, its resulting coefficient is unbiased. The smoothing 
variance is also a problem in predictive regression. The coefficient on the ICC is greater than the 
true coefficients. My findings lend support to the recent movement in studying the term structure of 
equity (Lambert (2009); and Callen and Lyle (2014)). 
In addition, I study the threats of spurious regression in ICC studies. The source of the 
spurious regression comes from the critical input of the ICC, analyst forecasts. I find that if analysts 
1) are biased in their cash flow forecasts toward certain types of firms, and 2) have limited cash 
flow forecasts, these measurement errors are translated to the discount rate and give us a false 
impression that the expected return is related to certain firm characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 THESIS REVIEW 
This thesis is a trilogy of essays focused on modelling conditional expected return and 
testing a central research question: “Is the ex-ante market risk premium always positive?” 
The notion that risk matters in determining returns is intuitive. To compensate for bearing 
additional risk, rational and risk-averse investors should demand higher returns for risky assets than 
for the risk free rate. As a result, the risk premium of the market portfolio always exceeds zero. 
Nevertheless, it is not, as it seems, so straightforward. An intense debate surrounding this positivity 
restriction continues to challenge asset pricing theorists. One of the most well respected asset 
pricing models, the Conditional CAPM imposes the positive risk premium as a necessary condition, 
whereas more general theories show that the negative risk premium is possible when market returns 
positively covary with the marginal rate of substitution (Whitelaw (2000); and Harrison and Kreps 
(1979)). Moreover, an overwhelming amount of research that documents the complex nature of the 
risk-return trade-off remains heated and unsettled (Pastor, et al. (2008); or Rossi and Timmermann 
(2010)). Given these observations, it is surprising that not much empirical research endeavours to 
test the positive risk premium hypothesis.  
The studies contained in this thesis examine the question with novel measures of conditional 
expected return. Through these estimates, I further highlight the critical role of valid empirical 
proxies for unobservable conditional expectations, used for testing conditional asset pricing models. 
The thesis seeks to contribute by connecting different and important strands of research. 
5.2 REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The first essay uses the implied cost of capital (ICC), a forward-looking proxy for the 
conditional expected return (Pastor, et al. (2008)). The ICC is defined as the internal rate of return 
that equates the firm’s value with the present value of its expected cash flows. Because the ICC 
uses earnings forecasts and stock prices, it is strictly ex-ante and thus overcomes numerous pitfalls 
associated with the noisy realised return being a proxy for the expected return (Elton (1999); 
Campello, et al. (2008); and Chen, et al. (2013)). Applying this proxy in the multiple inequality 
constraints framework, I find evidence that the positive risk premium is violated in the US, German, 
Japanese, and Italian markets. Such evidence implies that the Condition CAPM does not hold in 
these markets (Lewellen and Nagel (2006). 
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These findings contribute to the literature by bridging unrelated areas of the accounting and 
finance research. First, while empirical asset pricing has devoted considerable effort to investigating 
the linear restrictions implied by models, it has devoted little attention to an important condition: 
positivity of the risk premium. This first study, among a few, directly examines whether or not this 
condition is violated in the international context. Second, unlike most accounting literature studying 
the cross-sectional properties of the ICC, I focus on the time series characteristic of the aggregate 
ICC. 
The second study introduces a new two-stage procedure to model the conditional mean 
return. Using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in the first stage, I seek to capture the investors’ 
information set by summarising the variation underlying 160 financial variables from Ludvigson 
and Ng (2007) and Welch and Goyal (2008) into a few common factors. Next, a set of principal 
components are included in the second stage where a regression tree technique is employed. This 
technique approximates the unknown function of information variables in producing conditional 
risk premium, by breaking up the predictor space sequentially through piece-wise constant models. 
Additionally, an ensemble method, known as boosting, aims to combine the individual trees into a 
final model with much improved properties (Rapach, et al. (2010); and Ng (2014)). The risk 
premium, which is estimated out-of-sample from the two-stage method, serves as a conditional risk 
premium proxy in the multiple inequality constraints framework in order to investigate the positive 
risk premium hypothesis in the US market from 1970 to 2012. I again find evidence that the 
positive risk premium condition is violated in the US market. Also, the two-stage method survives 
through various validity tests, indicating that it is a good proxy for the conditional risk premium. 
With the introduction of the superior two-stage procedure, the second essay contributes by 
highlighting the importance of capturing the investors’ information set along with the complex 
return data generating process. This is the first study to apply the boosting regression tree, a state-
of-the-art method in the machine learning literature, in testing the positivity of the risk premium 
hypothesis. 
 While appealing in its own right, the ICC’s validity as a proxy for the conditional expected 
return is open to debate. Accordingly, the third study investigates when and to what extent this 
estimate deviates from true expectations. In a simulation study allowing for a time varying discount 
rate, I find that due to the constant term structure assumption embedded in the ICC method, the 
variation of the ICC is significantly lower than that of the true expected return. This feature reveals 
that in a standard regression, the economic significance interpretation of the coefficient is no longer 
appropriate. The coefficient is downward (upward) biased when the ICC is an independent 
(dependent) variable. Next, I extend the work from Wang (2015) by showing analytically that the 
measurement errors in analyst forecasts can result in the estimated ICC being contaminated. In the 
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simulation, the spurious regressions become a real issue when analyst forecasts are biased and/or 
unable to capture the full information of the cash flow expectation incorporated in market price. 
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis opens several future research avenues. As the studies considered here only focus 
on a set of major international markets, i.e. the G7 countries, it would be interesting to see whether 
or not the negative risk premium continues to exist in other countries as well as in the global 
context. Such testing would provide evidence with respect to the external validity of the established 
results.  
Next, because the aggregate ICC is an excellent proxy for tracking the market time varying 
expected return, future work can find other applications utilising this estimate. For example, paying 
attention to Figure 2.3, it can be seen that the risk premiums in major European countries tend to 
mirror each other, especially since the formation of the European Monetary Union. Moreover, the 
risk premium in these markets has increased ever since the event. Investigating how such policy 
affects the underlying risk premium at the individual country level, as well as the implications for 
market integration, is worthy of future study. 
It would be beneficial to expand our understanding with respect to the time varying ICC at 
the firm level. However, caution is warranted. As highlighted in the third study, spurious 
regressions due to measurement errors in analyst forecasts can become a problem. Accordingly, 
searching for a solution to these measurement errors might prove rewarding, given the 
attractiveness of the forward-looking ICC. 
Finally, as researchers are exposed to increasingly large amounts of data, further 
applications of the PCA and BRT are a promising research avenue. Due to the superior ability in 
handling high dimensional data and complex data generating structures, approximating high 
moments of expectation and examining implications for ex-ante asset pricing models with these 
techniques is a potential solution to the growing dissatisfaction with the traditional instrumental 
method. In so doing, the construct validity of established results in the literature can be reassessed. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
A.1 Correlation Matrix (Chapter 2) 
Table A.1.1: The Correlation Matrix between the Implied Risk Premium and the Realised Risk Premium for Non-US Countries 
This table reports the correlation matrix among measures of risk premium computed by the Implied Cost of Capital methodology, denoted as IRP and 
ex-post realised returns, denoted as RRP, of the non-US countries (UK, Canada, Italy, France, Germany, and Japan) from 1990 to 2012. At firm level, 
the implied cost of capital is derived from analyst earnings forecasts. The market-wide ICC is the value-weighted average of individual firms at 
monthly frequency. The ex-post market realised returns are value-weighted returns including dividends at monthly frequency. The risk premium is 
computed by subtracting the yield of 10-year Treasury Bonds (7-year for Italy) from the market-wide ICC or the market ex-post realised returns. 
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑏𝑉𝑑𝑉 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑉𝑏𝐺 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑉𝑏𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐾 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐽𝑉𝑝𝑉𝑏 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑉𝑏𝐺 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑏𝑉𝑑𝑉 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑉𝑏  𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑉𝑏𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐾  𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐽𝑉𝑝𝑉𝑏 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑉𝑏𝐺 
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑏𝑉𝑑𝑉 1.00            
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑉𝑏𝐺 0.77*** 1.00           
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑉𝑏𝑐𝑒  0.82*** 0.96*** 1.00          
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐾  0.86*** 0.93*** 0.95*** 1.00         
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐽𝑉𝑝𝑉𝑏  0.69*** 0.92*** 0.90*** 0.88*** 1.00        
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑉𝑏𝐺  0.70*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.90*** 1.00       
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑉𝑏𝑉𝑑𝑉 0.07 0.12** 0.13** 0.10* 0.05 0.12** 1.00      
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑉𝑏𝐺 0.13** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.15** 0.09 0.16*** 0.84*** 1.00     
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑉𝑏𝑐𝑒  0.04 0.13** 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.10* 0.85*** 0.95*** 1.00    
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐾  0.19*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.06 0.09 0.75*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 1.00   
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐽𝑉𝑝𝑉𝑏  0.28*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 1.00  
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑉𝑏𝐺  0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.74*** 0.83*** 0.86*** 0.78*** 0.63*** 1.00 
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A.2 Least Angle Regression (LAR) in Chapter 3 
LAR, proposed by Efron, et al. (2004), is an efficient model selection mechanism that 
allows researchers to choose the best linear subset among potential conditioning variables in 
predicting, in this case, stock returns. Traditionally, researchers can self-select and report the best 
subset and disregard the effort of mining the data, so data snooping bias becomes an issue. 
Additionally, the computation quickly becomes infeasible when the number of predictors becomes 
large.36 Instead, LAR algorithmically builds the model through a sequence of steps, starting with a 
zero active set. At the first step, it adds the variable that mostly correlates with the dependent 
variable to the active set; and then it moves the coefficient on that predictor towards its least 
squares’ coefficient, until another predictor has as much correlation with the current residual as the 
first predictor does. This is when the second predictor is added to the active set. The procedure 
continues in the same fashion, but now the coefficients on the active predictors move in their joint 
least squares’ direction, until the one independent variable has as much correlation with the current 
residual. The process can be stopped until the pre-specified number of predictors enters the active 
set, or the model eventually includes all predictors in which the solution is the ordinary least 
squares.37 
A.3 Proof of Equations in Chapter 4 
A.3.1 Proof of Equation (4.7) 
Note that by iterating equation (4.3), I obtain 𝐸𝑡(𝑙𝑡+𝑘) = 𝜙𝑔𝑘𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑔 1−𝜙𝑔𝑘1−𝜙𝑔. In addition, by 
definition 𝑑𝑡+𝑘 = 𝑑𝑡 + ∑ 𝑙𝑡+𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 , the LHS of equation (4.7) becomes: 
                                                 
36 Suppose the number of potential predictors is p, the possible subsets are 2𝑝. Therefore , if 𝑝 = 15 then 
researchers have 32768 models to choose from. 
37 Note that the coefficients on the predictors at the intermediate steps are not equal to the least square 
solution coefficients. 
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�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡(𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗)∞
𝑗=0
= �𝜌𝑗∞
𝑗=0
�𝑑𝑡 +  �𝑙𝑡+𝑖𝑗+1
𝑖=1
�
= �𝜌𝑗∞
𝑗=0
�𝑑𝑡 +  ��𝜙𝑔𝑘𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑔 1 − 𝜙𝑔𝑘1 − 𝜙𝑔�𝑗+1𝑖=1 � 
(A.3.1) 
At this step, I use MATHEMATICA ® functions Sum and Coefficient to expand and to 
collect terms for 𝑑𝑡, 𝛼𝑔, and 𝑙𝑡 respectively.38 It is then simple to obtain the expression as in 
equation (4.7). 
A.3.2 Proof of Equation (4.8)  
Iterating (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6), I express the conditional expected return: 
 
𝜇𝑡+𝑗 = 𝐸𝑡�𝑟𝑡+1+𝑗�
= �𝜙𝛽𝑖𝑗−1
𝑖=0
��𝛼𝜆𝜙𝜆𝑏
𝑗−1
𝑏=0
+ 𝜙𝜆𝑗𝜆𝑡�𝛼𝛽 + ��𝜙𝜆𝑖𝑗−1
𝑖=0
𝜙𝛽
𝑗𝛽𝑡�𝛼𝜆
+ 𝜙𝜆𝑗𝜙𝛽𝑗𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡 
(A.3.2) 
 
Substitute into the LHS of equation (4.8): 
 
�𝜌𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑟𝑡+1+𝑗�
∞
𝑗=0
= �𝜌𝑗∞
𝑗=0
��𝜙𝛽𝑖
𝑗−1
𝑖=0
��𝛼𝜆𝜙𝜆𝑏
𝑗−1
𝑏=0
+ 𝜙𝜆𝑗𝜆𝑡�𝛼𝛽
+ ��𝜙𝜆𝑖𝑗−1
𝑖=0
𝜙𝛽
𝑗𝛽𝑡�𝛼𝜆 + 𝜙𝜆𝑗𝜙𝛽𝑗𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡� 
(A.3.3) 
 
Similarly, Sum and Coefficient functions are used to expand and collect terms for 
𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡,  𝛽𝑡,𝜆𝑡,𝛼𝜆, and 𝛼𝛽, respectively. The closed form expression as in equation (4.8) follows. 
A.3.3 Proof of Equation (4.12) 
To prove equation (4.12) , I substitute ?̅? = 𝛼𝑔1−𝜙𝑔 into equation (4.11): 
                                                 
38 The codes are available upon request. 
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�𝐸𝑡�𝑑𝑡+1+𝑗� = �𝜌𝑗(𝑑𝑡 + �𝑙𝑡+𝑖𝑗+1
𝑖=1
)𝑇−1
𝑗=0
∞
𝑗=0 + �𝜌𝑇+𝑗−1∞
𝑗=1
�𝑑𝑡+𝑇 + 𝑠 𝛼𝑔1 − 𝜙𝑔� 
(A.3.4) 
 
Similarly, it is straightforward to expand and collect terms for 𝑑𝑡, 𝛼𝑔, and 𝑙𝑡. Additionally, 
to simplify the expressions in each term, I use the FullSimplify function. Equation (4.12) is then 
obtained. 
A.3.4 Proof of Equation (4.24) 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) provide an approximation for 𝑟𝑡+1 = log (𝐶𝑡+1+𝐷𝑡+1𝐶𝑡 ): 
 𝑟𝑡+1 ≈ 𝑘 + 𝜌𝑝𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡 (A.3.5) 
Substituting the true price in equation (4.9) into 𝑝𝑡+1 in (A.3.5) and gathering all the terms 
known at time 𝑡 as a constant 𝑘𝑡, I can express the log future returns as 
 
𝑟𝑡+1 ≈ 𝑘𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡+1 + 𝜌𝜙𝑔𝑙𝑡+11 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔
− 𝜌 � 𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆 + � 𝜌𝛼𝜆𝜙𝛽�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽��1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆��𝛽𝑡+ � 𝜌𝛼𝛽𝜙𝜆(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�� 𝜆𝑡+ 𝜌𝛼𝑏𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝜌2𝜙𝑏𝜙𝜆)(1 − 𝜌)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽�(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�� 
(A.3.6) 
 
Taking variance of (A.3.6) and assuming the covariance between cash flows 𝑙𝑡 and 
expected returns 𝜇𝑡 are 0, I approximate the return variance as: 
 
𝑉𝑣𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1) = 𝜎𝑔,𝑡+12 + 𝜌2𝜙𝑔2𝜎𝑔,𝑡+12(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔)+ 𝑉𝑣𝑟𝑡 �−𝜌 � 𝛽𝑡𝜆𝑡1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆 + � 𝜌𝛼𝜆𝜙𝛽�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽��1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆��𝛽𝑡+ � 𝜌𝛼𝛽𝜙𝜆(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆�� 𝜆𝑡+ 𝜌𝛼𝑏𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝜌2𝜙𝑏𝜙𝜆)(1 − 𝜌)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽�(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝜆)�1 − 𝜌𝜙𝛽𝜙𝜆���+ 2𝜌𝜙𝑔(1 − 𝜌𝜙𝑔)𝜎𝑔,𝑡+12  
(A.3.7) 
 
Note that in 𝑉𝑣𝑟𝑡(𝛽𝑡+1) = 𝜎𝜆2, 𝑉𝑣𝑟𝑡(𝜆𝑡+1) = 𝜎𝜆2, 𝑉𝑣𝑟𝑡(𝛽𝑡+1𝜆𝑡+1) = (𝛼𝜆 + 𝜙𝜆𝜆𝑡)2𝜎𝛽2 +
�𝛼𝛽 + 𝜙𝛽𝛽𝑡�2𝜎𝜆2 + 𝜎𝛽2𝜎𝜆2, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡(𝛽𝑡+1, 𝜆𝑡+1) = 0, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡(𝛽𝑡+1,𝛽𝑡+1𝜆𝑡+1) = (𝛼𝜆 + 𝜙𝜆𝜆𝑡)𝜎𝛽2, and 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡(𝜆𝑡+1,𝛽𝑡+1𝜆𝑡+1) = �𝛼𝛽 + 𝜙𝛽𝛽𝑡�𝜎𝜆2, I expand and collect terms for 𝜎𝜆2𝜎𝑏2, 𝜎𝜆2, and 𝜎𝑏2 in the 
third term of (A.3.7). Subsequently, I simplify (A.3.7) to get equation (4.24). 
